173. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1
SUBJECT
- Official Visit to the United States of the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Nobusuke Kishi
The Prime Minister of Japan will be in Washington for his official visit between June 19 and 21. He is scheduled to meet with you for official talks at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 19,2 and at 11:00 a.m., on Friday, June 21.3 I forwarded to you a schedule for the Prime Minister’s entire stay in the United States in my memorandum of June 5, 1957.4
Arrangements have been made through Mr. Shanley to meet with you on June 185 to discuss substantive matters which Mr. Kishi will raise. Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador MacArthur will accompany me.
Mr. Kishi gives every indication of being the strongest Government leader to emerge in postwar Japan. During his short tenure in office he has become the leader of the Conservative Party. His predecessors [Page 347] tended to represent a faction or factions of that party. He has emphasized that he desires the establishment of a full partnership with the United States and that he is thinking in terms of long range goals rather than immediate political expediency. He feels strongly that the time has come to make readjustments in our present relationship in order to make our relations durable.
After a period of drift, sentiment in Japan is now beginning to crystallize, and we stand on the threshold of a new era in our relations with Japan. The Prime Minister’s visit affords a unique opportunity to influence the pattern of this new era in the critical period of the next decade or more. A strong, cooperative Japan is fundamental and essential to our Far Eastern position, and the road that Japan chooses to follow will influence greatly the path which other free Asian nations take.
The Prime Minister has indicated during his conversations with Ambassador MacArthur that he will wish to discuss the following major topics:
- 1.
- Security and defense relationships between the United States and Japan;
- 2.
- Territorial questions relating to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands;
- 3.
- Testing of large nuclear weapons and disarmament;
- 4.
- Japanese war criminals still retained by the United States;6
- 5.
- United States-Japanese trade relations, including the laws designed to discriminate against Japanese textiles in Alabama and South Carolina;
- 6.
- United States-Japanese cooperation in fostering economic development in South and Southeast Asia;
- 7.
- Trade with Communist China.
The Prime Minister has emphasized that the existing United States Security Treaty with Japan, principally because of its alleged unequal nature, has become a major irritant in relations between our two countries. Japan’s re-emergence as a sovereign nation, the technological advances in the military field since the Security Treaty was signed in 1951, and the alteration of the military strategic concept in the last half decade have altered the character of the United States-Japanese relations upon which the Treaty was based. I believe that the Security Treaty has fully reflected the situation in United States-Japanese relations up to now. However, I feel that the time has come to take the initiative in proposing a readjustment of our relations with [Page 348] Japan and to suggest to Mr. Kishi that we work toward a mutual security arrangement which could, we would hope, replace the present Security Treaty.
I believe, however, that this is not the time to renegotiate any of the specific provisions of the present Treaty. This process requires most careful study and preparation if it is not to precipitate strong Japanese public and Socialist Party demands for such sweeping revisions in the Treaty that our entire security relationship with Japan could be placed in jeopardy. If, however, Prime Minister Kishi concurs in the proposal that we have discussions looking toward a common objective of a Mutual Security Treaty or some other mutually satisfactory security arrangement, we should be prepared, subsequent to his visit, to hold discussions with him in Tokyo. We could lay the groundwork during the visit for such later discussions with him following his return to Japan.
The Prime Minister has indicated that the next most important issue which he wishes to discuss is the United States administration of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The United States cannot relinquish administrative rights over these islands so long as the threat and tension in the Far East continue. Fuller understanding of the military and political realities of the Far East as they affect both the United States and Japan should enable the Prime Minister to explain to his people the military and political reasons underlying our position in the Ryukyus.
Additional irritants which exist in our relations with Japan are our continued inability to agree to the repatriation of some of the Bonin Islanders who were removed to Japan during World War II and the laws in Alabama and South Carolina designed to discriminate against the importation of Japanese textiles.
With regard to the repatriation of Bonin Islanders, the Department of State sees no political objection to our permitting some of the Islanders to be repatriated from Japan. The Department of Defense, however, holds the view that such repatriation would jeopardize our security position in the Bonin Islands. The matter is currently under discussion by the two Departments in the hope of devising some solution prior to the visit of Prime Minister Kishi.
With respect to the State laws in Alabama and South Carolina designed to discriminate against the importation of Japanese textiles,7 legal action by the Department of Justice to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating these laws on the grounds that they are in violation [Page 349] of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Japan, which was ratified by the United States Senate on July 21, 1953,8 has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of promised efforts by the United States textile industry to seek the removal of these laws from the books in the two States. In the judgment of the Department of State, this issue will be a most important one in the discussions with Prime Minister Kishi. It is the plan to seek the concurrence of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Commerce to a position whereby Prime Minister Kishi will be informed during his visit that due to current debates, particularly with regard to civil rights legislation, the present is an unpropitious time to take legal action; but that legal action will be taken in case the cooperation of the United States textile industry does not succeed in obtaining the removal of these laws.
I suggest also that you be prepared to discuss frankly with the Prime Minister our policy regarding testing of large nuclear weapons and our general disarmament goals.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/6–1257. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Weintraub of NA, MacArthur, and Dulles.↩
- See Document 183.↩
- See Document 192.↩
- Not found. A complete itinerary for the Prime Minister’s visit is in Department of State Press Release No. 360, dated June 13. A copy is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 889.↩
- See Document 177.↩
- In a June 13 memorandum to MacArthur, Joseph N. Greene, Jr., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, stated that in response to a query the Department had received from the President, he had telephoned General Goodpaster to say that as of June 14 there were still 66 Japanese war criminals under detention, under the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and that 347 had been paroled, 6 had been discharged, and 7 had died. (Attachment)↩
- These laws, passed early in 1956, required the posting in stores selling Japanese textiles of signs saying “Japanese textiles sold here”. Japan had protested. Although the laws had not been enforced, in a few instances stores had ceased selling Japanese textiles. (Position Paper KIV 5/4, undated, attached to memorandum from MacArthur to Dulles, June 15; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 889)↩
- Signed at Tokyo, April 2, 1953. For text, see TIAS 2863; 4 UST (pt. 2) 2063.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩