Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

191. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, June 21, 1957, 9 a.m.¹

KIV/MC–10a

Washington, June 21, 1957, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Approval of Joint Communiqué on Kishi Visit

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Kishi
• Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishida
• Japanese Ambassador Asakai
• Director, American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Koh Chiba
• Counselor of Japanese Embassy Tanaka
• Secretary of State
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• Assistant Secretary Berding
• Ambassador MacArthur
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin
• J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.
• Mr. Becker, L
• Mr. Parsons, NA

Mr. Kishi began the discussion by saying that he wanted to examine the contents of the draft joint communiqué² this morning because there were a number of minor questions requiring editing and a few suggestions of a major nature. He said that he would like to have the communiqué considered as a whole, rather than as a communiqué plus an annex. He wanted to revise the order somewhat and divide the communiqué into two parts, incorporating matters of United States-Japanese cooperation in the first part and matters of defense in the second part. If agreeable to the Secretary, he would like to re-edit some of the defense parts in order to meet more fully our ideas. He wondered whether the Secretary would agree to this.

The Secretary replied that he had no objection to the idea in principle, and it would certainly be useful. It would be necessary to translate that principle into a draft as rapidly as possible, however, and he hoped the group could have it in final form by the time they called on the President at 11 a.m. He asked whether the Prime Minister felt that his thoughts could be put into words by 11 a.m. The Prime Minister said that he thought that this was feasible, and he would proceed to explain certain details. He thought that the first two paragraphs of the draft should be considered the introduction. Part 1 of the communiqué should begin with the 3d paragraph, and the previous annex should be put into the text thereafter. The Prime Minister said that he thought that the principles contained in the annex were of some importance and should appear at an early stage in the document.

A number of minor changes in wording were then suggested and incorporated in the draft.

The Prime Minister then inquired whether it would be possible to dispense with the words, “concerning the implementation” in the sentence which read, “It was agreed to establish an intergovernmental committee to study basic problems concerning the implementation of the Security Treaty and to consult, wherever practicable, regarding the dispositiion and employment of United States forces in Japan.” The Secretary replied that he thought the sentence would not be very good in that form.

The Prime Minister said, however, that he would like to point out that in the Japanese translation the included words would appear to limit the function of the committee. He preferred to give the impression to the Japanese public that this would be a high-level committee to discuss basic matters.

The Secretary said he would like to exchange ideas a little further regarding the functions of this committee so that there would be no future misunderstandings.

Yesterday, the Prime Minister continued, Mr. Dulles had said that it would be difficult to change the Security Treaty because that would require Senate concurrence. He understood and appreciated that fact. He had no intent of using this terminology to permit Japan to bring up problems beyond those intended for the committee. His real purpose was simply to avoid giving the impression that this committee would have very limited authority and responsibility.

The Secretary replied that yesterday it had been considered that the joint committee would handle two matters, consultation on the disposition and employment of United States forces in Japan and making reports to the United Nations. He thought that the language would be better if it read, “study problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty.”

Mr. Kishi said that he would be quite happy with that, and the draft was so amended. The Secretary then proposed that that part of the same sentence reading, “and to consult, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment of United States forces in Japan” be changed to show, “including consultation” instead of “and to consult.” What we are discussing, he said, is whether this language would require consultation if the United States decided to send its forces from Japan to Korea, Taiwan, Guam, etc. He was sure that this was not intended, but he wanted to make sure the language was right.

The Prime Minister replied that this problem was taken care of by the words, “whenever practicable,” since on such occasions the United States might not find it practicable to consult.

The Secretary said that he did not know whether he objected to this, but he had thought that the matter of consultation concerned the disposition and employment of forces in Japan and that it would not be necessary in the case of forces being taken out. We want to reduce our forces, he said, and have no particular objection to consultation regarding that.

Ambassador Asakai interjected that wording was not meant to cover such a withdrawal. The Secretary noted, however, that as the draft was written, it would require consultation whenever any forces were taken out of Japan. He had thought that by consultation the Prime Minister had wanted to control the shifting of forces within Japan. In the Security Treaty the United States was given the right to move its forces about almost anywhere in Japan. Now we would agree not to exercise that right except after consultation. If the Prime Minister were to bring up the question of consultation on withdrawal of forces from Japan, that would be a new question. The Secretary then proposed that the sentence in question be further amended to read, “regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces.” This amendment was accepted.

The Prime Minister said that the most troublesome thing in Japan in connection with the Security Treaty was the fear that Japan could be gotten into a state of war involuntarily or without its knowledge in the event that the United States took action somewhere without the Japanese Government having known about it. This criticism is often heard in Tokyo and that was his reason for discussing this matter. He thought that Mr. Dulles’ wording was all right, but he wanted him to understand the uneasy feeling in Japan. If he could feel assured that in a major crisis the United States would inform Japan or give Japan an opportunity to consult, he felt that he could go along. He wondered whether this could be tacitly understood.

The Secretary said, “Let me say that the United States feels that in the event of any critical development in the Japan area which involved the prospect of war we would want to maintain very close relations with your Government. Obviously the successful prosecution of any war in that area would call for, if possible, the good will and support of the people and Government of Japan and we would not want in any way to act, unless it was imperative, in any way that was abrupt or lacking in the normal courtesy between friendly governments.”³

The Prime Minister said that he was very happy to have the Secretary’s thoughts and the wording was quite agreeable.

The Secretary handed the Prime Minister a draft paragraph which began: “The United States welcomed information on Japan’s firm plans for the buildup of her defense forces.” Ambassador Asakai said that to use this wording would result in the Prime Minister being questioned in the Diet as to why he had given information or explained to the United States something that seemed solely of concern to Japan.

Ambassador MacArthur asked whether this could not be interpreted as the Japan Defense Council plan. Ambassador Asakai explained that this plan had not yet been given to the Diet. It was then proposed that the sentence be changed to read: “The United States welcomed Japan’s plans for the buildup of her defense forces” and this wording was accepted.

The Prime Minister then said he would like to discuss the paragraph on strategic trade controls. He asked whether the following wording would be acceptable: “The Prime Minister, while recognizing the importance of exercising control in cooperation with other free world governments on exports of strategic materials to those countries threatening the independence of free nations through the extension of international Communism, pointed out the necessity for Japan to expand its trade with its neighboring countries. The President, while stressing the continuing need to exercise such control, recognized that Japan must trade to live.”

The Secretary said that he did not like this very much. He could not see the need for stressing the expansion of trade with neighboring countries. The draft later on goes on to say that Japan would seek a high level of trade with the United States which is not a neighbor. There could hardly be a greater need for Japan to expand her trade with her neighbors than with the United States. This paragraph, the Secretary continued, was not designed to cover the general problem of trade, but what was a portion of the military problem. Trade was to be covered in a later paragraph.

The Prime Minister asked if it would improve the matter to leave the President’s statement in its original form.

The Secretary asked why there had to be such emphasis on neighboring countries. Ambassador Asakai replied that they meant Red China, but had wanted to avoid that expression.

The Secretary asked why it was important to expand trade with Communist China. Was there some miraculous virtue to be obtained in that way? Of course, the Prime Minister was free to say anything he wanted to, but if the United States accepted his statement in a joint communiqué it would look as if the United States were withdrawing its opposition to trade with Red China, which was using that trade to build a war potential against the United States. The United States tolerates that trade, but opposes it as evil. We could not put the Japanese draft in the communiqué.

The Secretary then asked whether the whole paragraph ought not to be omitted. The Prime Minister inquired whether they should leave out the references to neighboring countries.

It was then agreed to leave the first sentence of this paragraph which contained the statement of the President unchanged and to replace the second sentence, the Prime Minister’s statement, with the following sentence: “The Prime Minister, while agreeing with the need for such control in cooperation with other free world governments, pointed out the necessity for Japan to increase its trade.”

The Secretary then said that he did not see the need for the word “ultimate” in the phrase “residual and ultimate sovereignty” as applied to the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. He said that he was not sure what was meant by this word and that in the discussions leading up to the peace treaty the word “residual” had always been used. At San Francisco former Prime Minister Yoshida had welcomed the Secretary’s statement on residual sovereignty, and the Secretary preferred to keep that language.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the Secretary, himself, had used the word “ultimate” at a press conference⁴ and that the Japanese had considered this a considerable improvement from their standpoint over the word “residual.” They were not sure as to exactly what “residual” meant, but they believed that “ultimate” meant that they would get the islands back some day. They had been happy at that statement and thought that there would be no objection to using both words. If one word had to be left out, however, they would prefer to keep “ultimate” in the text.

That showed how dangerous press conferences were, the Secretary replied. Words used at informal press conferences did not have the same nicety and legally binding effect as words carefully chosen in speeches designed to portray concepts. There was no great difference, but no thought that no bilateral change should be made in a subject which concerned not only ourselves, but the other parties to the peace treaty. Several of the allied governments had wanted to have Japan renounce all claim to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The United States, however, had felt it best to have Japan retain residual sovereignty, with the United States as the administering authority. These words have a certain history. The formula used in the peace treaty was a compromise not only with Japan, but with the other allied nations, and such a formal understanding could not be changed on the basis of a press conference.

Mr. Kishi said that he did not want to argue the question of legal authority, but wanted to point out that the word “residual” was not quite clear and did not include the idea that the islands would eventually revert to Japan. When the Japanese had heard the word “ultimate” used they had obtained a feeling that a new possibility had opened. He would be surely disappointed if he had to tell the people that the words were just the same.

The Secretary said that he thought it was clear from the phrase, “so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East the United States will find it necessary to continue to exercise its present powers and rights,” that we do not consider that our authority in these islands is in perpetuity. On the other hand, in a formal statement, the President and the Prime Minister could not properly seem to change a formulation agreed upon by almost 50 nations and to which certain nations such as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines attach great importance. It would not be right to use lesser language in an informal attempt to make a bilateral change in a multilateral undertaking. The United States could not do this in a formal document.

The meeting then adjourned at 11:25 so that the Secretary and the Prime Minister could call upon the President at the White House.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 889. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen and cleared by Robertson.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. See footnote 3, Document 193.
4. Reference is to the Secretary’s response to a question at a news conference held April 23, when he said: “Now, as you know, we have never ourselves sought to acquire the ultimate sovereignty of those islands. That remains with Japan, and we do not look upon this arrangement as a permanent arrangement. We do believe, and I think the Japanese would agree, that nothing should be done there which would so weaken the defensive posture of the free countries as would encourage an aggressive move on the part of the Communists.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1957, p. 766)