Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan ¹

Washington, January 10, 1955—7:41 p.m.

1386. Your 1443,² 1451,³ 1502.⁴ Department assumes as result your conversation December 27 with Shigemitsu (your 1502) no immediate US reaction to question Japan’s reopening relations USSR and Communist China required. However providing guide lines for use your discretion in event problem assumes serious proportions in future.

Following considerations important: 1) existence US relations with USSR precludes strong efforts persuade Japan from establishing relations with USSR; 2) US opposed Japan’s recognition Communist China under present circumstances: 3) US does not want be put position suffering major public diplomatic defeat prejudicial basic US–Japan security alignment if Japan eventually takes steps develop diplomatic relations USSR or Communist China.

Guide lines follow:

(a) Continuation present propaganda exchange between Japan and USSR can only strengthen hand Socialists and divide Conservative forces. It can have effect without intending do so of building up strong domestic pressures inconsistent with Government intentions.

(b) One objective USSR is play upon difficulty establishing relations with Communist China thus exacerbating Japan’s internal political situation.

(c) US would look adversely upon recognition Communist China by Japan. Communist China gives every evidence continuing aggressive policies. To make any move now toward Communist China would fly in face international opinion—unity of which just demonstrated by UN condemnation Communist China for illegal retention US fliers.

(d) Japan’s establishment relations Communist China could have dangerous effect on rest Asia and its will resist Communist expansion.

(e) Hope for trade of anything approaching prewar levels with Communist China illusory and is dangerous for Japan develop reliance Communist China as source raw materials since Communist trade policy politically motivated for purposes dividing free world. Reliance prospect trade with Communist China may also adversely affect Japan’s relations with Korea, Formosa and possibly Thailand and Philippines and inhibit critically important efforts Japan strengthen political and economic ties with countries of east and southeast Asia through reparations settlements, economic development plans and expansion of trade.⁵

(f) Although US accepts Japanese Government’s assurances no real change relations with US contemplated continued statements such as made by leading officials new government cannot help but have adverse effect on congressional and public opinion this country.

(g) US support Japanese sovereignty Habomai and Shikotan should be called attention Japanese and query raised about Japan’s position these islands and Kuriles in any possible discussion Soviets.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/1–1055. Secret. Drafted in NA, cleared in EE and CA, and approved by Walter S. Robertson.
2. Dated December 17, 1954. (Ibid., 794.00/12–1754)
3. Dated December 18, 1954. (Ibid., 493.9431/12–1854)
4. In telegram 1502, December 27, the Ambassador reported on his conversation held that day with Shigemitsu, and stated in part that, while the Foreign Minister thought that “it was most important from the point of view of public opinion in Japan not to block off Red China in a watertight compartment”, he had gone on to say that there were no concrete plans for regularizing Japanese relations with the Communist bloc, and that if the Japanese Government did entertain such plans, it would first consult the United States. (Ibid., 611.94/12–2754)
5. In a memorandum to Robertson, January 7, McClurkin stated that “over the long run” there was little the United States could do to prevent the development of direct relations between Japan and Communist China. Initially the United States should take the position outlined in telegram 1386 (then in draft form). “If despite the arguments advanced by us the Japanese insist on the necessity of taking steps looking toward the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist China, we should strongly call to their attention the desirability of adhering to the minimum condition that normalization of relations not be allowed to interfere with existing treaty relations with Nationalist China.” (Ibid., 661.941/1–755)