Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, December 20, 1957—2 p.m.

1651. Pass Defense and CNO. Joint message from Ambassador MacArthur and Admiral Stump. Embtel 1641.² Japanese-American Committee on Security held 4th meeting on morning of December 19. Full report with text statements follows by pouch.³ Summary follows:

I —“Recent developments in Soviet Union and Communist bloc”—Foreign Minister Fujiyama opened discussion with summary of Japanese views, which generally paralleled our assessment. He said Japanese feel Khrushchev regime will continue efforts to strengthen its political position but faces economic difficulties. Externally USSR expected to continue policy on “peaceful co-existence” and easing of tensions while exploiting recent scientific successes particularly on psychological front. Communist Chinese regime considered politically strong but facing serious economic difficulties. Communist Chinese-Soviet ties are viewed as very close; Japanese feel that Sino-Soviet negotiations to provide Communist China with modern weapons probably undertaken recently.

Following Fujiyama presentation, I summarized assessment provided in Deptel 1309⁴ (I had given Committee members previous to meeting more detailed background paper drawn from Deptel). Fujiyama expressed appreciation for my presentation since Japanese government attached great importance to our views on Soviet bloc. He raised several questions relating to background of Zhukov ouster and to tactics employed by free world to exploit current Communist Chinese economic difficulties. On latter point, Fujiyama questioned whether it might not be preferable for free world to try to exploit these economic difficulties through increased free world trade with ChiComs which would tend to separate them from USSR. In reply, I pointed out Chinese Communist-Soviet ties based on far more than Chinese economic dependence on USSR and that increased ChiCom trade with West likely to result in strengthening Chinese regime and opening way for expansionist efforts in South and Southeast Asia to detriment of free world and particularly Japan. I agreed one of our general objectives should be dividing ChiComs from USSR but stressed we did not feel this objective could be currently achieved through efforts to lessen ChiCom economic dependence on USSR. Fujiyama expressed interest in further discussion of ways and means to divide ChiComs and USSR.

II —“Implications of recent Soviet scientific developments and free world policies in light thereof”—In opening discussion of this agenda item, Fujiyama stressed Soviets are making fullest use of scientific successes in propaganda field and not without results in Japan. He stated Japanese feel that military balance has not been immediately affected by Soviet developments but Russians currently have lead in field of long range missiles. Since US superiority in military science is considered key to maintenance of world peace and security, Japan considers main question is whether US will catch up by 1960 when, they understand, Soviet ICBM will be operational.

Spiritual unity of free world is also felt to be currently more important in order to cope with Communist political and psychological offensive. Defense Agency Director-General Tsushima spoke along similar lines, commenting that Soviet military strength constitutes grave threat to Japan, particularly since Soviets expected to furnish missiles to ChiComs and North Korea. However, in view continued strength of US deterrent power, Defense Agency believes Communists will resort psychological and other Cold War tactics although possibility of localized aggression cannot be discounted. Tsushima said in conclusion that Defense Agency will continue build up along lines of current 3-year plan but modernization of weapons also required.

Admiral Stump and I spoke along lines Deptels 1310 and secret parts of 1326⁵ but did not use material in para A.⁶ Fujiyama commented that our remarks were much appreciated and that Japan is prepared to do its share within limits of its economic capabilities.⁷

III —“Modernization of Japanese Self-Defense Forces”—Tsushima opened discussion by stating that Japanese Air Force is anxious to modernize equipment with US assistance and that its annual budget includes provision for improvement of equipment. He said that, with recent developments, self-defense forces are in urgent need of speedy build-up and would like to request various types of missiles from US as soon as possible. He said existing law for protection of equipment given GOJ under MDAP provides sufficient security safeguards. In reply, Admiral Stump advised committee that US prepared to offer “Sidewinder” (as authorized DEF 933991).⁸ Admiral Stump also said that US military will investigate possibility of providing other missiles to Japan. Tsushima and Fujiyama expressed warm gratification with our prompt response to Japanese request for “Sidewinder”.

IV —“Integration of air defense operations”—Tsushima noted briefly completion of staff study by members of Air Self-Defense Force and Fifth Air Force on coordination of air defense operations. He said he would study report in view of importance of this problem which involves political and legal difficulties. Admiral Stump expressed appreciation for Tsushima’s remarks and for efforts already made to solve this problem.

V —“NATO meeting”—I had on Dec. 14 given Japanese background paper on general purposes of NATO meeting based on material given me by Department. I pointed out such exchanges of info in advance of NATO meeting in keeping with new era of US-Japanese partnership. I said that once NATO meeting completed and I am informed of results, I intend to convey them to Foreign Ministry. Fujiyama expressed great appreciation for advance information on NATO Council meeting. He said Japan, as member of free world, vitally interested in these developments which have important impact on free world position. He also thought NATO meeting instructive for functioning of Security Committee. He hoped we would have further discussion of NATO meeting once we received information on its results.

VI —Final item of agenda was personal report by Prime Minister Kishi on his recent tour of Southeast Asia. Summary of Kishi’s remarks being sent in separate message.

VII —At the conclusion of the meeting Committee agreed on press release (Embtel 1641). At end of meeting Fujiyama suggested Committee meet again before Diet convenes January 25. We tentatively agreed to have next meeting on January 23 or 24.

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/12–2057. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and to COMUS Japan.
2. Telegram 1641 from Tokyo, December 19, contained the text of a press release on the meeting described in telegram 1651. (Ibid., 611.94/12–1957)
3. Despatch 707 from Tokyo, January 3, 1958, not printed. (Ibid., 611.94/1–358)
4. In telegram 1309, December 14, drafted in EUR and CA and approved by Robertson, the Department provided an assessment of current political trends in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People’s Republic of China. (Ibid., 611.94/12–1257)
5. Telegrams 1310, December 14, and 1326, December 17, were both on the subject of U.S. policy in response to Soviet military advances. (Ibid., 611.94/12–1257 and 611.94/12–1757, respectively) See also footnote 4, infra.
6. Paragraph A of telegram 1326 concerned U.S. estimates of Soviet missile development, including a prediction that by some time during the 1958–1959 period the Soviet Union would have built 10 prototypes of a 5,500-knot-range ICBM, with the possibility that 500 could be operational 2 or 3 years thereafter.
7. Telegram 1310 concluded with a statement that the United States would welcome Japanese views as to how Japan could most effectively contribute to “free world security, stability and progress.”
8. Not printed.