274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador’s Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 9:30 a.m.1
USDel/MC/22
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Mr. Constantin Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
- Mr. Averoff-Tossitza, Foreign Minister of Greece
- Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell
SUBJECT
- Cyprus
Mr. Karamanlis said that he wanted to invite the President’s attention to the problem of Cyprus. It was having very unfortunate repercussions in the Balkan Pact and in NATO. The solution was simple—Cyprus should either be independent or Greek. In either circumstance, it would be with the United Nations and a member of NATO; Greece was prepared to give guarantees concerning the Turkish minority.
The President commented that all problems become difficult when emotions are involved. He knew that Cyprus was not an easy problem for Greece. Mr. Karamanlis declared that Greece had a moral obligation to support the Greeks on Cyprus.
The President said he thought the UK was now more flexible on this problem and would support any arrangement that Greece and Turkey agreed on. Mr. Averoff wondered whether the UK was sincere in this and the President stated his strong conviction, based on his long friendship with Prime Minister Macmillan, that the UK was indeed sincere.
The President said he would be very happy to see Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes get together on Cyprus, to see if within an atmosphere of flexibility they could agree on something.
Mr. Karamanlis said that for 2½ years he had endured a series of provocations connected with Cyprus. He referred to the riots in Istanbul and Izmir and to “unfriendly” British moves. An anti-Western feeling was being built up in Greece because of Cyprus. Whereas only 10 per cent of the Greek population is Communist, a Popular Front had now been established. Mr. Karamanlis said that despite all this, he continued to steer a pro-West policy but he was constantly being attacked because the West was against Greece on [Page 524] Cyprus. “You all vote against us in the United Nations,” he said. …
The President asked whether Turkey or Greece couldn’t sit down with a third, neutral, person to work out an agreement. Mr. Karamanlis reiterated that the solution was a simple one. He added that if a neutral person became involved, it should be the President.
Mr. Averoff, in discussing the Turkish minority, said that Greece had in mind that a committee of neutrals would fix the status of the minority. This status would then be put under the guarantee of the United Nations, which would have a Commissioner on Cyprus for this purpose.
The President inquired whether Cyprus, if independent, could survive economically. Mr. Averoff said it could.
The President asked whether the Greeks had proposed their solution directly to the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis said there had been no direct contact but that the Turks were aware of the Greek position. Turkey is opposed to the union of Cyprus with Greece, he added, A UN guarantee against this should prevent such union. …
The President commented that the geography of the situation worries the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis replied that there would be no security problem if Cyprus were independent or controlled by Greece, a small power. Cyprus under UK control was more dangerous to Turkey because the UK is a big power and some day might not be friendly to Turkey.
The President stressed his concern over the damage being done to NATO by the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. He thought Cyprus should not be allowed to prevent Greece and Turkey from being allies in NATO. He noted that Cyprus had even caused the destruction of the American Library in Athens, despite our vote in the UN, which we understood had pleased the Greeks. Mr. Karamanlis said he was sorry about this. He believed the Communists might have done it.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The President said that the Turkish Prime Minister was coming to see him shortly and that he would suggest to Mr. Menderes that Turkey should be as flexible as possible and that Greece and Turkey might meet to discuss Cyprus.
Mr. Karamanlis said that Turkey desired partition of Cyprus but that this was not a logical or practical idea, since 82 per cent of the population is Greek. The Turks are too intransigent, he thought.
The President said that he would be willing to do personally anything he thought would help. Mr. Averoff said that the US is the only country that can persuade Turkey to be “reasonable”. The [Page 525] President made clear that we had not espoused any particular Cyprus solution. We did not believe we should use pressure on either side. We would urge flexibility and the possible use of a neutral party. Mr. Karamanlis said that he was grateful that the US had made clear that it is not against Greece.
The President said that the US was trying to keep strong the alliance against Communism. We are trying to promote agreements among the many friends we have in cases where these friends are in dispute. We often think it is better to abstain in votes on these problems and thus maintain our influence and ability to play a useful role.
- Source: Department of State, President’s Memoranda Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, 56–59. Drafted by Rockwell. Eisenhower was in Paris to attend the NATO Heads of Government meeting, December 16–19.↩