We believe the controversy is now at a point where the disputants are
unlikely to come to any settlement unless they have outside help. If you
agree, I feel strongly that Julius
Holmes should be asked to undertake as soon as possible
the secret, high level talks outlined in Part III of this paper as
necessary to achieve a solution of this problem.
[Tab B]
Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
(Holmes) to the Secretary
of State5
Washington, July 30,
1956.
SUBJECT
I recommend that we take the initiative in an attempt to bring about
an early settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. It is not likely
that the disputants will be able to reach an agreement without
outside help, and if a solution is not found the damage to the
NATO alliance and to the
British position in the Middle East will be very great. There is
every advantage in finding a solution before the next General
Assembly of the UN and before the
report of the
[Page 389]
Committee of
Three is considered.6 Events in Egypt make a settlement more urgent and
more likely of attainment.7
The benefits to be derived from an early settlement are very great.
If a solution can be brought about under the NATO aegis and announced to the world
as a NATO settlement, it will go
far toward meeting the universal expectancy that some striking
result will emerge following the creation of the special Committee
of Three Foreign Ministers. Such an important, tangible success
would give great encouragement and confidence for the future of the
coalition. Another beneficial result would be to assure the United
Kingdom of a strong military bastion in the Eastern Mediterranean
not plagued with local hostility. The British position in the Middle
East has been seriously weakened and it is vitally in the interest
of the West that it be salvaged and strengthened. If this is not
done, the availability of Middle East oil to the UK and Western
Europe may be seriously threatened.
We should commence by discussing prospects of settlement secretly
with the British, and if general agreement is found, subsequently
with the Greeks and Turks. The latter will be the most difficult. At
some point it would probably be necessary for representatives
authorized to speak for the UK and Greece to go secretly to the
Seychelles Islands and obtain the approval of Makarios to any agreed solution. I
suggest that discussions be begun based on the following:
A general election called by the sovereign power, the United Kingdom,
should be held, under NATO
supervision, of a constituent assembly; the Committee of Supervision
to consist of from three to five members, not including British,
Greek or Turkish representatives. After the election, the
constitution would be written and self-government given to the
island; the British Governor reserving only control over foreign
affairs, defense, and the right to intervene to restore public order
in the event of a really serious threat. (If necessary to obtain
Greek agreement, this right might be further qualified by making its
use dependent on a finding by SACEUR that the disruption of public order was of such
character as to endanger Western defense.) The constitution would
include the usual, recognized guarantee for minorities to protect
the Turkish population.
[Page 390]
Additional protection and assurance to the Turkish Government could
be given by provision in the constitution which would accord the
minority in the legislative assembly the right to appeal against
certain categories of legislation, the broad definition of which
would be any act which discriminated against the minority. I believe
it is possible for qualified constitutional lawyers to produce
definitions of such legislation. As it is probably not feasible to
create a Supreme Court with power to pass on the constitutionality
of legislative acts, a substitute could be found in a panel of
eminent jurists named by each of the NATO powers. A prescribed number of these jurists would
be empowered to give a binding decision on the appeal. A petition
signed by a pre-determined percentage of members of the legislature,
calculated to represent a majority of the number of Turkish
representatives, would constitute a judicial appeal.
It would be agreed that this period of self-government would run for
ten years during which time there would be no change in the
international status of the Island. At the end of the ten year
period, a plebiscite would be held, again supervised by NATO, under which the population of
Cyprus would have the right to vote for: (1) union with Greece; (2)
local autonomy under the Greek crown; (3) full independence; or (4)
a self-governing status under British sovereignty, all to continue
minority guarantees. …
The British would agree to concentrate their military establishments
in a given area which I believe they are already doing, including
adequate port facilities. This area would continue to remain under
British sovereignty regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. As
these bases would be sovereign British territory, it would be
understood that the UK would make arrangements for joint use of any
facility with any NATO nation. In
return for the specific recognition by the British of the right of
self-determination, the Greeks would agree that even in the event
the plebiscite resulted in union with Greece, Greek armed forces on
the Island would be limited to police. They would agree not to
fortify or to send troops except at the request of the NATO Council or on agreement by the
NATO Council.
The entire settlement would be guaranteed by the NATO powers. This would have to be
done by individual governments—we should have to go to the
Senate—but the guarantee should be made to appear to be a collective
action in so far as possible. It might also be found necessary to
include the island in the NATO
area, although this is not likely.
A further protection for the Turkish minority might be provided by a
Tripartite treaty among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.
The general settlement would also have to include arrangements for
amnesty and the cessation of terror. It would probably be
[Page 391]
necessary and even
advisable for the British to agree to Makarios’s return to Cyprus.
Domestic political pressures impel the British and Greek Governments
to seek a genuine solution. On the other hand domestic political
pressures impel the Turkish Government to oppose any solution. It is
strongly committed to the continuance of the British presence on
Cyprus, failing which it claims the Island should revert to Turkey.
In the troubled domestic political and economic situation in Turkey,
this is the one subject on which all elements agree. The Turks
object to another Greek island so close to their coast and to Greek
domination of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. They claim that the
Treaty of Lausanne created a balanced pattern for the Eastern
Mediterranean which should not be disturbed. They insist on a
“maintenance of the status quo”. They are stubborn.
However, they are also realists and will probably accept a changing
situation if they realize it is inevitable. When it appeared that
the Harding–Makarios talks might succeed last
winter, their attitude was described by the British Ambassador at
Ankara as “grudging acceptance of a fait accompli”.
Before a plan is proposed to the Turks, a concerted effort should be
made to convince them that we consider they have a legitimate, but
not decisive, interest in the evolving political situation on
Cyprus. This interest is based on geography and the Turkish
minority, not on the Treaty of Lausanne. We consider it unrealistic
to talk of maintaining the status quo. The Island has already
changed in two years from a peaceful British Colony to a place where
18,000 British troops are having difficulty in keeping order.
British public opinion will not indefinitely support the use of so
many troops for this purpose and therefore the situation will
inevitably continue to change. We fully support the British
intention of maintaining troops on the Island and share the British
belief that to restore stability the population must be allowed,
under British and NATO supervision,
to work out its own political problems. If this evolution is
encouraged to proceed peacefully, we believe that tensions on the
Island will decrease .… It could also be pointed out that the
extensive Turkish minority in Metropolitan Greece has been well
treated by the Greek authorities.
If the Turks make a point of the Treaty of Lausanne, we will have to
make clear that this Treaty simply recognized British sovereignty
over Cyprus which had existed de facto since it was annexed by the
British on November 5, 1914. We consider that Lausanne
[Page 392]
gave the British complete
sovereignty including the right to make any changes in its status
which it may wish.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The elements of this approach which should appeal to the disputants:
- 1)
- To All Three: End to a bitter
quarrel. Not only the saving of the NATO Alliance from disruption but giving it a
new lease on life.
- 2)
- To the United Kingdom:
- a)
- The elimination of bitter domestic criticism not
only by the opposition but by British public opinion
in general.
- b)
- The end of terrorism in Cyprus, thus freeing the
forces there for their proper function.
- c)
- The assurance of a strong military base in the
Eastern Mediterranean.
- d)
Restoration of good relations with Greece and
Turkey.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
- f)
- Granting the principle of self-determination would
reduce criticism from anti-Colonial sources.
- 3)
- To Greece:
- a)
- An explosive political problem would be
substantially eliminated.
- b)
- The right of the Greek population of Cyprus to
self-determination would be acknowledged.
- 4)
- To Turkey:
- a)
- The British military position on the Island would
be assured for the indefinite future.
- b)
- Assurance would be obtained that Cyprus would not
become a Greek military base.
- c)
The Turkish minority would be protected.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
Recommendation:
I recommend that this plan be discussed informally with
Roger Makins to
obtain his personal views as to its feasibility. Depending
on his reaction, we could consider subsequent steps.8
