Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

228. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, September 23, 1957.

Dear Mr. Robertson: In accordance with your request,² the Department of Defense has completed a study to determine whether a limited number of former residents of the Bonin Islands could be repatriated from Japan. The conclusions drawn as a result of this survey are set forth below.

We know that in the 1930’s these islands supported an agricultural population of between 1,000 and 2,000 people. This was at the end of a long period of development which began with the first European settlers in the nineteenth century. It can be assumed therefore, on the basis of arability alone and aside from all other considerations, that there exists an eventual capability to support considerably more than the present 176 civilian inhabitants.

To determine an order of magnitude of support capability a number of factors must be weighed. Setting aside for the moment the security aspects of these islands we find the following to be true. The land has returned to nature and is jungle, except for the small amount tilled by the present inhabitants. There is no housing. Existing roads, waterworks, electricity, and other facilities are sufficient only for present requirements. Under existing conditions the 176 native inhabitants make a poor and minimum satisfactory living. They live in a harmony which is largely attributable to their common background and interests and the machinery of government required is negligible. Therefore, we find that in order for these islands to support any increase in their population there will require the expenditure of time, investment of capital, development of government organization and services, and social readjustment in ratios which place a variable limitation on both the size and success of any immigration. For these reasons it is extremely difficult to set a definite figure upon the number of additional population hypothetically supportable by the Bonin Islands. Secretary Dulles’ estimate of 200–300 is perhaps as good as can be made for a repatriation over a period of one to two years. This presupposes adequate financial support. A more accurate figure would depend upon detailed surveys requiring the expenditure of funds not now available or, under the circumstances, justifiable.

The study reviewed the security aspects of the U.S. occupancy of the Bonin Islands. The review confirmed our present position. In brief, present world conditions, the state of military technology and our strategic assessment make it essential that we refuse consideration of further repatriation for the foreseeable future. The withdrawal of our forces from Japan serves only to increase our need for this posture. We have previously outlined to you the present and contemplated future uses which require this control and the reservation of all useful land for military purposes. As you know the requirements of U.S. law restrict knowledge of some of the installations envisaged to the minimum who need to know. In carrying out its responsibility for protecting information this Department has concluded that the present policy of exclusion must be maintained. We consider that the presence of the 176 Bonin Islanders now resident in the islands is a justifiable exception to this policy. These individuals, descended from the original European settlers, were pro-U.S. throughout World War II and were returned to the Bonins shortly after the war to save them from the persecution they were undergoing in Japan. This repatriation occurred before the present military requirements developed. These islanders continue to be pro-U.S. and even are seeking U.S. citizenship. They offer no security problem. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they would have been returned to the Bonins if present needs had been known at the time. There is, of course, now no humane alternative to their continued residence. Except for the present islanders the presence of Japanese civilian visitors or residents, however innocent their intentions, would inevitably lead to difficult security problems and attendant irritations and prejudice to our relations with Japan. Therefore the Department of Defense strongly opposes the repatriation of any civilian to the Bonins, now or in the foreseeable future. Repatriation will be acceptable only concurrent with the release of the islands from U.S. control, which, of course, should not occur until world conditions have changed considerably.

Since it is not feasible to repatriate any of the Bonin Islanders from Japan it would seem proper to assist Prime Minister Kishi in disposing of the problem in a manner politically palatable to the Japanese people. Toward that end, it is recommended that the Departments of Defense and State, and other interested agencies, consult further with respect to compensating former residents whose private landholdings have been used or appropriated by U.S. forces. In view of the fact that these landowners were originally evicted by the Japanese government, it would seem reasonable for Japan to share the cost of such compensation. No study was made of the amount of land or money this would involve, or of the existence of any funds from which compensation might be paid.

It is recommended that the above conclusions be communicated to the Japanese government in such manner as you desire as soon as possible, together with a reiteration that so long as conditions of unrest and tension exist in the Far East, the U.S. must adhere to present policies with respect to the Bonin Islands.³

Sincerely yours,

John N. Irwin, II

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 294.94C22/9–2357. Confidential.
2. Reference is to a letter from Robertson to Sprague dated July 13. (Ibid., 033.9411/7–1357) a summary of this letter is contained in Document 208.

3. Dulles and Fujiyama discussed Bonin repatriation that same day; the memorandum of their conversation is infra.

   In a reply to Irwin dated November 4, Robertson wrote that Dulles “considered your letter carefully prior to his meeting with Foreign Minister Fujiyama on September 23 and decided that we should take the position that repatriation was not feasible in view of the military requirements which you described.” The letter noted that Dulles did agree, however, “that we would study the matter of indemnification for the displaced islanders.” Robertson also informed Irwin that the Department of State did not agree with Defense that Japan should share in the cost of compensating former residents whose property had been used or appropriated by U.S. forces. “Such a suggestion would nullify the major political objective we are seeking to obtain through compensation which is to eliminate or at least to greatly diminish the pressure for repatriation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 294.94C22/9–2357)