185. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)1
SUBJECT
- Bonin Islands
The following items are submitted in brief explanation of some of the more important factors from a military point of view to be considered in connection with retention of the Bonin Islands. These factors relate only to this element of the problem, and are not to be construed as covering the entire problem.
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Our base system in the Pacific Ocean is a single strategic entity which comprises numerous island positions. While economy of forces will not permit maintenance of garrisons in all these positions, the maximum U.S. control must be maintained in order to assure maximum availability in time of war.
[5 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]
Of interest in connection with the foregoing is the physical size and conformation of these islands. They are small; they have almost no economic potential and were utilized by the Japanese almost entirely to increase Japanese military potential.
It has been contended that we should be willing to repatriate the Bonin Islanders to areas on which there are no important military installations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that repatriation of a Japanese-oriented group to any of these islands, regardless of whether or not there are at present any military installations, would largely negate their potential usefulness. Furthermore, the difficulties which would ensue as a consequence of such partial repatriation are clearly indicated by our experience in the Ryukyu Islands.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text bears Eisenhower’s initials, indicating that he saw it.↩