Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

82. Memorandum of Discussion at the 290th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 12, 1956¹

Washington, July 12, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]

5. U.S. Policy Toward Japan (NSC 5516/1; Progress Report, dated June 27, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5516/1)²

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the highlights of the subject Progress Report, and indicated that Mr. Allen Dulles would comment, in the course of his intelligence briefing, on the results of the recent elections in the upper house of the Japanese Diet.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

6. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

With the use of a chart, the Director of Central Intelligence analyzed the situation before and after the recently concluded elections to the Japanese House of Councillors.³ In conclusion, he indicated that, thanks to the number of Socialists elected, it would be practically impossible for the Japanese Government to obtain the two-thirds vote in the House necessary to secure the desired program of Japanese rearmament. Mr. Dulles also noted the possibility of an early resumption of negotiations between Japan and the USSR for a treaty of peace.

Apropos of the situation in Japan, Secretary Wilson informed the Council that the Defense Department had agreed upon a new plan for the reorganization of military affairs in the Pacific area. When this plan was in effect there would be a single Pacific Command headed up by Admiral Stump. In addition, it had been decided to remove the UN Command from Japan and to locate it in Korea. Secretary Wilson said this was part of the great effort in the Defense Department to scotch the idea so prevalent in Japan that that country was still occupied. If we could not succeed in destroying this idea, we stood to lose our entire position in the Japanese islands. Secretary Wilson warned that it might take a year to effect this reorganization, although he was not sure that it need take more than three months.⁴

Secretary Hoover expressed great satisfaction at this information from Secretary Wilson, and said that the only disturbing aspect was the length of time estimated to be required to effect this reorganization.

Secretary Wilson replied by reemphasizing that the reorganization could be done much more quickly if it was necessary, and he would be very glad to have Secretary Hoover’s recommendation for a shorter period. Secretary Hoover said he would be very glad to see the reorganization accomplished in thirty days, and promised the help of the State Department in effecting the relocation of the UN Command to Korea.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the results of the recent Japanese elections; the continuing debate on the Khrushchev de-Stalinization speech; unrest in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; and the situations in Iceland, the Middle East, and Cambodia.

SEG

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 13.

2. The Progress Report is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) In a June 22 memorandum to Hoover, Howard Jones summarized a draft of a June 15 Progress Report (identical to the June 27 version) as follows:

   “The report states that our present policy (NSC 5516/1) is adequate. However, the report also states that while Japan is still basically aligned with the United States, some of the ties are wearing thin, and developments over recent months tend to introduce a new phase in U.S.-Japanese relations. Improved political stability, a comfortable foreign exchange situation, resurgence of nationalism and a drift towards the Communist continent are important signs of decreased Japanese dependence on the United States and the advent of more independent Japanese policies. Troublesome problems to which the report draws attention are the Bonin Islanders, war criminals, territorial issues, the tendency to establish new relations with the USSR and Communist China, Pacific fisheries, security arrangements, Japanese trade, and Asian economic development.

   “The most important part of the progress report is that entitled, ‘Major Problems or Areas of Difficulty,’ which sets forth the issues which we are going to have to face in our relations with the Japanese over the next few years. Even since the writing of the initial draft of this report, the Japanese have approached us on several of these issues; namely, the repatriation of the Bonin Islanders, the release of the war criminals, the Pacific nuclear tests and the U.S. position in Okinawa.” (Ibid.,OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Japan)

3. In these elections, held July 8, the Socialists increased their representation from 68 to 80. The LDP won 122 seats, the Green Breeze Society 17, and minor parties and independents 31.
4. The reorganization was effected on July 1, 1957.