53. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)1
Dear Gordon: During my two-day visit to Japan starting October 3, I expect to be asked a number of questions on defense matters. I do not propose to negotiate with the Japanese on any of these but I think it will be necessary for me to have the current thinking of the Department of Defense on two major problems—the size of our forces in Japan and Japan’s contribution to their support.
Any change in the strength of our forces in Japan will have an important bearing on Japan’s economy and on the Japanese attitude toward their defense contribution to us. As I understand our plans on the basis of preparations for the talks with Shigemitsu, we intend by July 1956 to reduce our ground forces in Japan from about 66,500 men to about 29,000, while our air strength of 39,000 and naval strength of 8,100 will remain about the same. This would mean a reduction from a total of about 113,000 men to about 76,000. I would appreciate confirmation of these figures as well as any comments you care to make on our plans for reduction over the next couple of years.
The Japanese will almost certainly press for a further reduction in their contribution to our forces under Article XIV of the Administrative Agreement. I believe that a repetition of last year’s prolonged and acrimonious negotiations with the Japanese on this issue would prejudice our efforts in accordance with NSC policy to build political stability in Japan and encourage their cooperation with us on defense matters. Therefore we should try to reach a rapid settlement this year. It is my opinion that Japan will be most reluctant to spend more than 140 billion yen for all defense purposes in its coming fiscal year, an increase of 7.3 billion yen from the current 132.7, and that it will not substantially increase the figure of about 103 billion yen tentatively set in its current plans for the Japan Defense Agency. I have accordingly attached two alternative schedules either of which could be the position which the United States would seek to achieve in negotiating with Japan on its JFY56 defense expenditures. These schedules also provide for defense spending by Japan through JFY 1959, although of course [Page 125] the figures beyond JFY 56 would be subject to subsequent negotiation and might then be revised upwards. I realize that the implications of last year’s understanding with the Japanese could lead us to press them for a considerably higher defense budget next year, but I believe that it would be politically most unwise for us to do so. I should therefore appreciate your concurrence in these schedules, either of which reflects the kind of understanding I believe we should seek to obtain.
Since I plan to leave on September 29 I should appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible. If you wish I should be glad, before I go, to meet with you to discuss these problems.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–2355. Secret. Drafted in NA and sent to Hoover under cover of a September 21 memorandum from Robertson (also drafted in NA). (Ibid., 110.12–HO/9–2155) As pointed out in the memorandum, the Embassy had in telegram 735 from Tokyo, September 17, suggested that the preparations for Hoover’s visit to Japan be used as a means for coming to an agreement with the Department of Defense on the size of U.S. forces in Japan and the size of the Japanese contribution to their support. (Ibid., 110.12–HO/9–1755)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩