Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

174. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, June 13, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Future U.S.-Japanese Relationships (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 29 May 1957,² subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Japan continues to be important to U.S. security interests and that Japan must be prevented from coming under Communist domination. They consider that U.S. policy and programs are, from the military point of view, adequate; these are designed to prevent the Japanese Government from embracing neutralism, yet provide sufficient flexibility to permit evolutionary changes in the future relationship between the United States and Japan. Current national policy takes cognizance of the fact that as Japanese strength grows, dependence on the United States will lessen and should be replaced by a new sense of common purpose, mutual interests and working partnership. To this end, the U.S. objectives provide for a Japan, allied to the United States, which is capable and willing not only to defend herself but to contribute to the security of the Pacific area. The military courses of action to attain these objectives include consultation with the Japanese Government to develop a long-range plan for the buildup of Japanese defense forces and a phased withdrawal from Japan of U.S. forces as consistent with United States and Japanese security interests.

3. While the long-range U.S. policies and objectives which the United States desires to accomplish in partnership with Japan remain valid, the detailed programs and policies for their attainment should be revised in the light of present day conditions.

4. The United States military posture for the foreseeable future must provide for:

a. Deterring general war.

b. Deterring military conflict short of general war.

c. Bringing military conflict short of general war to a rapid and successful conclusion.

d. Accomplishing successfully the initial tasks of a general war.

5. In order to achieve this military posture, the United States must maintain, among other things, a forward deployment of U.S. ready military forces prepared to conduct operations immediately from positions strategically selected both to counter local aggression and to carry out the initial tasks of a general war. This forward deployment currently includes U.S. forces and bases in Japan proper, in the Bonins, and in the Ryukyus. Recognizing that a strong Japan is essential to the over-all U.S. position in the Far East, U.S. forces there are currently contributing to the defense of Japan.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a strong Japan allied to the United States would be a deterrent to a general war, and a deterrent to military conflict short of general war. However, Japanese forces will, over the next few years, have no capability for employment outside of Japan to assist U.S. forces in bringing military conflict short of general war to a rapid and successful conclusion. In the near future Japan will probably be of little assistance in the successful accomplishment of the initial tasks of a general war except to provide a base for U.S. military operations.

7. With respect to the defense of Japan proper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Japan is capable of substantially increasing her defense forces from her own resources, and that the Japanese Government should assume a degree of responsibility for the defense of Japan more nearly compatible with the country’s potential capability. To date, however, the Japanese have not developed an official long-range defense plan, nor have they adopted official force goals for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The Japanese Defense Agency has prepared a “Six Year Plan” for the development of the JSDF, but the plan has not been officially accepted by the Government, the forces outlined therein fall short of the U.S. Military Defense Assistance force objectives, and even these forces are not being developed as rapidly as scheduled.

8. The primary mission of the JSDF in the defense of Japan for the short term will be the maintenance of internal security, local ground defense, home-based air defense, antisubmarine warfare, minesweeping and harbor defense. Operational and logistical tasks in support of the primary mission will need to be assumed by the JSDF as the capability to perform these tasks is achieved. Once the JSDF achieves the capability and assumes the responsibility for greater defense of Japan, U.S. forces and facilities would no longer be required for that purpose. Although earlier phasing down of U.S. defense forces would weaken the military defenses of Japan, it is recognized that other considerations may justify the acceptance of this military risk.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate that they consider that all U.S. held islands in the Western Pacific, which are not currently or fully utilized for military purposes, are nevertheless an integral part of our base system in the Pacific. This applies particularly to the Ryukyu and Bonin group where the continued use of the base facilities will be required for the accomplishment of the broader purposes set forth in paragraph 4 above. They represent potential assets. Although the need for economy of force and the dictates of national strategy will not permit the maintenance of garrisons or continuous use in all positions, U.S. control must be maintained in time of peace, in order to assure maximum availability in time of war.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Files, CCS 092 Japan (12–12–50). Top Secret.
2. Not found. According to JCS 2180/95, June 13, a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on future U.S.-Japanese relationships, Sprague had requested the views of the JCS on the future military requirements in the Japan–Ryukyus area, and the missions for the Japanese and the United States in maintaining an adequate defense posture in that area. (Ibid.)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.