Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

25. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

• NSC 5516—“United States Policy Toward Japan”²

1. NSC 5516 is scheduled for consideration by the NSC on April 7. It is based upon a draft originally prepared in the Department.³

2. The basic thesis of the paper is stated in paragraphs 21–24.⁴ The final sentence of paragraph 24 is repeated in paragraph 49⁵ as a course of action: “The United States should avoid pressing the Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of political and economic stability.” I believe that it is important to our future relationship with Japan that this point be established. The real difficulty is that every year we have a major struggle with the Japanese over budgetary expenditures. Defense does not believe that the positions they insist we take constitute “pressure”. We do. Attached is a table⁶ showing the various positions involved in the current defense negotiation in Tokyo. I believe that it would be useful for you in the course of the NSC discussion to refer to this negotiation and to establish that in order to carry out the course of action quoted above we should refrain from insisting that the Japanese spend more on defense this year than they did last year, even though it may mean a lower contribution by them to the United States forces in Japan.

3. Special note might be made of paragraph 32⁷ which emphasizes the importance of a solution of Japan’s long-run economic problem if it is to play the role we should like it to play in Asia.

4. There is a split position on paragraph 35⁸ where we have proposed that we publicly indicate willingness “at a suitable early date” to negotiate a mutual defense treaty to replace our Mutual Security Treaty with Japan. The difference here is entirely one of timing, and I suggest that the simplest thing to do will be to propose the deletion of the word “early” especially since there is no likelihood that the Japanese will be in a position to negotiate such a treaty in the near future.

5. Paragraph 52⁹ calls for the development of a general understanding with the Japanese on a long-range plan for their defense forces, a phased withdrawal of our forces and phased reductions of the Japanese contribution to our forces. Here again the problem is one of timing. Defense wants no steps like this taken “until the Formosa situation has been clarified”. The JCS believe this would be “unnecessarily restrictive”. I agree with Defense that the present Formosa situation makes it difficult to develop an orderly long-range plan. Nevertheless, if the Japanese come to us with a request to endeavor to develop such a plan, I believe that we should be receptive.

Recommendation: I recommend that you support the adoption by the NSC of the draft statement of United States policy toward Japan and that in the discussion you take the positions indicated in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 above.

[Enclosure]

CURRENT DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS¹⁰

1. The JCS position on paragraph 52 reflects the wide difference in view as to what constitutes pressure on Japan endangering political and economic stability. The JCS want reductions in contribution by Japan to the United States forces in Japan to be made only on a matching basis—for example, Japan will be allowed a $20 million reduction in contribution only if that $20 million plus $20 million of new Japanese funds are devoted to defense purposes. This is simply not a practical position for us to take.

2. The position the JCS wants us to take in the current defense negotiations runs directly counter to the proposed NSC policy because it is doing serious damage to hopes of political stability in Japan. The abortive Shigemitsu visit is known to have centered around the defense issue. The USSR response on negotiations with Japan has further shaken the Hatoyama cabinet. Local elections in Japan are April 23. Failure to reach a satisfactory arrangement on the defense issue before April 16–20 will increase the prospect of substantial Socialist gains in these local elections, thus placing more local political machines in the hands of the Socialists. This is particularly dangerous since new national elections in Japan will be brought measurably sooner if the life of the Hatoyama cabinet is endangered by protracted and (from the Japanese point of view) losing negotiations with the United States over the defense issue. Certainly our hope for an increased Japanese defense effort is more likely of realization if the Conservatives stay in power.

3. It is therefore in the United States interest to reach a settlement with Japan by April 16 or very shortly thereafter on a basis which keeps Japan spending on defense as much of its own money as it spent last year (132.7 billion yen), and is also devoting to Japanese defense purposes a sizable reduction in its contribution to United States forces. It will probably require specific sanction of the NSC and the President in order to overrule the present JCS position rapidly enough to accomplish this end.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–655. Top Secret. Drafted in NA and concurred in draft by S/P, E, IO, and FE by Sebald and Baldwin.
2. Dated March 29, not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files; Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5516 Series) NSC 5516/1 is Document 28. For the differences between the two versions, see infra.
3. Apparent reference to the March 14 draft. See footnote 5, Document 19.
4. These paragraphs are identical in NSC 5516 and NSC 5516/1.
5. This paragraph is identical in NSC 5516 and NSC 5516/1, although in NSC 5516/ 1 it is renumbered 48.
6. Not printed.
7. This paragraph is identical in NSC 5516 and NSC 5516/1.
8. See Document 22.
9. See Document 22.
10. Top Secret.