Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, August 24, 1956—6:32 p.m.

1325. Following instructions are based on assumption Secretary did not make suggested demarche to HMG re Cyprus.² If he did present instructions should be modified your discretion.

In Department view recent events Cyprus will result slipping away unexpected opportunity offered by EOKA truce for progress toward settlement. Believe it of importance to prevent loss this opportunity by some rapid UK move designed appear as positive response EOKA truce without appearing as concession to violence. British surrender terms alone seem likely to lead to renewed violence and increased Greek and Cypriot distrust (Athens 669³).

You should inform HMG of above plus following:

UK position has been no further negotiations possible until violence ended. Violence has ended but main UK response has been what amounts to, in eyes EOKA, additional demand for complete surrender, resulting in confirmation Greek distrust British motives. While weakened state EOKA (Nicosia 55⁴) may mean this threat is only bluff, Greek and Greek-Cypriot attitude has now hardened reducing chances for progress (Athens 675⁵). If no positive UK response soon EOKA may indeed resume violence regardless present strength.

You should urge UK consider immediate announcement, preferably from London and from highest level, reiterating that it would be unfortunate if present improved prospects for progress toward self-government resulting from truce are now lost by renewal violence as threatened by EOKA. For this to be convincing to Greeks and EOKA, such announcement might be accompanied by indications from UK that surrender terms do not constitute condition which must be met before further progress made but are part of machinery providing opportunity for terrorists extricate themselves from present circumstances and eventual return to normal life, either in Greece or Cyprus. (Would be preferable if three-week limitation were not mentioned.)

In addition some UK compromise gesture, if nothing more than reaffirmation intention press ahead with proposals for self-government coupled with announcement of early Radcliffe return to Island seems essential.

In absence some such British moves now there is danger increased bitterness both sides likely remove any possibility progress before next Session GA.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by, Wood, and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Ankara, and pouched to Paris for USRO and to USUN. Dulles was in London for the Suez Canal Conference, August 16–23.
2. On August 22, in Tedul 19, the Department suggested that Dulles’ visit to London might provide an opportunity to test Britain’s receptivity to the proposed U.S. plan on Cyprus as outlined in Holmes’ memorandum of July 30 and Rountree’s of August 13 (supra). The Department added that the present halt in violence called by EOKA might support Britain’s view that it could solve the problem on Cyprus and that London might be in no mood to consider the U.S. plan. (Ibid.,747C.00/8–2256)
3. Dated August 23. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2356)
4. In telegram 55, August 20, Courtney reported from Nicosia that Governor Harding had indicated to him that the EOKA truce resulted from the organizations own recognition of its weakness. British operations waged against it, Harding noted, had harassed and disrupted EOKA’s campaign of terror. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2056)
5. In telegram 675, August 23 (subsequently renumbered as 674), the Embassy informed the Department: “We believe precipitate British advance from truce to surrender may have seriously compromised chances for progress toward solution. As was to be expected, latest British move being seized upon by opposition to charge government with complicity, if not treason.” (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2356)