Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Japan–USSR Negotiations

1. The Soviets have expressed a willingness to return the Habomais and Shikotan as part of a total agreement. Malik said this would be conditional on Japan’s not militarizing these islands.

2. Malik and Matsumoto have substantially agreed on the following: the Soviet Union will grant amnesty to about 1365 Japanese “war criminals” once a treaty has been signed; the Soviet Union will support Japan’s application for entry into the United Nations; detailed arrangements for a commercial agreement and a fisheries agreement will be negotiated later.

3. The major issues outstanding are: (a) the Soviet Union wants Japan to recognize its sovereignty over the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, while Japan is still claiming sovereignty over the southernmost Kuriles and wants disposition of the remaining disputed territories to be decided later by the Allied Powers involved; (b) the Soviet Union wants Japan to prohibit passage through all straits connecting with the Sea of Japan by non-riparian powers, while Japan objects to this provision; and (c) the Soviet condition that the Habomais and Shikotan be demilitarized.

4. Hatoyama may well decide that the time has come for Japan to reach agreement with the Soviets. We have had information from Tokyo that Hatoyama may be in a mood for compromise, particularly in view of his shaky political position and the recent decline in the influence of Shigemitsu, who has been the most outspoken advocate of hard bargaining with the Soviets. The results of the Adenauer visit to Moscow² will lend force to arguments for resuming relations without settlement of all issues.

5. Our policy has been to avoid any appearance of interfering with the talks, although we have given Japan advice on a number of points and have made clear that any agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union must not conflict with the San Francisco Treaty and our Security Treaty. Japan will almost certainly continue to reject the Soviet position on the straits as outlined in paragraph 3(b). This is probably a bargaining point on the part of the Soviets.

6. Tab A is a telegram for your signature³ recommending to Ambassador Allison that he discreetly advise high Japanese officials of our views that (a) we hope Japan will do nothing implying recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and South Sakhalin and we believe disposition of these territories should be left for future international decision,⁴ (b) the Soviet proposal to prohibit entry into the Japan Sea by warships of non-riparian powers violates international law and would virtually nullify the naval aspects of the US-Japan Security Treaty,⁵ and (c) the Soviet proposal for demilitarization of the Habomais and Shikotan would appear to be an unjustifiable derogation of Japanese sovereignty over these islands.

7. While not feeling strongly, EE does not believe we should give any advice to Japan regarding the Kuriles and South Sakhalin at this time (point (a) above) on the ground that Japan will probably be unwilling in any case to recognize Soviet sovereignty over these areas. I believe, however, that it is advisable to make perfectly clear to the Japanese our view that Japan should do nothing implying recognition of the Soviet claim and that the future disposition of these areas, like Formosa, should await future international decision. I also believe that it is in the United States interest to do what we can to prevent the Soviets from strengthening their color of title to the Kuriles and Sakhalin.⁶

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram (Tab A).⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.9429/9–1855. Secret. Drafted in NA.
2. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited Moscow in September 1955.
3. Draft prepared in NA and sent as telegram 609 to Tokyo, September 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/9–955) The draft was modified by Dulles in several places, as noted in footnotes below.
4. The pertinent sentences of the draft read: “Hope Japan will do nothing implying recognition Soviet sovereignty over Kuriles and South Sakhalin. Believe disposition these territories should be left future international decision.” As modified by Dulles, in telegram 609, these sentences read: “Hope Japan will do nothing implying recognition Soviet sovereignty over Kuriles and South Sakhalin although of course accepting Japan’s renunciation under Article 2(c) of 1951 Peace Treaty. Believe final disposition these territories should be left future international decision.”
5. In the draft, the relevant sentence reads: “Soviet proposal prohibit entry warships non-riparian powers into Japan Sea violates international law and would virtually nullify naval aspects US–Japan Security Treaty.” After modification by the Secretary, in telegram 609, this sentence reads: “Soviet proposal prohibit entry warships non-riparian powers into Japan Sea violates international law and would nullify and violate sea-force aspects US–Japan Security Treaty.”
6. In telegram 773 from Tokyo, September 22, Allison reported he had that day given Shigemitsu and Tani a paraphrase of telegram 609, that Shigemitsu had said the paragraph on the Kuriles expressed the Japanese position exactly, and that both men had “nodded approval” while reading the remainder. Shigemitsu had remarked that the London negotiations were in effect suspended. “Shigemitsu further stated emphatically that government had not and and did not intend to change its previous position vis-à-vis Soviet negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.022/9–2255)
7. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Signed by Secy 9/18/55 and sent.”