Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus: Our Goals and Steps To Attain Them

Discussion

As you requested,² I attach a paper setting forth our intermediate and eventual goals in the Cyprus question and the steps we think we should take to reach them.

We believe the controversy is now at a point where the disputants are unlikely to come to any settlement unless they have outside help. If you agree, I feel strongly that Julius Holmes should be asked to undertake as soon as possible the secret, high level talks outlined in Part III of this paper as necessary to achieve a solution of this problem.

Recommendation

That you approve the procedure suggested above.³

[Tab A]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated.

I. Goals In The Cyprus Dispute

A. Our Intermediate Goals

1. To have talks between the parties resumed and in such a state of progress before the November United Nations General Assembly that acrimonious conflict in the United Nations can be avoided.

2. To achieve a success in promoting a Cyprus solution that can be presented as a tangible accomplishment of NATO, thus giving encouragement for the future of the alliance.

3. To relieve the Karamanlis Government in Greece of serious dangers from an opposition that is subject to neutralist and communist appeals based on this issue.

4. To strengthen the Allied position in the area and to free the British forces now tied down in Cyprus for general defense operations in the Middle East.

B. Our Eventual Goals

1. To end the Cyprus controversy as a divisive element affecting both NATO and the Balkan Alliance.

2. To guarantee that bases in Cyprus will be at the permanent disposal of Great Britain … for protecting its interests to the East.

3. To provide the inhabitants of the Island with guarantees of their rights of self-determination with full protection for minorities.

4. To insure for the future that Cyprus will not be considered by the Government of Turkey as a threat to its security.

II. Proposed Plan For Cyprus Settlement

In order to achieve these goals, the United States should take the initiative, without delay, in presenting privately to the British, Turkish and Greek Governments a concrete plan which may have a good chance of leading to a solution of the Cyprus problem.

Such a plan has been set forth in the Holmes memorandum (Tab B). In brief, it would provide for the following:

Self-Government:

A. Election of a Constituent Assembly for Cyprus

1. Call by the UK for election of a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution, based largely on Lord Radcliffe’s investigations, for immediate self-government. Election to be under supervision of a Commission of from three to five NATO members, not including the UK, Greece or Turkey.

B. Drafting of Constitution

1. To assure Turkish cooperation in electing Assembly, general lines of Constitution, providing adequate safeguards for Turkish minority, would be laid down in advance of elections.

2. The UK would announce its intention to reserve control over only foreign affairs and defense and the right to intervene to restore public order. Exercise of this right might be made to depend upon a finding by SACEUR.

3. Agreement would need to be reached on Amnesty and Cessation of Violence.

C. Establishment of Self-Government

D. Return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus

1. The Archbishop would have been kept advised of the constitutional discussions and his assent obtained to final draft. Conditions for his return would have to be clearly established.

Self-Determination:

A. Plebiscite to Determine Future International Status of Island

1. At time of calling elections above, UK would announce that at end of ten years of self-government, plebiscite would be held under NATO supervision to determine future of Island.

2. Plebiscite would permit choice of any of following:

a. Union with Greece

b. Local autonomy under the Greek Crown

c. Full Independence

d. Self-government within the Commonwealth

Safeguards:

A. Military Use of Island

1. Announcement by UK that specified areas in Island would remain, in perpetuity, under UK sovereignty for the maintenance of military bases.

2. It would be understood that the UK, if it chose, could make joint-use agreements for the use of these areas by any other NATO country (for example the US).

3. Even should the plebiscite result in union with Greece, Greek forces would not be stationed on the Island, unless requested by NATO.

B. Protection of Minorities

1. Negotiation of a Tripartite Treaty between the UK, Turkey and Greece, providing guarantees for minorities on the Island in addition to those guarantees spelled out in the Constitution.

2. There should also be a provision for the minority’s appeal, on questions involving constitutionality of legislative acts, to higher authority, such as a panel of eminent jurists named by the NATO powers.

C. International Guarantee

1. The entire settlement to be guaranteed by the NATO countries.

III. Procedure

1. We should designate an emissary who will be empowered to undertake discussions with British, Turkish and Greek authorities at a high level. These discussions must be secret, with every precaution against the publicity that can arouse popular emotions and force the governments concerned into rigid positions. Our envoy should have appropriate cover.

2. The first step might be to have our representative sound out the British, starting with an informal exploratory approach to Ambassador Makins in Washington. If in Makins’ view, HMG may see merit in the plan, our envoy should go to London to seek British support and British assurances that HMG will press the Turks at the appropriate time to accept a reasonable solution.

3. If the talks in London are successful, he should go to Athens, where there is a growing disposition to accept a compromise solution. …

4. Our emissary must line up his strongest arguments for his talks in Ankara, where opposition to the plan will be most intense. He must seek Turkish agreement by using the following main arguments:

a. The plan provides concrete guarantees against Cyprus falling under military control hostile to Turkey.

b. The plan does not necessarily lead to Enosis. (The economic argument here is a powerful one.) The inhabitants of the Island will have ample opportunity to choose another destiny, which at end of a ten-year cooling-off period might well be something other than Enosis.

c. The Turkish minority, in any case, will be afforded ample protection under international guarantees.

d. Turkey must recognize that in the interests of NATO and Western defenses, the United States and United Kingdom must go ahead with a settlement and that Turkey has no legal or moral right to block it. The Allied Powers are doing all possible to safeguard Turkey’s legitimate interests.

5. In Turkey our envoy may find it useful to discuss variations on the plan in order to find an arrangement suitable to Turkey. … He may also discuss other means of fixing a date for the self-determination plebiscite in lieu of the ten-year limit prescribed in Part II.

6. At one point in the negotiations, British, Greek and, possibly, an American representative should go secretly to the Seychelles Islands to obtain Makarios’ approval. Timing of this trip might be determined in consultation with Greek authorities.

7. If agreement is reached, it should first be made public by NATO in order that that body may get appropriate credit.

[Tab B]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Holmes) to the Secretary of State⁵

Washington, July 30, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

I recommend that we take the initiative in an attempt to bring about an early settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. It is not likely that the disputants will be able to reach an agreement without outside help, and if a solution is not found the damage to the NATO alliance and to the British position in the Middle East will be very great. There is every advantage in finding a solution before the next General Assembly of the UN and before the report of the Committee of Three is considered.⁶ Events in Egypt make a settlement more urgent and more likely of attainment.⁷

The benefits to be derived from an early settlement are very great. If a solution can be brought about under the NATO aegis and announced to the world as a NATO settlement, it will go far toward meeting the universal expectancy that some striking result will emerge following the creation of the special Committee of Three Foreign Ministers. Such an important, tangible success would give great encouragement and confidence for the future of the coalition. Another beneficial result would be to assure the United Kingdom of a strong military bastion in the Eastern Mediterranean not plagued with local hostility. The British position in the Middle East has been seriously weakened and it is vitally in the interest of the West that it be salvaged and strengthened. If this is not done, the availability of Middle East oil to the UK and Western Europe may be seriously threatened.

We should commence by discussing prospects of settlement secretly with the British, and if general agreement is found, subsequently with the Greeks and Turks. The latter will be the most difficult. At some point it would probably be necessary for representatives authorized to speak for the UK and Greece to go secretly to the Seychelles Islands and obtain the approval of Makarios to any agreed solution. I suggest that discussions be begun based on the following:

A general election called by the sovereign power, the United Kingdom, should be held, under NATO supervision, of a constituent assembly; the Committee of Supervision to consist of from three to five members, not including British, Greek or Turkish representatives. After the election, the constitution would be written and self-government given to the island; the British Governor reserving only control over foreign affairs, defense, and the right to intervene to restore public order in the event of a really serious threat. (If necessary to obtain Greek agreement, this right might be further qualified by making its use dependent on a finding by SACEUR that the disruption of public order was of such character as to endanger Western defense.) The constitution would include the usual, recognized guarantee for minorities to protect the Turkish population. Additional protection and assurance to the Turkish Government could be given by provision in the constitution which would accord the minority in the legislative assembly the right to appeal against certain categories of legislation, the broad definition of which would be any act which discriminated against the minority. I believe it is possible for qualified constitutional lawyers to produce definitions of such legislation. As it is probably not feasible to create a Supreme Court with power to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts, a substitute could be found in a panel of eminent jurists named by each of the NATO powers. A prescribed number of these jurists would be empowered to give a binding decision on the appeal. A petition signed by a pre-determined percentage of members of the legislature, calculated to represent a majority of the number of Turkish representatives, would constitute a judicial appeal.

It would be agreed that this period of self-government would run for ten years during which time there would be no change in the international status of the Island. At the end of the ten year period, a plebiscite would be held, again supervised by NATO, under which the population of Cyprus would have the right to vote for: (1) union with Greece; (2) local autonomy under the Greek crown; (3) full independence; or (4) a self-governing status under British sovereignty, all to continue minority guarantees. …

The British would agree to concentrate their military establishments in a given area which I believe they are already doing, including adequate port facilities. This area would continue to remain under British sovereignty regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. As these bases would be sovereign British territory, it would be understood that the UK would make arrangements for joint use of any facility with any NATO nation. In return for the specific recognition by the British of the right of self-determination, the Greeks would agree that even in the event the plebiscite resulted in union with Greece, Greek armed forces on the Island would be limited to police. They would agree not to fortify or to send troops except at the request of the NATO Council or on agreement by the NATO Council.

The entire settlement would be guaranteed by the NATO powers. This would have to be done by individual governments—we should have to go to the Senate—but the guarantee should be made to appear to be a collective action in so far as possible. It might also be found necessary to include the island in the NATO area, although this is not likely.

A further protection for the Turkish minority might be provided by a Tripartite treaty among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

The general settlement would also have to include arrangements for amnesty and the cessation of terror. It would probably be necessary and even advisable for the British to agree to Makarios’s return to Cyprus.

Domestic political pressures impel the British and Greek Governments to seek a genuine solution. On the other hand domestic political pressures impel the Turkish Government to oppose any solution. It is strongly committed to the continuance of the British presence on Cyprus, failing which it claims the Island should revert to Turkey. In the troubled domestic political and economic situation in Turkey, this is the one subject on which all elements agree. The Turks object to another Greek island so close to their coast and to Greek domination of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. They claim that the Treaty of Lausanne created a balanced pattern for the Eastern Mediterranean which should not be disturbed. They insist on a “maintenance of the status quo”. They are stubborn.

However, they are also realists and will probably accept a changing situation if they realize it is inevitable. When it appeared that the Harding–Makarios talks might succeed last winter, their attitude was described by the British Ambassador at Ankara as “grudging acceptance of a fait accompli”.

Before a plan is proposed to the Turks, a concerted effort should be made to convince them that we consider they have a legitimate, but not decisive, interest in the evolving political situation on Cyprus. This interest is based on geography and the Turkish minority, not on the Treaty of Lausanne. We consider it unrealistic to talk of maintaining the status quo. The Island has already changed in two years from a peaceful British Colony to a place where 18,000 British troops are having difficulty in keeping order. British public opinion will not indefinitely support the use of so many troops for this purpose and therefore the situation will inevitably continue to change. We fully support the British intention of maintaining troops on the Island and share the British belief that to restore stability the population must be allowed, under British and NATO supervision, to work out its own political problems. If this evolution is encouraged to proceed peacefully, we believe that tensions on the Island will decrease .… It could also be pointed out that the extensive Turkish minority in Metropolitan Greece has been well treated by the Greek authorities.

If the Turks make a point of the Treaty of Lausanne, we will have to make clear that this Treaty simply recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus which had existed de facto since it was annexed by the British on November 5, 1914. We consider that Lausanne gave the British complete sovereignty including the right to make any changes in its status which it may wish.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The elements of this approach which should appeal to the disputants:

1) To All Three: End to a bitter quarrel. Not only the saving of the NATO Alliance from disruption but giving it a new lease on life.

2) To the United Kingdom:

a) The elimination of bitter domestic criticism not only by the opposition but by British public opinion in general.

b) The end of terrorism in Cyprus, thus freeing the forces there for their proper function.

c) The assurance of a strong military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.

d) Restoration of good relations with Greece and Turkey.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

f) Granting the principle of self-determination would reduce criticism from anti-Colonial sources.

3) To Greece:

a) An explosive political problem would be substantially eliminated.

b) The right of the Greek population of Cyprus to self-determination would be acknowledged.

4) To Turkey:

a) The British military position on the Island would be assured for the indefinite future.

b) Assurance would be obtained that Cyprus would not become a Greek military base.

c) The Turkish minority would be protected.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendation:

I recommend that this plan be discussed informally with Roger Makins to obtain his personal views as to its feasibility. Depending on his reaction, we could consider subsequent steps.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–3056. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen and sent through S/S and G.

2. On August 8 at 11:30 a.m., during a conversation with the President, Dulles raised the subject of Cyprus. A memorandum of the discussion reads:

   “In connection with the attitude of Greece, I spoke of the Cyprus matter and said that there was a recommendation to me that the US should try to get into the solution of the Cyprus problem and take some initiative and offer its good offices to the three principal parties. The President said this was all right if we had what we thought was an answer. However, we should not get in unless we had some pretty clear idea as to where we could come out.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

3. There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.
4. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen.
5. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Dulles saw this memorandum.
6. At the Ministerial meeting of the NAC in May 1956, a Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation was established to advise the Council on ways to improve and promote cooperation in nonmilitary areas and to encourage greater unity within the NATO community. The committee, often referred to as the “Three Wise Men”, was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway—Lester B. Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Harvard Lange.
7. Presumably a reference to Egyptian President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.
8. This memorandum was approved by Elbrick, Bowie, and Allen. There is no indication on the source text of Dulles’ approval.