Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

205. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Washington, March 15, 1957.

SUBJECT

• March 13 Draft of Statement of Policy on Korea²

This draft, which is to be considered by the Planning Board March 15, perhaps for the last time before reference to the Council, brings into sharp focus in the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a),³ 11,⁴ and 19⁵ the split between State on the one hand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, Treasury and Bureau of the Budget on the other on the question of providing United States forces in Korea with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

You will recall that during a discussion of this problem on January 18, 1957⁶ with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, the Secretary reluctantly agreed to go along with a military program calling for the introduction of such weapons on the specific assurance that publishable evidence was at hand confirming comparable Communist action in north Korea. Thus far, the Department has not been provided with the promised Joint Chiefs of Staff Report containing such evidence. FE, IO, and L are convinced that, particularly in view of the clear provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement, it would be disastrous to our position with our Allies and in the United Nations were we to proceed and equip our forces in Korea with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the absence of demonstrable and comparable Communist action. We have, therefore, endeavored to build into the new Korean policy paper, which, at National Security Council direction embodies Alternative B of NSC 5702, what we consider essential safeguards in the implementation of Alternative B by giving due consideration to the timing of such action and the bearing it will have on other sectors, not only of our Korean policy but of our policy towards our Allies and in the United Nations. I understand that during Planning Board and Board Assistants consideration of the paper, these safeguards were vigorously attacked and that the majority view at the last Board Assistants meeting, with State strongly dissenting, was that the National Security Council in selecting Alternative B of NSC 5702 had decided without conditions in favor of giving our forces dual conventional nuclear weapons, thus permitting a reduction in ROK forces, and that our policy should, therefore, be directed toward the immediate implementation of that decision.

I believe you will agree that since the Secretary’s concurrence in Alternative B was based on Admiral Radford’s assurances with respect to certain evidence of Communist actions, we must, in the absence of such evidence, require adequate safeguards in the new policy paper. I do not think, therefore, that State can agree at this juncture to a paper which excludes in substance the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a), 11, and 19 of the March 13 draft.

With respect to the bracketed word “strong” in paragraphs 1 and 24(c),⁷FE feels that its omission from the new paper can only be construed as a change in our objectives with respect to future ROK force levels in a manner calculated to pave the way for their reduction to a status of impotency insofar as capacity to resist or deter renewed Communist aggression is concerned. ROK capability to resist strongly is not only essential in the preservation of the will to fight in the Korean people and hence their ability to resist Communist subversion and to remain independent and free but has great symbolic and psychological importance throughout the Far East.

The desire of other agencies to eliminate the bracketed portion of paragraph 15⁸ is difficult to understand since the policy set forth therein is a basic element both in NSC 5429⁹ and the Japanese paper, NSC 5516/1.¹⁰ It is, in fact, an integral part of United States policy in the Far East and should be referred to in the Korean paper.

Our reasons for desiring the insertion of “consider” in the introductory sentence of paragraph 23¹¹ have been previously explained, the intention being to make it clear that an ill-advised irrational act on the part of President Rhee will not automatically result in our initiation of actions whose end result might very possibly assure a Communist take-over of south Korea.

I also believe we should push for the inclusion of “maximum” before “rate” in the first line of paragraph 2(b)¹² as a reflection of our desire to enable the ROK to become more self-sufficient.

Both Howard Parsons, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs, and David Nes, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, plan to attend the March 15 Planning Board meeting and will be glad to discuss State’s position in more detail at your convenience prior to the meeting. Officers of IO and L would also be available if you so desire.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared in draft with IO and L.
2. The March 13 draft statement outlining “U.S. Policy Toward Korea” was the third revision by the NSC Planning Board Assistants of the initial Department of State draft which was circulated to the Planning Board on February 21. The initial draft and the first revision are discussed in footnote 2, Document 202. The second revision of the paper, dated March 4, was prepared in light of Planning Board discussion on March 1. The Planning Board considered this version at a special meeting on March 5, and the March 13 draft was prepared in light of the discussion at that meeting. Copies of the draft statements on “U.S Policy Toward Korea” circulated to the Planning Board under cover of memoranda by the Director of the NSC Secretariat on March 4 and March 13 are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).
3. Paragraph 9a of the draft dealt with the continued deployment of two U.S. Infantry Divisions and one fighter-bomber wing in South Korea. The paragraph specified that all U.S. forces in Korea would be modernized with dual conventional-nuclear weapons. The two bracketed portions of the paragraph, proposed by the Department of State, qualified the authorization to modernize U.S. forces by stipulating that nuclear warheads could not be stored in Korea, and that the timing of the introduction of dual capable weapons would depend upon the establishment and publication of evidence of comparable violations of the Armistice Agreement by Communist forces in North Korea.
4. Paragraph 11 of the draft called for continuing efforts to maintain the support of the other members of the United Nations for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea. Specifically, the United States would seek to preserve the Unified Command, assure support for the Joint Policy Declaration, and continue the military involvement of participants in the U.N. Command. The paragraph closed with a bracketed sentence which, according to a note on the source text, the Defense and JCS representatives proposed to delete: “In so doing the U.S. must continue to give due weight to the effect on other UN members of any decisions it may take as the Unified Command, particularly any actions implementing paragraph 9a above.”
5. Paragraph 19 stipulated that the United States should continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement. To that end, the Department of State proposed implementing language in paragraphs 19a and 19b which the Department of Defense wanted to have deleted. In paragraph 19a, the bracketed sentence reads: “Seek, as a matter of priority, to establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13(d).” In paragraph 19b, the bracketed sentence read: “The timing of the introduction of dual conventional-nuclear weapons under paragraph 9a shall be decided upon by the Secretaries of State and Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, only after they shall have determined that publishable evidence establishes the Communist introductions comparable in nature and extent.”
6. See Document 198.
7. In paragraph 1 of the draft statement, the Department of State proposed that the concluding language should read that the Republic of Korea’s armed forces should be “capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.” The word “strong” was bracketed in the draft, indicating a divergence of opinion among the Planning Board Assistants. The word “strong” was similarly bracketed and indicated as a Department of State proposal in paragraph 24c, which reads that, in order to promote Korean unification, the United States should: “accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of [strong] resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.”
8. The bracketed portion of paragraph 15 reads: “Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, the Republic of China and the ROK, eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.”
9. For text of NSC 5429/5, “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” December 22, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 1062–1072.
10. For text of NSC 5516/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” April 9, 1955, see vol. XXIII, Part 1, pp. 52–62.
11. The introductory sentence of paragraph 23 of the draft statement reads: “If, despite the actions taken under Annex F ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should [consider]:”
12. Paragraph 2b of the draft statement indicated that it should be a U.S. objective to assist the Republic of Korea by: “Enabling the Republic of Korea to achieve a rate of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree of stability.”