60. Memorandum of Discussion at the 266th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 15, 19551

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward Japan (NSC 5516/1; Progress Report, dated October 19, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5516/1)2

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the contents of the reference Progress Report (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).3 He interrupted his briefing to permit Mr. Allen Dulles to make a comment on the merger of the two Japanese conservative [Page 138] parties announced in the press today.4 Mr. Dulles predicted that the present Prime Minister would continue in office for some months, but that the present Cabinet would be considerably changed. He also commented that the merger of the two parties was a hopeful development, and that the single conservative party would have a good working majority in the Japanese Diet.

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing, Secretary Wilson said he wished to make a statement. He said that some months ago we had discussed our military deployments in Japan, as had the Secretary of State, with Prime Minister Hatoyama.5 From these discussions the Defense Department had come to feel that it would be desirable to withdraw some of our forces from Japan, By doing so we should help the Japanese to get forward with their own efforts to build a defensive military establishment. Admiral Radford, said Secretary Wilson, agrees with this line of thought.

Secretary Wilson estimated that we now had approximately 117,000 Army troops in the Far East. The initial plan was that this number should be reduced to approximately 90,000. Very recently, however, the Army had informed Secretary Wilson that they would prefer the level of Army forces in the Far East to stand at 98,000. The Defense Department, however, wants to stick to the 90,000 figure. Accordingly, the authorities in the Defense Department are currently talking of leaving two Army divisions in Korea, a regiment in Okinawa, and two regiments in Japan. Altogether this accounted for three divisions. The Marine Corps personnel will be brought back and stationed in Hawaii. Secretary Wilson indicated that he was now in the process of trying to secure agreement within the Pentagon that this was the right program for deployment of Army forces in the Far East, and that he would appreciate support from the State Department for this program.

Admiral Radford commented that carrying out the program would amount to a net reduction of 30,000 in the total of U.S. Army forces in Japan. Secretary Wilson added that this would leave about 35,000 in Japan, or approximately half the present strength of Army personnel based in Japan.

Secretary Hoover said that he believed that the State Department would agree in general with Secretary Wilson’s program. At the present time, however, the State Department was heavily engaged in financial negotiations with Japan, and he wanted advice as to whether to tell the Japanese of our redeployment plans during the negotiations or after their conclusion. Admiral Radford said he believed that it was [Page 139] fairer to tell the Japanese of our plans prior to the conclusion of the negotiations. We would certainly want any reduction of the Japanese yen contribution to maintaining U. S. forces in Japan to be transferred to the maintenance of their own defense establishment.

The Vice President inquired whether it was not customary for the President to give approval to plans involving deployment or redeployment of U.S. forces. Admiral Radford replied that the President had already indicated general agreement to the proposed redeployment plans for Japan. The reason that the issue had come up again was the Army’s desire to change the over-all figure from 90,000 to 98,000.

The Vice President said that he presumed that if the State Department went along with the program there would be no difficulty.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

S. Everett Gleason
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 16.
  2. According to this Progress Report, there had been “both favorable and unfavorable developments” in the last year in three major policy objectives of the United States in Japan: political stability and effective government, development of economic strength, and adequate defense capability. The report also noted, however, that “in each there has been some progress although slower than we would like. There is still a long way to go before any of the objectives is achieved.” (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Japan)
  3. Minutes of all NSC meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
  4. See the memorandum, infra.
  5. Perhaps a reference to Dulles’ discussions with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in August 1955. See Documents 44, 45, and 47.