Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

61. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, November 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Conservative Merger in Japan

Tokyo’s telegram No. 1134 of November 15 (Tab A)² reports that Japan’s two conservative parties, the Democratic Party of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and the Liberal Party of Taketora Ogata, merged on November 15 to form a unified “Liberal-Democratic Party”. All Democratic members of the Diet joined the unified party whereas three Liberals, including former Prime Minister Yoshida, chose to remain outside the new party. The election of a party president has been deferred until April, when presumably Hatoyama will retire and Ogata will take over. In the interim a caretaker “proxy committee” consisting of Hatoyama (D), Ogata (L), Miki (D),³ and Ono (L)⁴ will administer party affairs. At a meeting of Hatoyama and Ogata on the 14th, it was agreed that Hatoyama would head the new cabinet and would be in charge of governmental business while Ogata would be responsible for party affairs. Kishi (D), who visited the United States with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, is the Secretary-General of the new party. It is planned that the present Cabinet will resign on November 21 and that Hatoyama will be re-elected as Prime Minister when the extraordinary session of the Diet is convoked on the 22nd. The new Cabinet reportedly will be composed of nine former Democrats and seven former Liberals, and Shigemitsu will continue as Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

As a result of the merger the unified Liberal-Democratic Party now holds 300 out of 467 seats in the House of Representatives and 118 out of 250 in the House of Councillors. As a result of the unification of the Socialists on October 13, the Socialists hold 155 and 69 seats respectively. The conservative “Green Breeze Club” in the House of Councillors (47 members) will probably support the Liberal-Democrats.

Tokyo’s telegram No. 1138 of November 16⁵ (Tab B) is the Embassy’s estimate:

1. For the first time since 1952 the Government will enjoy a working majority in the Diet and will be in a position to run the Diet effectively.

2. These potentialities will probably not be realized immediately. Personal and factional rivalries of many years can be expected to continue. The question of party leadership has been postponed, not settled. There is no single strong man to enforce party discipline. However, the external threat of the Socialists will probably prevent the breaking up of the conservative alliance.⁶ The election for the House of Councillors in April or May 1956 will be important.

3. The new party does not enjoy complete dominance over the Socialists, since the Socialists hold more than the one-third of the Diet seats necessary to prevent overall revising of the Constitution, a primary goal of the conservatives.

4. The conservatives are not at all confident of bettering their standing vis-à-vis the Socialists in an election. Many conservative leaders fear the mounting appeal of the Left.⁷

5. The following attitudes and tactics are likely to characterize the new party over the next few months:

(a) Internal consolidation of the party is the first order of business. Although rival factions will be maneuvering to preserve and strengthen positions, the “neutral leaders”, Kishi and Bukichi Miki, will work hard to assure a permanent union on both national and local levels.

(b) In order to strengthen their position relative to the Socialists the conservatives will attempt to enact legislation to help them in future elections: revision of the election law to reduce the size of election districts; increased social security expenditures; an expanded housing program and increased subsidies. Unpopular though necessary measures such as austerity, increased defense expenditures and measures inviting the charge of “one-sided dependence on the United States” will be postponed.

(c) Basic consolidation of the conservative position will require at least one year. A general election which would open the way for constitutional revision will not be risked prior to consolidation.

6. The majority conservative government will be more responsible than the present Hatoyama minority regime and will be more capable of getting things done. With Liberals snaring the responsibility there will be less flirtation with the Communist orbit and a clearer affirmation of Japan’s ties with the Free World. During the early period conservatives will move very cautiously in politically sensitive areas such as defense and will plead political weakness. They will move decisively in the defense field only after establishment of a firm political foundation.

7. The Embassy considers the conservative program sound, and one which will in the long run open the way for the achievement of goals both the United States and Japanese conservatives consider necessary. United States “advice” or pressure in regard to defense would probably be ineffective. A majority conservative government is likely to have an increased sense of self-confidence, independence and determination to carry out its own decisions. Conservative leaders will, without undue deference to the United States, feel that the United States is obliged to cooperate with and support them regardless of our approval or disapproval of their methods and timing, since presumably we have no one else to whom we can turn. This will be partially offset by the fact that conservative leaders know that Japan must rely heavily on the United States in the international field for some time to come.

I concur in general with the Embassy’s estimate. This is a very encouraging development, although it is only one step by the Japanese toward stability and firmer control, and there is a long way for the conservatives to go. I also concur that it is important that the United States avoid unnecessary pressures on the new government during its formative period and do what we can to help strengthen the Liberal-Democrats.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/11–1855. Confidential. Drafted by Richard M. Herndon on November 17.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 794.00/11–1555)
3. Takeo Miki, Minister of Transportation, March–November 1955.
4. Bamboku Ono, Minister of State, May–July 1954.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/11–1655)
6. McClurkin wrote the following in the margin next to this sentence: “Yes, it may be in our long-run interest if the Socialist merger does not break down.”
7. McClurkin added the following handwritten sentence after paragraph 4: “But Left-Socialist Katsumata told us that if the election law is revised to provide single-member districts, Socialist strength in the Lower House might be cut as much as 2/3.”
8. McClurkin wrote the following sentence at the end: “However, we should continue to try to get the Japanese Government to take an increasing public responsibility for Japanese defense measures, etc.”