Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

229. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, September 23, 1957, 3–5:30 p.m.¹

Washington, September 23, 1957, 3–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Aiichiro Fujiyama, Foreign Minister of Japan
• Mr. Koichiro Asakai, Ambassador, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Kenichi Otabe, Counselor, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Toshiro Shimanouchi, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Funihiko Togo, Chief, 2nd Section, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Shinichiro Kondo, Director, Public Information and Cultural Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
• Mr. William C. Ockey, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
• Mr. J. Owen Zurhellen, FE, Interpreter

SUBJECT

• General Discussion of American-Japanese Relations by the Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister

The Secretary opened the meeting by noting that he had met the Foreign Minister at the UN in New York, and that it was a great satisfaction to welcome him to the Department of State. Mr. Fujiyama knew the Secretary’s special interest in Japan, dating from the time when he had negotiated the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The Secretary had been confident then that Japan would develop into a truly great country in the Far East and the Western Pacific, great in the sense of contributing to the welfare, peace and stability of the area. That confidence has been proven justified. The United States wishes to contribute in any way possible to achieve further results along these lines.

The recent visit of Prime Minister Kishi, who was at that time also Acting Foreign Minister, had been very useful, the Secretary continued. He had received a cordial note from Mr. Kishi introducing Mr. Fujiyama, and he wanted Mr. Fujiyama to carry back his thanks. He would be happy to continue through Mr. Fujiyama the good relations maintained with Prime Minister Kishi, and asked that the talks today be in the same spirit of frankness and friendship as those held with Mr. Kishi.

The Foreign Minister said that it was a great honor to meet Mr. Dulles in Washington. He had ended a 35-year career as a businessman to enter the Government as Foreign Minister, and it was significant, and would be remembered by him, that this discussion was being held as a starting point in his new career. He had been a close friend of Mr. Kishi for over 20 years, and had always hoped that Mr. Kishi would someday become Prime Minister. When that eventuality came to pass, and Mr. Kishi strongly urged him to accept the post of Foreign Minister, he had accepted because he knew that Mr. Kishi wanted a man who agreed with him. They wanted no duality in foreign affairs, but the closest teamwork. The fact that he had become Foreign Minister did not mean that there would be any alteration in Japan’s foreign policy, but on the contrary he was resolved to pursue the objectives decided upon between the President and the Prime Minister.

As the Secretary knew, Mr. Fujiyama continued, the new Kishi Cabinet had taken office on July 10 of this year. The reorganization of the Cabinet had given it added strength, and one factor in that strength was the successful visit which Mr. Kishi had made to Washington, during which the cornerstone had been laid for close cooperation with the United States in various fields of foreign relations. Japan relied on its relations with the United States as the keynote for its relations with other areas, such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Japan’s policy was to solve problems and work for adjustments through the United Nations.

On the domestic side, there were two problems which the Foreign Minister wanted to mention, labor and education. A Cabinet Council had been set up to deal with labor matters, and Mr. Ishida, former Chief Cabinet Secretary who had accompanied Mr. Kishi to Washington, had been appointed Minister of Labor. Basically, the labor problem in Japan is one which the present Cabinet can solve. Public opinion supports the Cabinet, as was indicated by the reaction to the Government’s action in discharging striking workers on the Government railroads several months ago. To a certain extent, at least, the Government can succeed in its labor program.

In the field of education, the Government is determined to move ahead in spite of strong resistance from the Japan Teachers’ Union. Steps will be taken to improve the general administration of education as well as its content. Within the context of wider relations between the United States and Japan, Mr. Fujiyama desired to bring up the question of education in the Ryukyu Islands, as he had twice been requested to do by the Minister of Education. The election of a communist sympathizer, if not an outright communist, as mayor of Naha had indicated, he believed, that there is an unhealthy and dangerous drift in the Ryukyus, for which education is partly, at least, responsible. The Japanese Government is taking forceful measures in education in Japan, and believes that it would be a welcome first step if some participation in education in the Ryukyus could be returned to Japan. This would also satisfy some of the aspirations of the people of the Ryukyus, and remove some of the sting arising from the fact that the islands are still under military government.

It might be difficult, the Foreign Minister admitted, to accomplish this from the administrative point of view, but it would be a first step to assure Japan of the eventual restoration to it of the civil administration of the Ryukyus. This would be a great help to United States-Japanese relations and would be beneficial to the people of Japan and of the Ryukyus. He asked the Secretary to give thought to this proposal.

The people of Japan, Mr. Fujiyama continued, are looking forward to the results of the Kishi–Eisenhower talks. The new Joint Committee on Security has already met twice, and both the Government and the people are well satisfied. The recent exchange of notes between our two countries linking the Security Treaty to the United Nations has had a very favorable impact. Another result of the talks has been the rapid withdrawal of American ground combat forces. Various problems have been discussed in the Joint Committee on Security, and it has been favorably received by the Japanese people. The military participants in the Committee have been very helpful, and he wanted particularly to express gratitude for the part played by General Smith.

The Foreign Minister said, however, that there were two matters which concerned the Japanese people and on which they were still waiting to hear the results of the Kishi–Eisenhower talks, the repatriation of the Bonin islanders and the release of war criminals. The details of the talks on these matters had not been disclosed, but it was known that they had been discussed and there was a strong desire for their settlement. It was especially disturbing that persons of pure Japanese ancestry were excluded from the islands, while persons of partly Caucasian ancestry had been allowed to return. The people and Government of Japan would greatly appreciate it if some means could be found to allow some repatriation. It would not be necessary for all to go, or for all the islands to be opened, but they hoped for the admission of at least several hundred on this occasion.

The League for Acceleration of Return to the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, Mr. Fujiyama said, strongly desires to have some persons return to the islands, and he wanted to do anything that he could to remove this problem from the field of American-Japanese relations. The League has 2,000 members, but the Foreign Minister did not know how many of these would actually want to return to the islands if the opportunity were offered. He believed that the very fact that they were forbidden to travel to the Bonins might be a principal cause of their agitation. Twelve years have elapsed since the end of the war, many of the people are elderly, and perhaps only a handful would return. If two or three hundred could be allowed in, as a first increment, that might solve this petty situation.

On the subject of war criminals, the Foreign Minister continued, the number was not large, but the fact that there are any at all, twelve years after the end of the war, is a sore spot. He realized that it might not be possible to dispose of all Class A, Class B and Class C cases at once. Although the United States has suggested that Japan set up a new Commission to review Class B and C cases, Japan already has such a Commission. It would be undesirable to set up a new Commission, because to do so would undermine the trust and confidence enjoyed by the present Commission, and Japan would therefore like to use the existent Commission for the review of the war criminal cases. If it proved difficult to reduce the sentences of the war criminals to the time already served, and thus free them entirely, could not the system of supervision and surveillance over those on parole be terminated? The important thing, the Foreign Minister said, was to move ahead, step by step, however slowly, and not to stand still. If this can be done, the people will be impressed with the results of the Washington talks. If these problems regarding the Bonin Islands and the war criminals can be solved, then overall United States-Japan relations will improve at the same time. Some problems are well handled through established diplomatic channels, Mr. Fujiyama emphasized, but as Minister of Foreign Affairs he was interested in trying to solve these particular cases in a way which would strengthen relations between the two countries.

The Foreign Minister asked whether the Secretary would like to comment at this point, or whether he would prefer Mr. Fujiyama to complete his entire presentation first.

The Secretary replied that he would be glad to comment on the matters already raised, and Mr. Fujiyama might then resume his presentation.

He was very glad, the Secretary said, that the Foreign Minister had presented frankly and without reserve the political problems facing his country, and that he had expressed the desire to work together for our mutual advantage. He was very happy that the Japanese Government intended to deal vigorously with the labor problem in Japan. He had felt, from his own knowledge, that the labor situation was dangerous and the unions apt to be infiltrated by communist agitators. We know that the communists try particularly to get control over labor unions. We have had this problem in our own country, and perhaps it has not yet been dealt with completely adequately. It is important that the Japanese labor movement not be controlled by communists. They are extremely able organizers, and excel at organizing mass movements. Of course we do not think, and the Japanese Government would not think, that mere repression is the answer. What is needed is a good labor movement which will not fall under the leadership of men with ulterior motives.

Education needs careful watching, Mr. Dulles continued. The communist emphasis on youth and the training of youth is one element in their worldwide program, and is a great element of danger. They think about the education of youth in long-range terms. Too often democratic societies, with elections every few years, think in shorter-range terms. The communists are also apt to penetrate into teachers’ unions. The Secretary said that he did not know whether the proposal regarding education in the Ryukyus was practicable, but that he would take note of it and submit it for study to those who have the primary responsibility for the Ryukyus.

We too, continued the Secretary, are gratified at the prompt implementation of the agreements reached with Prime Minister Kishi. By means of the new Joint Committee on Security, it was possible to develop an acceptable degree of mutuality to serve the interests of both countries without modifying the terms of the Security Treaty, which would have been very difficult. Rapid progress has also been made in the withdrawal of ground combat forces, which the Secretary understood would all have left Japan by the end of this year.

Regarding the Bonin Islands, Mr. Dulles went on, Mr. Kishi had been told that we would study the possibility of repatriation, and Mr. Kishi had suggested that, if repatriation seemed impracticable, indemnification of the former inhabitants be considered. The matter has been considered, and considered very carefully, said the Secretary, but he was sorry to say that the result was negative. A real effort had been made to see if it would be practicable. Mr. Dulles said that he had pressed the Defense Department very strongly to justify their stand against any repatriation, and that he had been convinced of the validity of their arguments. He had concluded that their analysis of security factors was valid, and that repatriation was just not practicable. Indeed, he thought that the Defense Department regretted the presence of the 176 or so persons who were already there. While he had said that this conclusion was mainly justified by the Defense Department, who bear primary responsibility for the Bonin Islands, Mr. Dulles emphasized, he did not want it thought that the whole onus of the decision was theirs. He himself doubted whether it would in fact serve the interests of our two countries if one or two hundred persons returned to the islands. That would only increase the demands and produce a recurrent problem. While the reasons for this conclusion had been primarily adduced by the military authorities, he said, he did not feel that the conclusion was necessarily against the cause of good relations between the two countries. Experience shows that a little beginning only increases the demand. There is a real limit to means of livelihood on these islands, and very little land. It would be much better to take Mr. Kishi’s suggested alternative and consider indemnification. That alternative he would be glad to consider.

The Secretary then said that he would turn to the question of war criminals. Mr. Robertson said that there was no problem in the cases of the three civilian Class A criminals, but that the other seven Class A’s, who are former military men, were more difficult.

Mr. Dulles said that this was a technical problem to him, and perhaps it was to Mr. Fujiyama as well. He was somewhat confused by the distinctions between A’s, B’s, C’s, parole, civilians, military, etc. The Foreign Minister said that if there was a disposition on the Secretary’s part to do something about the war criminals, that would suffice, and he would leave a paper² with the Department for the discussion of details.

We do expect to do something about them, the Secretary replied. We are prepared to recommend to the other countries concerned reduction of the sentences of the three civilian Class A men to the time they have already served, so that they can start anew with a clean slate. We will try to do something for the other seven, and to find some way of ending surveillance. Regarding the Class B and C men, however, we have some doubt as to whether the present Japanese Commission meets the requirements which we have for review of the cases by a non-political body.

The Foreign Minister asked that the recommendation to the other countries regarding the Class A men be made as soon as possible.

Mr. Robertson said that we were now trying to work that out. Our parole board is reluctant to treat the former military men on the same basis as the civilians, but if it proves impossible to reduce their sentences we will try to end the surveillance.

The Foreign Minister then returned to the question of education in the Ryukyu Islands, and said that the Japanese Ministry of Education had made a study of the textbooks in use in the Ryukyus. These texts, it had been found, were not appropriate for the education of the people of the Ryukyus, who are, after all, Japanese from the political point of view. He asked whether it would not be possible to adopt the Japanese point of view in the texts, or to use Japanese texts. He requested that consideration be given to consultation with the Japanese regarding textbooks.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Fujiyama had a paper on the texts pointing out the parts considered objectionable. The Foreign Minister said that he would send such a paper after his return to Japan. The Secretary asked that it be turned over to Ambassador MacArthur, and expressed the thought that something might be done.³

Mr. Robertson then asked the Foreign Minister whether the school texts in Japan were selected by the Teachers’ Union. Mr. Fujiyama replied that this was done by the Ministry of Education.

Mr. Fujiyama then said that he understood well the difficulty of the military point of view on the Bonin Islands, but that Japanese public opinion was very strong on this subject. If the military would only be specific and say what type of people they did not want in the Bonins (Mr. Dulles interjected: any) or what number (Mr. Dulles: any) or in what places (Mr. Dulles: any) then progress could be made.

The Foreign Minister continued that not only the Japanese, but all Oriental peoples, have a strong religious desire to visit the graves of their ancestors, and said that the Japanese would deeply appreciate arrangements being made for such visits to the Bonins.

The Secretary recalled that Prime Minister Kishi had made a strong sentimental and moral appeal for such visits, which had impressed those who heard it. The Secretary had inquired about the feasibility, but had been told that it was not possible to find the graves.

Mr. Robertson said we had been informed that many grave markers had been destroyed by bombing during the war and that the jungle growth in the meantime had also obliterated many of them.

Mr. Fujiyama said that as far as the Japanese Government is concerned, it cannot tell the people that they cannot return to the Bonins to visit graves because there are no graves. The people themselves would know the locations.

Mr. Dulles asked whether it would be feasible to send a Japanese Government representative to the islands to verify the situation. Mr. Robertson pointed out that while there were no facilities for visitors on the islands, we would explore this suggestion.

It was impossible to believe that there were no graves, Mr. Fujiyama continued. Common sense dictated that in a place where thousands of people had lived there would be graves.

But the markers have been destroyed, rejoined the Secretary, and the place is heavily overgrown. What could be done to put the Japanese Government in a position to verify the facts? The Foreign Minister said that at any rate he would appreciate it if the Secretary would pursue the matter sympathetically.

Mr. Fujiyama than went on to say the he had been asked by the Prime Minister to mention the matter of the nuclear tests which the United States has announced it intends to carry out next spring. The Japanese people, old and young, are very sensitive on this question. It is not merely a question of communists. The Japanese Government was placed in a position where it had to lodge a protest. The handling of this matter is vital for the conservative government. The psychological situation in Japan compels the Government to stand for disarmament, the abolition of war, and the establishment of peace, and against the manufacture and use of all nuclear weapons. This was the background of the Foreign Minister’s speech the other day at the UN General Assembly.⁴

Mr. Dulles interjected that he had thought it a very good address.

The Japanese Government faces elections in 1959, Mr. Fujiyama continued, unless they should occur sooner by reason of dissolution of the Diet. It is the intent of the Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party to win a large number of seats in the Diet. If the question of nuclear testing should be handled awkwardly or unfortunately, the very existence of the Liberal-Democratic Party might be endangered. Japan has therefore concluded that it had to make a unilateral proposal for the banning of nuclear tests.

The matter of United States-Japan trade relations was then brought up by the Foreign Minister. The Japanese Government, he said, appreciates the present Administration’s profound understanding of Japan’s need for trade, and knows that all possible efforts, including the use of the veto, have been made to avoid adverse courses of action. The Japanese people know that there will be elections in the United States next year, and that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act will expire. They fear that these events will be accompanied by increased agitation for trade restrictions. Within Japan every effort is being made to hold down quotas on exports to the United States and to carry out orderly marketing. Controls are exercised on both quality and volume. While the two governments agree as to the logic of these measures, however, the simple logic of the common man in Japan notes only that Japan buys twice as much from the United States as she sells, and that Japan is hard put to find the dollar exchange to make up the difference between a billion dollars in purchases and half a billion dollars in sales. Most of the items in the export trade to the United States are those handled by small and medium business enterprises, and these firms are especially hard hit by restrictions. The Foreign Minister said that he understood the American measures already being taken, but earnestly hoped that every effort would be made to maintain the present arrangements, since any move to restrict trade further would weaken the overall relationship between Japan and the United States.

There are many small firms in Japan in the export trade, Mr. Fujiyama continued. Particularly among these there is a strong desire to increase trade with communist China. The Government and informed circles have no high expectations regarding increased trade with the Chinese communists, but the demands of the trading firms must be satisfied to some extent and directed into non-injurious channels. This problem is completely divorced from the question of political recognition. The Japanese Government is now considering granting permission for the stationing in Japan of a Chinese communist trade representative. The Government’s purpose is to prevent leftists and communists from involving themselves in the trade as middlemen and steering the trade in a manner not beneficial to Japan. It is contemplated that there would be in Japan a representative of the International Import and Export Corporation of China with whom the Japanese traders could deal directly, instead of having to deal through local leftist middlemen. The Japanese believe that this approach will keep trade in trading channels, and will keep politics out. They feel that this is the most practical way to direct into proper channels the strong demand in Japan for trade relations with communist China, but emphasize that it is not a step towards political recognition.

As the Secretary would recall, Mr. Fujiyama went on, Mr. Kishi had proposed a Southeast Asia development fund. We all understand that there are many approaches to develop this idea in a practicable and feasible form. The Japanese do not necessarily intend to insist upon the Kishi proposals in their original form, but are awaiting the reactions, comments, criticisms and suggestions of the Southeast Asian countries. The Foreign Minister would welcome any comments from the Secretary, whether favorable or unfavorable, and any suggestions he might care to make. It was not necessary to do the whole thing at once, but the Japanese rather want to start with what is feasible now. With that in mind, the Japanese budget for next year will contain funds for financing a technical training center for cooperation with the Southeast Asian nations. Mr. Fujiyama asked for suggestions in that connection, and for further earnest consideration by the United States. The Japanese purpose, he explained, was not only to assist in the economic development of the other countries concerned, but also to expand trade for the benefit of Japan and the entire free world. He asked for the Secretary’s comments.

Mr. Dulles said that he would take up the disarmament question first. Both he and the Foreign Minister had spoken on that subject at the UN General Assembly in New York; he had examined in a tentative way what the Foreign Minister had said, and he hoped that Mr. Fujiyama had done the same about his remarks. The Secretary said that he understood quite well the natural abhorrence which the people of Japan feel for atomic weapons, although he expected more people had actually died under worse conditions in Tokyo than in Hiroshima. The basic fact was this: there has been discovered in the last twelve years a great new source of power. Within time, in perhaps 5, 10, or 20 years, no one can say just when, this source of power will be used in almost everything we do. If we consider the situation 50 years from now, perhaps all our lights, our clocks, even our watches, will run by this power. Now it is in a crude state. It is like electricity, which once was nothing but lightning to burn down houses, but now is a great servant of men both for war and in peace, happily more for peace than for war.

To think that this new power would not be used if we have a war would be unrealistic, the Secretary continued. Even if they destroyed all nuclear weapons now, the great powers could remake them in a matter of a few weeks. It took a long time to make the first ones, but now it would be easy and would almost surely be done. If we can take steps to make war less likely, such as mutual inspection, and if there is no war, then of course nuclear weapons will not be used. But if we cannot make war less likely, then we must study ways to use the atom with the least destruction of life. This assumes that we conduct our testing under conditions not injurious to human life. As the Secretary had stated at the UN, we are prepared to stop testing nuclear weapons if steps are taken at the same time to make war less likely, but if the latter is not done, then we must find weapons which, if used, will not destroy all human life.

We realize, Mr. Dulles went on, that the Japanese Government has a special problem that is more emotional than reasonable. The American people perhaps reason about this, while the Japanese view the problem emotionally, and the Japanese Government must take that into account. If we thought the testing was injurious we would be the first to stop it, as we are in the most danger. There is more testing in the United States then elsewhere, and the prevailing winds blow the residue of explosions in our direction, but we are taking and will continue to take proper safeguards. We think it is possible to keep future discharges of radioactive material into the atmosphere within an amount which will do no more than replace that material which is losing its radioactivity, thus not exceeding the present level of radioactivity. The Secretary hoped that Mr. Fujiyama would have an opportunity to talk to Admiral Strauss about these technical aspects.

We hope, continued the Secretary, that we can work closely together at the UN on these matters. We realize that the Japanese have special problems and will not press them unduly regarding politically important things. We want to strengthen the Foreign Minister and the Government, not lead them to political suicide. The Secretary hoped that Mr. Fujiyama and the Japanese Government recognize the integrity of our purpose, as we do theirs, and that we can work closely and avoid any appearance of the Japanese joining with the Russians. The position of the Russians is not sound and would greatly injure the defense capability of the free world.

With respect to trade, the Secretary went on, we are confident that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act will be renewed next year. There is some increase in protectionist feeling in the South. The South has changed. It used to be an agricultural area, producing cotton for export. Now it is to a considerable extent industrialized and the market for cotton is not abroad, but here in Washington in the Commodity Credit Corporation. They know that they have a support price, and what cannot be sold abroad will be bought here. There is no dependence on foreign markets. It is for these two reasons that the South has become more protectionist. You may say that it is wrong, but it is a fact. I say that it is wrong too, said Mr. Dulles, but I know it to be a fact. We are confident, however, that the Trade Agreements Act will be renewed and the President is already thinking and talking of plans to assure that it is.

Regarding trade with communist China, the Secretary went on, the Japanese would suffer bad political consequences if they were to open a regular trade office on the China mainland. The small businessmen would not benefit, because the communists do not deal with small traders. They like items such as electronic equipment. The political liability would be greater than the commercial benefits. He realized that the Japanese consider their plan the lesser of two evils. Perhaps they were right; he did not know. He thought, however, that it would be useful for them to consider the example of Chancellor Adenauer who was quite successful politically without indulging in compromise.

We feel, the Secretary continued, that the growth of trade between Japan and the Southeast Asian countries is very important, and in principle we favor and encourage the idea of economic development such as suggested by the Japanese. We do not think, however, that the proposed organization with a capital of $700 million is practical. Multiplicity of means is not desirable; we already have the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, our new development loan fund, and we prefer to work through these generalized institutions rather than set up a new one of limited character. It is frequently the case that others desire to set up new banks with United States funds. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization wants one for the African trade. The UN wants SUNFED and things of that sort. When Mr. Dillon was recently in Buenos Aires, they wanted something for South America, and so on. If there is a real opportunity to do business between Japan and Southeast Asia and help is needed from the United States, we will find one means or another to help. The important thing, however, is to find the business and then see if a new organization is needed. Where there is a good business prospect it should be possible to find means of providing the capital. The Japanese are proceeding on a more modest basis, and that is fine. If the idea develops, we may find some way to help. First, though, it is necessary to get the responses from the other countries, which will shed light on the problem.

To recapitulate, said the Secretary, the idea of Japan-Southeast Asia cooperation is absolutely sound. The Japanese have the technical know-how and the industrial capacity. The other countries have raw materials. The United States, however, does not feel that new regional institutions are necessary, but rather that the present institutions are adequate. We will welcome further knowledge of the situation when it is obtained by the Japanese. If there is business to be done but no credit available, then will be the time to think of a new institution. We fully recognize that trade is vital for Japan. With a population soon approaching 100 million, Japan needs a solid, dependable foreign trade, not the kind to be found on the China mainland, which has never really been a major market for Japan. It is important to encourage the development of new markets, but the need for a new agency has not been demonstrated.⁵

The Secretary then asked Mr. Dillon if he had anything to add. Mr. Dillon said that he did not, but that he was always glad to hear from the Japanese. He would be particularly interested in learning the responses from the Southeast Asian nations to the Japanese approach, since in the past they had not been noted for any desire for regional organization.

Foreign Minister Fujiyama said that he had no responses as yet, and so did not intend to pursue the matter in detail. The Japanese plan to move ahead in a modest way, however, and any evidence of support would help them.

Mr. Dulles said that if the responses indicate that business can be done and more capital is needed, the Japanese should not hesitate to come to us on a case by case basis. Under Mr. Stassen’s guidance the “Arc of Asia” plan had been proposed, but it had not been possible to find reality behind the name. The Southeast Asian countries were not anxious for triangular or multilateral business, and our experience had not been good. Perhaps the Japanese will develop possibilities which we could not find, however. The Secretary said that he did not guarantee the funds to make up shortages of capital, but the Japanese should talk to us and we will try to help.

Ambassador Asakai stated that the Japanese already had two or three concrete programs in mind. Mr. Dulles said that this was fine.

The Foreign Minister noted that time was running short, and that he would just like to mention several other topics, such as the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to Japan, an agreement for the peaceful use of atomic energy and temporary agricultural workers.

The Secretary said that a program had been worked out to increase the number of temporary agricultural workers from Japan by 1,000 per year for the next two years, so that there would be a total of 3,000 in this country thereafter on a revolving basis.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that this matter was not yet ready for public announcement and that no premature public disclosure should be made.

Mr. Fujiyama said that other topics which he would like to mention in passing were the return of vested Japanese assets in the United States, and the desire of Japan Air Lines for terminal rights at Los Angeles. He also wanted to call attention to the deadlocked negotiations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. He would not cover the whole course of the negotiations, he said, but the problems boil down to the fact that the Republic of Korea will not accept the United States interpretation of the Japanese Peace Treaty on property claims,

As a final point, said Foreign Minister Fujiyama, he wanted to urge the importance of cultural relations. The Russians were very vigorous and aggressive in sending artists to Japan. These artists, such as the Bolshoi Ballet, which is at present in Japan, are welcomed not merely by the communists in Japan but by all people who admire their artistry. Because of the lack of dollar funds, Japan cannot invite American artists to come to Japan. The Russians, however, pay all the expenses for their groups. Serious efforts should be made regarding this problem.

The Secretary said that he attached great importance to this problem. On an early trip to Japan he took with him Mr. John D. Rockefeller 3rd⁶ and got him interested in certain types of cultural exchange. The Rockefeller Foundation, of which Mr. Dulles had been chairman, financed the exchanges of persons to some extent. He mentioned this only to show the importance which he himself attached to this type of relationship. A society operating along private lines, however, cannot do some of the things that a totalitarian regime can do. We cannot order artists to go somewhere, or easily pay their way. On the other hand the point certainly deserves mention and should be in our minds.

Foreign Minister Fujiyama then said that although this had been a very interesting discussion he was deeply disappointed in regard to the Bonin Islands. It seemed that there was no hope, He would be very grateful at this time if he could hear an assurance that the problem could still be discussed and that study would continue. He was particularly disappointed because as a result of the Kishi visit there had arisen a hope that some solution would be arrived at to give some satisfaction to the Japanese people and especially to the Bonin Islanders. It would be most disappointing and heartbreaking if he were to convey the Secretary’s words to the Japanese. Could the Department of State continue to discuss this question with the Department of Defense and find some formula to satisfy Japan? The area of admittance might be restricted, the number of persons, or the occupations they were to follow, any formula to give the Bonin Islanders some satisfaction. He hoped that the door was not completely closed. From the point of view of our overall relations a solution should be found. These people were not communists. They are hard-working men of integrity. It would be heartbreaking for Mr. Fujiyama to bring them disappointment. If the door were open even to one or two hundred he was sure that the Boin Islanders’ League could take the responsibility of selecting only those who would represent the best in the Bonin Islands.

The Secretary replied that when Mr. Kishi was here the latter had stated that if repatriation was too difficult then indemnification might be a solution. The Secretary then read the following remarks of Mr. Kishi from the record of their talks: (KIV 7a)

“If …⁷ the United States should still find it extremely difficult to permit even these persons to return, then he had to point out that the question arose of indemnification for those persons who were unable to return and who were having difficulty in maintaining their livelihood in Japan proper.”⁸

The Secretary wondered whether this was not the solution for them to consider. There were security factors on which he could not elaborate, he said, but which were particularly important now with the withdrawal of American forces from Japan. These factors require an exclusive military reserve. If these factors had been known in the period immediately after the end of the war, it was probable the 176 present inhabitants would not have been readmitted to the islands. The military authorities had explained this in a convincing way, and he had not been easy to convince. He would have preferred to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government but he had been persuaded otherwise. There is very little land in the Bonin Islands, and they are required as an exclusive military reserve. No one is wanted there. We would be glad to send the 176 back to the main islands of Japan if the Japanese Government wants them.

The Foreign Minister replied that to discuss the matter of indemnification would put an end to discussion of the whole matter of repatriation, and this would be extremely embarrassing to him. It was injustice and discrimination against other upright people that the present 176 inhabitants of partly Caucasian descent were the only Japanese allowed to live in the islands. He wondered whether further consideration could not be given to the admittance of a restricted number to a restricted area, under any other appropriate restrictions. He was not lacking in cognizance of the security of the United States, but the fact that some islanders of part Caucasian blood had been allowed to return was embarrassing.

It was not because we wanted to discriminate in favor of them, the Secretary said, that we had allowed these people to return, but because they were being discriminated against in Japan. The discrimination did not start with us, but with the Japanese. If we had it to do over, we would not take them. They have only a meager existence and are an embarrassment to the security of the islands. There is no need to make a public announcement, he continued, but it would be better to try paving the way for indemnification and for resettlement of these people in Japan. We have exhausted the means for consideration of this problem. The Defense Department has reasons which the Japanese would recognize as valid if they knew of them. We should not let a hundred people out of 90 million become a major difference between our countries; we are dealing with bigger elements.

Mr. Fujiyama questioned whether Japan had in fact originally discriminated against the part Caucasian Bonin Islanders.

The Secretary rejoined that neither he nor Mr. Fujiyama had firsthand information on that point.

The Foreign Minister said that he fervently hoped that the Secretary would not stop considering this problem.

Mr. Dulles said that he would “not stop considering, but … ”⁹

However much he had been convinced by the military, Mr. Fujiyama continued, he hoped that the Secretary would continue to discuss with them all aspects of the problem and find something that would contribute to our mutual relations.

We reach the point, the Secretary said, where it is not fair or right to keep alive hopes. In fairness to them the islanders should be told to settle down where they are. At best the Japanese request would affect only one or two hundred people out of several thousand. Whether it is better to keep alive these hopes is very doubtful. We have tried to find a way to squeeze a few people into these wretched islands, but it is impossible. It would be better for the Foreign Minister to report to Prime Minister Kishi and see if he does not agree to discuss indemnification. We will await further word, the Secretary concluded.

Mr. Fujiyama said that that was agreeable to him. The Secretary then handed Mr. Fujiyama a memorandum containing an agreed announcement to be made to the press. Mr. Fujiyama approved the announcement, but said that the Japanese would also like to be able to inform their press that Southeast Asian development and United States-Japanese cultural relations had been discussed. This was agreed to. (Press announcement attached hereto)¹⁰

The Foreign Minister then said that he would like to give the press, as background information, a statement that he had opened formal negotiations with the Secretary on an agreement for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. After a brief discussion with the other officers present, the Secretary said that he had no objection to this.

The meeting thereupon concluded, it being 5:30 p.m.¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen on October 1.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. In a memorandum to the Secretary dated November 8, drafted in NA, Jones reported that the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus was opposed to return of outright or modified control of Ryukyuan education to the Japanese Government, on the ground that it would set a precedent and be an invitation for demands for reversion of other areas of civil government to Japan. Moreover, the High Commissioner pointed out that most textbooks at the primary and secondary levels were already chosen from those approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education. Jones stated in conclusion that a Foreign Office official had “acknowledged to the Embassy with evident embarrassment that when Mr. Fujiyama met with you he had not been informed that Japanese text books were used in the Ryukyus. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, Ryukyu Islands 1957)
4. Apparent reference to Fujiyama’s speech delivered September 19.
5. This portion of the conversation is summarized in circular telegram 344, October 11, printed in vol. XXI, p.398.
6. Reference is to Dulles’ stay in Japan, January 25–February 11, 1951. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 132 ff. and 777 ff.
7. Ellipsis in the source text.
8. Document 188.
9. Ellipsis in the source text.
10. Not printed.
11. On September 24 Fujiyama paid a courtesy call on Secretary Wilson, during which he brought up Japan’s desire for a continuation of of military assistance in order that the self-defense forces could be expanded. Fujiyama also asked for an expansion of offshore procurement, and stressed the increased ability of Japanese industry to fill orders. Wilson stated that consideration would be given to Japan’s needs. (Memorandum of conversation by William C. Ockey; Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/9–2457)