Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, January 10, 1955—8 p.m.

1647. Reference CINCFE 71040, 7 January 1955.²

1. I have reviewed General Hull’s reference message summarizing FEC views regarding US policy in Japan and FEC comments on Embassy study “A preliminary reappraisal of US policy with respect to Japan”, Embdesp 516 of October 25.³ I am in basic agreement with summary US objectives in Japan in part one of reference message although I believe it is cast in too strictly military terms. Our goal here should be development of strong Japan and harnessing of its strength to free world’s effort to thwart Communist threat. Considering Japanese achievements in pre-war period, there can be little question of its capabilities for becoming important power in Far East. Nevertheless, it is also evident that limited resources do not permit rapid progress toward achievement of economic and military strength. Problem facing US policy is therefore how we best contribute to hastening Japanese achievement of strength and at same time assure that Japan, once strong, will not move towards Soviet orbit or adopt such strictly neutralist policies as would limit its aid to Western efforts against Communist aggression. In considering our short-term policies, I do not believe we should lose sight of fact that Japanese recovery of power is likely be long-term task. Stake in Japan far too great to risk unnecessarily substantial eventual contribution to free world effort by seeking momentary gains.

2. Principal present obstacle to immediate emphasis on recovery of Japanese military strength lies not in capabilities to undertake more extensive defense effort but in unwillingness of Japanese Government at present to utilize this potential due to political reasons based on social and economic requirements pointed out Embassy study. Primary significance of Finance Minister Ichimada presentation of case for reduction in Japanese contribution to support costs lies in reaffirmation by Hatoyama Government of defense policies of Yoshida Government. While elements in Japanese Government, particularly Defense Agency, for larger defense program, policy of present government is to resist additional defense efforts at this time and concentrate instead on developing Japanese economy and increasing receptiveness of Japanese people to subsequent major defense efforts. Privately, major figures in conservative movement admit need for far greater defense efforts. However, they are unwilling undertake such program before political situation stabilized by unity of conservative political forces, economic conditions improved, and national spirit rehabilitated thus making climate of opinion more favorable. Until then Japanese Government willing depend largely on US and make only token annual increases in Japanese forces. After political and economic stabilization achieved, innate compulsions of Japanese to exercise influential role as major power will probably lead to more substantial defense program since military strength is prerequisite for power. For present, however, political leadership proceeding cautiously in belief ground must be carefully prepared to assure that defense program, once undertaken, does not falter and become political “football” leading to deterioration moderate conservative position.

3. I do not believe either that policy of increased US pressure over next few years is capable of overcoming present Japanese unwillingness undertake more substantial effort in defense field, or that it is desirable in light of long-run US objectives. Up to present, pressure for greater defense effort has brought achievements far short of force goals envisaged in 1952. In almost every respect (budgetary appropriations, size of defense forces, mobilization defense industry) Japanese action is not up to goals. Japanese in past two years have lagged far behind what we have considered reasonable defense effort despite variety of US pressures and international situation more immediately threatening in military sense than at present. Furthermore, it is quite likely that any defense budget for 1955 approved under increased US pressure would be only slightly greater than amount likely to be obtained if our negotiation tactics are restrained and based on persuasion. Even twenty million dollars more seems small dividend in perspective of total cost to build major military force desired for Japan.

Even if tactics of pressure were more successful than envisaged, I do not consider this adequate or fruitful basis for developing long-run relationship of cooperation between US and Japan. Japanese are increasingly sensitive to US policies implying treatment of Japan as “second-class” nation. Japanese desire treatment as equal independent power capable of influencing US policy to same degree as major NATO powers and arriving at own decisions on basis consideration of national interests and not as result external pressures. Such treatment likely increase Japanese cooperation and responsiveness to US suggestions and enable US to exert continuing influence over rate of growth Japanese strength.

4. While I do not consider Japanese defense effort adequate, over next few years I believe our objectives best achieved by tactics along lines in Embassy study referred to above. Basically, initiative for defense can only come from Japanese if major effort is to be made and sound basis for US-Japanese cooperation formed. Our efforts during next two years should be devoted toward stimulating Japanese initiative by strengthening political and economic foundation and by increasing Japanese sense responsibility for own and Asian defense through such measures as gradual withdrawal US Forces, particularly ground forces, and greater Japanese participation in free world deliberations on Asian policy including attendance multi-lateral conferences on Far East. Primary emphasis should be placed on the achievement by moderate conservatives of cohesiveness and strength. The possibility that conservative failure to organize stable effective government in the next year will lead to gradual decline of conservative strength should not be underestimated (see my telegram 1624 January 7).⁴ If this comes to pass, our objective of strong Japan making a basic contribution to free world will be far less attainable and any substantial increase Japanese defense effort considerably delayed. On other hand, unified conservative force, if stabilized in power and exerting effective control over the economic situation, represents our best prospect for adoption policies aimed at reconstructing Japan, including development of military strength. Long-term objective of military strength can thus be best achieved by first assuring solid foundation of political stability and economic strength rather than emphasizing annual increments in Japanese defense forces. US policies along these lines also seem better suited to strenthening of Japanese ties with US and the free world than continued high pressure for immediate defense efforts.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/1–1055. Secret; Priority.
2. See Document 3.
3. For partial text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, p. 752.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/1–755)