268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 2, 19571
SUBJECT
- Cyprus: Greek Plans for UNGA
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
- Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
- The Secretary
- Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
- Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI
The Greek Foreign Minister opened his discussion with the Secretary today by extensive remarks on the Middle East designed apparently to show that the Greeks were good allies in a crisis, …
Mr. Averoff then turned to the one subject upon which, he said, all others depend—Cyprus. He felt the situation in recent months was both better and worse. It was better because the British attitude had clearly improved and the British had now shown themselves ready to accept a “quite logical solution to the problem”. The situation was worse because there seemed to be a new “intransigence” on the part of Turkey and there were prospects of a resumption of fighting in Cyprus itself.
Mr. Averoff emphasized that the Greek people now realized that not the United Kingdom but Turkey stood in the way of a solution of the Cyprus problem. He remarked that the British Ambassador in Athens had even said that he, the Ambassador, had started to become popular. Averoff said that there had been a period of calm on Cyprus which had developed particularly “because we have fed the people with hopes”. Now, with hopes still unrealized, the Cypriots might become discouraged. Moreover, the Turks on Cyprus were armed. “If fighting starts”, he said, “between Greeks and and Turkish Cypriots, I must forecast that Greek-Turkish relations will be broken. I will not do it myself. I will resign first, but the street will do it.”
The Foreign Minister added that the Greek Government had mobilized “all our imaginations to find a solution”. Tension goes on, where will it lead? What can we do?
Turning to the UNGA, the Foreign Minister remarked that he had made a proposal to the British. While he was under strong [Page 515] pressure to push for a resolution in favor of self-determination, he would try to break the least possible number of windows. He had suggested, therefore, that the British make a declaration at the UNGA (1) indicating that they would cancel the deportation of Makarios, (2) saying that the Government of Cyprus would start negotiations with the representatives of the people of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—regarding the future of the island. If the British would make such a declaration he would agree to a resolution which took note of the substance of this and would not press for his own resolution on self-determination. (Note: In a later talk with Mr. Rountree,2 Mr. Averoff made it plain that the resolution itself need include only the second portion of the proposed declaration.)
The Foreign Minister reported that the British in New York appeared sympathetic towards this proposal and had referred it to London. He was hopeful that this might lead to a satisfactory arrangement at the General Assembly.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In concluding his presentation, he said that be wished to request of the Secretary that the United States agree not to block his resolution on self-determination if the United Kingdom did not accept his compromise proposal. He added that he was convinced that one day the British Government would apply self-determination to Cyprus—if not under the Conservative Party, certainly under the Labor Party. “How,” he asked, “can other countries impede what the British will one day apply?”
In response to the Foreign Minister, the Secretary started to comment first on what Mr. Averoff had to say about the Middle East. Averoff stopped him, saying he was more interested in what the Secretary would say about Cyprus. The Secretary then referred to the British Labor Party’s statement on Cyprus to which Averoff had alluded. The Secretary noted that one must not base one’s hopes too much upon what a party out of power might say, since parties are known to change their minds when they assume power and responsibility. He then observed that Mr. Averoff had omitted any mention of Mr. Spaak’s name in his talk. Mr. Averoff replied that he would, of course, be glad to talk of Mr. Spaak if the Secretary wished. The Secretary then mentioned the overriding importance of a solution from the NATO standpoint, and said that he hoped that a solution could be reached in quiet diplomacy such as Mr. Spaak had undertaken. Accordingly we would not wish to see anything happen in the UN which might hurt the efforts in quiet diplomacy. The [Page 516] Secretary added that we did not think a United Nations resolution would resolve the problem. In respect to Mr. Averoff’s specific question as to whether we would support a resolution on self-determination, he said that we could not commit ourselves in advance to support a resolution which we have not seen. However, it seemed that the most desirable result would be for the Greeks to work out something with the British. Meanwhile, we would have to reserve our position. The Secretary further noted that Averoff had told him, when they last met in September,3 that the Greeks would do nothing to generate animosity in Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister took leave of the Secretary saying that he would continue his discussion in greater detail with Mr. Rountree.4
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of a Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Williams.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Central File 747C.00/12–257.↩
- See Document 264.↩
- Rountree’s discussion with Averoff
on December 2 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation drafted by
Williams. (Department of
State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–257)
In Gadel 100 to New York, December 3, the Department instructed its delegation to “encourage UK to work out something directly with Greeks”, but noted that it did not wish to take the lead on this matter. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–2857)
↩