Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

24. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan ¹

Washington, April 2, 1955—2:31 p.m.

2010. Your 2487² and 2490.³ Convey following Shigemitsu as US response his inquiry re early visit Washington.

1. Top level US officials naturally desirous exchanging views leading Japanese but Secretary obviously cannot be involved negotiation specific complex issues such as defense costs.

2. US fully appreciates importance early understanding on Japan’s defense program and hopes this can be obtained through narrowing and resolution differences in current Tokyo discussions. Shigemitsu visit could be meaningful only after expert discussions concluded so that high level talks could either confirm joint understanding or seek resolve any remaining policy differences. Believe expert discussions more feasible in Tokyo where they are now in progress.

3. Also appreciate that exchange views with Shigemitsu on broader subjects such as Japanese–USSR talks and Far East situation could be mutually helpful but believe this too requires advance understanding agenda and careful preparation.

4. Shigemitsu or other visit Cabinet level would require rescheduling Secretary’s plans this month which would be extremely difficult and it would be impossible for him to be adequately briefed within fortnight.

5. Greatly regret advance publicity prior official exploration Shigemitsu proposal.

6. If Japanese in light of above considerations decide send near future official representative not Cabinet level for general discussion, his basic contact would be Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and protocol and scheduling problems much easier. However our view is that visit this level would not be productive since we would still feel negotiation defense issues not readily feasible Washington at this stage and lower ranking representative could not speak with authority on broad policy problems.

7. Following specific alternative to Shigemitsu suggestion in form third person message from Secretary could be made public if agreeable Shigemitsu. “Secretary Dulles on being informed by Ambassador Allison of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu’s opinion that exchange views in Washington early April would be useful to both governments expressed regret Secretary’s schedule does not permit adequate time fully prepare for and discuss matters of common interest with Minister Shigemitsu. Secretary however emphasized interest of US Government in views of Japanese Government on situation in Far East and expressed hope our continuing interchange of such views could be supplemented by visit at later time by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to discuss broad problems of mutual concern. Secretary also said he appreciated importance of reaching early understanding Japan’s defense budget and its coordination with US defense effort in Japan and expressed belief discussions now proceeding Tokyo would lead to early understanding.” Coordinate timing any such release with Department.⁴

8. Secretary expects talk with Iguchi this general effect April 3.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/4–255. Secret; Priority. Drafted in NA, cleared in draft with the Secretary, and approved by Sebald.
2. See footnote 2, Supra .
3. Supra .

4. In telegram 2500 from Tokyo, April 3, Allison stated that Shigemitsu, after receiving a note based on telegram 2010, agreed to release of this message, and wished to release at the same time his own statement, the text of which the Ambassador had received orally. Allison stated Shigemitsu wished the statements released at noon, April 4, Tokyo time. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/4–355) In telegram 2013, the Department replied that the Secretary’s third-person statement would be released simultaneously in Washington at 10 p.m., April 3. (Ibid.)

   Text of the note sent to Shigemitsu, April 3, and the latter’s reply of the same date, are enclosed with despatch 1169 from Tokyo, April 5. (Ibid., 033.9411/4–455)

   Subsequently, the Ambassador complained in telegram 2501 from Tokyo, April 4, that he had been embarrassed by a leak of the story, which Japanese officials were maintaining had occurred in Washington and which had resulted in Hatoyama learning the “news from press before he himself [Shigemitsu] was able to get to Prime Minister. (Ibid., 033.9411/4–455) In telegram 2503, April 4, the Embassy presented evidence for its theory that the leak originated with the Washington office of the Kyodo agency and stated its intention to inform the Foreign Office that “all U.S. news agencies here correctly observed embargo and that press leak appears to have been based on Kyodo story.” (Ibid.) In reply the Department stated that its own investigation confirmed this theory and recommended that the Embassy inform the Foreign Office of the Department’s findings and “take action you consider appropriate re Kyodo Tokyo.” (Telegram 2027 to Tokyo, April 4; ibid.)

5. Sebald’s memorandum of the conversation is ibid., 794.11/4–355.