Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

187. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 11 a.m.¹

KIV/MC–6a

Washington, June 20, 1957, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Conversation Between Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary Dulles

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Kishi
• Ambassador of Japan Asakai
• Counselor of the Japanese Embassy Tanaka
• Director, American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Koh Chiba
• The Secretary of State
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• Ambassador MacArthur
• Mr. Becker, L
• Mr. Parsons, NA
• J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.

At 11:00, June 20, 1957, the Secretary asked the above participants to join him in his private office. The Secretary told the Prime Minister that if they were to accomplish what each hoped to have accomplished they would have to move swiftly and concretely. Time did not permit all the niceties of diplomatic usage, but the Secretary would tell the Prime Minister what could be done along the lines he desired. The Secretary inquired what were Mr. Kishi’s desires regarding the Security Treaty.

Mr. Kishi replied that in view of what should be the governing sentiment of partnership between the two countries Japan thought that it should have the right of consultation concerning the disposition of United States forces in Japan. As a second point, some provision should be made to clarify the relationship of the Security Treaty and the UN Charter. Third, if possible, a clear date should be set for the expiration of the Treaty, to signify the extent of time the Treaty would be in force. These three points were made, Mr. Chiba said, not because Japan wanted to weaken the Treaty or, as Mr. Dulles had said, “dilute” the relationship between the United States and Japan, but because it was felt that these points would contribute to a greater understanding among the Japanese people of the fundamental friendship between the United States and Japan.

The Secretary stated that he thought he could agree in principle that there should be consultation respecting the disposition of United States forces, but that this would not apply in an emergency situation where there was not time for consultation. This problem, he said, might be greatly minimized by the reduction in our combat ground forces which we contemplate carrying out at once. He asked the Prime Minister at what time and in what form he would like to have an assurance regarding this reduction in forces.

On the second point, the Secretary continued, he believed that we could make clear the relationship between the Security Treaty and the UN by, for example, making appropriate reports to the UN of any actions taken under the Treaty significant from the point of view of international peace and security. He did not think, however, that Article 4 of the Treaty could be altered to provide an expiration date. This would require submission to the United States Senate of an amendment to the Treaty, which would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate for passage. The Secretary thought that this would be difficult to obtain because we would be unable to explain in a way satisfactory to the Senate what the relationship would be between the United States and Japan in the event that the Treaty ceased to exist.

The Secretary stated that he gathered that the Prime Minister did not want, at this time, to suggest the replacement of the Security Treaty by another type of treaty. It would be preferable not to have to take any revision of the present Treaty to the Senate where the debate would not be helpful to Japanese-American relations and where the outcome would be doubtful. We could, the Secretary continued, of course reaffirm in the communiqué or in a letter the view of the United States Government that the Treaty was never designed to operate in perpetuity and that we hope that coming circumstances or other arrangements will permit its termination under Article 4.

The Secretary said that he understood that there had been criticism in Japan of Article 1 of the Security Treaty, under which the United States accepts the right to help, at the request of the Japanese Government, to put down internal riots due to the intervention of an outside power. This was to be done, the Secretary pointed out, only at the request of Japan, and he would have no objection to having it made clear publicly that such action would never be taken except at the express request of the Japanese Government.

The Prime Minister then stated that he had no thought whatever of seeking to abolish the Security Treaty in its basic sense. In the practical implementation of the Treaty, however, he felt, or in its form, the Japanese people believe that there is room for improvement. He would like to adjust the Treaty to the sentiments of the people. There was now a new situation, and he wondered whether a new, high-level committee could not be established to consider improvements in the implementation of the Treaty. Mr. Dulles had stated that it would be difficult to obtain Senate ratification, but the Prime Minister thought that it would be possible to solve the problems of consultation on the disposition of forces and reports to the UN with no actual change in the form of the Treaty.

The Secretary asked whether the Prime Minister felt disposed to respond to his question regarding making public the intent of the United States to reduce its forces in Japan. The Prime Minister should understand, he went on, that we are ready to announce now that we will wholly eliminate our ground forces from Japan within a year and that we will make substantial reductions in our other forces.

Mr. Kishi replied that he thought this announcement should be made in connection with his visit to the United States. He said that he would study the question of form and timing and reply on those points during the afternoon meeting.

The Secretary then said that he had something that he had wanted to say to the Prime Minister in the present small group. He assumed that Mr. Kishi’s Government desired to continue its close and intimate relationship with the United States, that Mr. Kishi shared, broadly speaking, our estimate of the danger from Soviet and Chinese Communism, and that these present talks were not designed just to ease the United States out of Japan because Japan did not want us with them.

Mr. Kishi broke in with the exclamation, “Absolutely”.

If that is so, the Secretary went on, then there is a large area in which we can work together and cooperate. But if, and I do not believe or hope that such is the case, it is the desire of the Japanese Government that we divorce ourselves from Japan, we will accommodate ourselves to that wish. There are alternative arrangements we can make in the Far East. Australia, for instance, had a mission here a few days ago asking that we develop Australia as an industrial base in place of Japan. I have believed throughout my association with Japan, the Secretary said, when I worked on the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty, that there was a basis for friendly and close cooperation between our two countries. But I want to be sure that this is what the Japanese Government really wants because if not we will not impose ourselves on Japan.

Mr. Kishi replied that as he had said on many occasions his conservative party (i.e., the Liberal-Democratic Party) feels that Japan’s future lies only in close cooperation with the United States. The Socialist Party, however, does not necessarily hold the same view, and if the Socialist Party came into power it is likely that this policy would be completely changed. The problem, therefore, is how the conservative party can be continued in power on a long term basis.

Can we understand, the Secretary asked, first that the Prime Minister will consider and let us know at our 3:00 p.m. meeting the form and time he desires for our public announcement of a precise statement on the reduction of our forces in Japan. We will include in the communiqué or in an exchange of letters, he continued, a statement that we will establish a joint group to study problems concerning the implementation of the Security Treaty and among other things the implementation of the principle of consultation wherever practicable by Japan and the United States regarding the disposition and employment of such United States forces as will remain in Japan.

Mr. Kishi answered that this would be fine.

The Secretary said that it should also be considered how to establish the maximum relationship with the UN through such reporting as might be appropriate.

Mr. Chiba asked whether this was also to be the responsibility of the proposed joint group. The Secretary answered that it could be either way the Prime Minister wanted, either handled by the joint group or included in the final communiqué. The Prime Minister said that he would consider this question and reply later.

The Secretary then asked whether, in the light of what he had said before, the Prime Minister desired some statement to be made about the expiration of the Security Treaty and the fact that we reaffirm that the Treaty was not meant to be in perpetuity, but for a transitory period.

Mr. Kishi said that his thought had been that the Treaty should be amended so as to have an initial period of validity for five years from the present, with each party to have the option of termination at one year’s notice thereafter. However, he felt that if some expression that the Treaty was not intended to be perpetual could be made, that might serve to a certain extent the purpose he had in mind.

The Secretary said that he thought appropriate language could be found for that purpose. He continued that, regarding the question of Okinawa and the Ryukyus, it was very difficult to see how any significant statement could be made on either matter, but he would be prepared to study further whether a very limited number of former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands could be permitted to return there.

When Mr. Kishi asked about how many this number might be, the Secretary replied that he thought the maximum would be about two or three hundred, perhaps. The actual number of persons would have to be established with a view towards security requirements (and he mentioned that the islands were being used for military purposes more than is generally realized) and in line with the amount of land available. There was only little arable land, he pointed out, for farmers and only one port for fishermen.

The Secretary continued that he did not know whether the President would approve the idea even in principle, but it might be possible to make a survey of the islands which would lead to the reintroduction of a relatively small number of people. He wanted, however, to emphasize two things: one, that our ability to reduce to some extent the military use of land in Japan involves the more intensive use of the Bonins, and two, that if the objective of the Prime Minister was to get relations on a better long-term basis, in the Secretary’s opinion the return of a few hundred persons to the Bonins might give the Prime Minister the impression of an immediate accomplishment but the problems which might grow out of this in the future would be even more difficult. The present 176 residents of the Bonins are essentially oriented towards the United States, and would like to become American citizens. If there were added in that meager territory even seven hundred persons more oriented toward Japan, it would cause difficulties and friction and future embarrassment to both countries. Perhaps the Prime Minister would consider this matter further.

The Secretary then asked whether Mr. Kishi would like to discuss the matter of war criminals then or later.

Mr. Kishi said that regarding Okinawa he had another request on the part of Japan, which had to do with the question of lump-sum payment for land requisitioned for military use. There have been proposals in Japan, he said, for an investigation by a committee composed of American Congressmen and Japanese Diet members which would result in a joint decision on this matter. He asked whether the United States could defer measures being taken to requisition further land in Okinawa pending such an investigation.

The Secretary replied that it was not practicable from our standpoint to turn this responsibility over to Congress. Our system differs from the parliamentary system, and under our Constitution the President conducts foreign affairs, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and cannot delegate those responsibilities to a Congressional Committee. The United States, he went on, is making a very close restudy of the land requirements in those area; he was not sure whether this would lead to any re-estimate of the requirements in Okinawa, but we were requesting the military to cut their requirements to the absolute minimum.

Mr. Kishi pointed out that there was no alternate land for the farmers in Okinawa when their land was requisitioned and asked whether the United States could assist in emigration of the affected persons to other countries.

The Secretary answered that this question was new to him, and he would not be able to reply at once. Ambassador MacArthur commented that the problem was to get the other countries to accept the immigrants. The Secretary jokingly remarked that he would like to see some of the Okinawans settle in New Guinea, but that the Australians would not have it. Mr. Robertson remarked that a colony of Okinawans had been moved to Bolivia last year, but that it had not worked out well.

Mr. Kishi inquired whether thought had been given to resettlement of Okinawans in the Trust Territory, or on Saipan or Tinian. The Secretary said that this question would be explored. He remarked, however, that the new jet aircraft are taking more space all the time in Okinawa and other places, and he did not know what could be done about the problem.

Mr. Kishi said that he was very desirous of meeting the anxiety of the Japanese people. He asked whether consideration could be given to permitting the flying of the Japanese flag in Okinawa.

The time had come for the Prime Minister’s party to depart for the Capitol, however, and the meeting came to an end at 12:05 without this question having been answered.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen and cleared by Robertson and MacArthur.