Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

106. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Our Japan Policy: Need for a Reappraisal and Certain Immediate Actions

Discussion

Japan is one of the three major countries in Asia and the Western Pacific. Indonesia has a major potential but does not constitute a political force comparable to that of Japan, India and Red China. Japan is the only one with which we have any immediate prospect of building lasting and close ties which would serve the vital strategic and political interests of the United States.

The strategic value to the United States of Japan as a close friend and ally is tremendous, and our entire strategic position in the Western Pacific is anchored on Japan. If Japan should evolve into a neutralist or uncommitted state, the problem of United States security would be made infinitely greater and more costly. But in addition to Japan’s strategic importance, her potential usefulness in the non-military aspects of the world struggle is just as great and is likely to increase as the struggle for uncommitted Asia and Africa develops. We therefore need Japan as a friend and ally.

Japan has moved ahead rapidly since the Peace Treaty, and the basis upon which our present relationship was established has radically altered since the signature of that Treaty. Japan is now economically prosperous, diplomatically integrated, and stands at the crossroads in the development of its foreign policy. There are growing indications everywhere that the Japanese, who in the period since their defeat have “rated well back off the pace” in terms of foreign policy and who have been content to follow the lead of the United States, are now feeling that they must assert and express their “independence”. It is clear that in the immediate and near future they are going to make decisions which will vitally affect our interests. There are indications that Japan will increasingly associate itself with the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations in the hope of becoming a leader in this grouping. It has already evidenced a strong independent policy in the United Nations by backing Kuriyama for a seat in the International Court of Justice in opposition to our support for Wellington Koo.² It has resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and is cultivating broader economic and social ties with Red China.

There are also increasing signs of Japanese discontent with its present role and status, and particularly with its relations with the United States. There are repeated and increasing statements by the Japanese leaders, still in fairly muted tones, that the Security Treaty must be revised and United States military facilities reduced. These signs of discontent are still subtle and under control, but if they break out into the open it will be too late to influence Japan’s policies in a direction which best serves the interests of the United States. If we do not recognize the ground swell which is taking place in Japan and prepare to make inevitable adjustments in time to derive maximum benefit from such adjustments, events will overtake us, force our hand and sour the outcome.

In other words, seeing clearly the current that is flowing strongly in Japan as we do, we should now place ourselves in the position to take the initiative at the appropriate moment, in making essential adjustments with Japan rather than permit the situation to deteriorate and become an inflamed domestic political issue to the point that any proposals of ours which might now appear to be reasonable would later be rejected out of hand by the Japanese. We must foster a greater mutuality in Japanese-American relations and make our readjustments, including certain concessions, on a timely basis which will tend to increase the prestige of the Conservative government and reverse the Socialist trend, which is essentially neutralist and to an extent anti-American.

In Japanese-American relations there are a number of vexing problems, some of which we can move on rapidly and others which are longer of term and will require further urgent consideration by our Government. These issues include: war criminals; the Bonin Islands; Okinawa and the Ryukyus; the present unmutual “Security Treaty” which we have with Japan; the problem of United States military bases and installations; and Japanese relations with Communist China.

But, if we are to solve the longer term problems, immediate steps should be taken to work out with the Japanese in the next two-to-three months solutions of at least two issues—War Criminals, and the Bonin Islands—which are emotional issues in Japan and which, if a reasonable solution were arrived at, would create the necessary friendly atmosphere of mutual cooperation essential to solve the longer term and much more serious issues.

If Ambassador MacArthur³ and Prime Minister Ishibashi⁴ could appear to have worked out a mutually satisfactory solution to the war criminals and Bonin Island problems early within their respective tenures (possibly within two-to-three months’ time), the essential elements of confidence and cooperation would be laid for dealing with problems which are of more fundamental importance from the United States point of view. Such a procedure should encourage the Japanese Government to keep the lid on the more difficult issues looking toward eventual discussions and solutions. There would be a credit of good will to draw upon.

I think we must recognize that if we do not take the initiative in moving in this direction, we run the gravest risk of a deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States. We risk seeing all the unrelated contentious issues coming together in a focal point of hostility in the Japanese mind resulting in domestic Japanese convulsions impairing permanently our future relations with Japan. In other words, if we do not act in timely fashion to meet the evolutionary changes occurring in Japan which we now see clearly, we risk finding ourselves in the same position in which the British, and particularly the French, have found themselves in their relations with various Asian and African countries.

Proposed Course of Action

1. Reach within the U.S. Government within the next three weeks a reasonable solution of the War Criminals problem which could be put to the Japanese in the next two or three months. Attached (Tab A)⁵ is a solution proposed by FE but about the details of which Mr. Phleger has some reservations.

2. Permit at least the 2,639 exiled Bonin Islanders, which Japan has been unable to absorb, to return to the Islands. (Tab B)⁶

3. Solving these two grievances of the Japanese promptly and generously will buy us some time to develop solutions on our own initiative to the following problems which are so serious and urgent that study upon them must be begun in earnest by this Government:

a. The status of the Ryukyu Islands is one which provides constant disharmony between ourselves and the Japanese, and ultimately a solution must be found. One solution that warrants study would include the reversion of the Islands to Japan, with the extension of long-term base rights to the United States. In any event, what appears necessary for the long-range is for us to proceed on a US Eyes Only basis with a review of the problem, aimed at recommendation for suitable resolution thereof. It also appears desirable to discuss with Defense the feasibility of establishing, possibly as an interim measure, a civilian form of government in the Ryukyus; I have sent you a separate memorandum on this matter already.⁷

b. There should be a review of our security relations with Japan, possibly under Presidential directive, involving discussions between State and Defense with a view to determining minimum objectives and placing our security arrangements with Japan on a durable basis of mutuality and self-interest rather than the present one-sided arrangement. This would involve some concessions by us, but such concessions would be well worthwhile if the result were to create a durable association for political and military cooperation and if Japan’s responsibilities for collective defense were clearly engaged.

c. There should be a study within the Department of State of the extent to which we can and should go in lending support of Japan in its effort to establish leadership in the Afro-Asian bloc in the world at large and in its activities in the United Nations.

Summary:

We could, of course, do nothing and simply try to hang on to what we have, giving up bit–by–bit under pressure, but such a course is inevitably doomed to failure over a period of time, and we risk losing not only our military facilities but also permanently alienating the Japanese, losing their friendship and cooperation in all fields and encouraging them in a neutralist direction.

Recomendation:

That we have a meeting with you early next week to discuss this paper and particularly the war criminals and the Bonin Islands. Mr. Phleger would be one of those present.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/1–757. Secret. Drafted on January 4 by Martin and Douglas MacArthur.
2. V. K. Wellington Koo was Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States, 1946–1956. During 1957 Koo was chosen by the General Assembly to complete the term of Justice Tsu Mo, who had died. In 1958 Koo was elected to a full 9-year term.
3. Allison left Japan on February 2. MacArthur, whose designation as his successor had been announced in December, was appointed on January 29 and presented his credentials on February 25.
4. Tanzan Ishibashi became Prime Minister on December 23, 1956.
5. Tab A, an undated draft memorandum for Robertson to send to the Secretary, is not printed. It contained a proposal, requiring Presidential approval, that would have resulted in parole for all Japanese war criminals who had served either one-third of their sentences or who had been imprisoned for 10 years, whichever was less. Later documentation indicates that this proposal was not adopted. See Document 116.
6. Not found attached or in Department of State files.
7. See footnote 1, infra.
8. Dulles initialed his approval on the source text, which indicates the meeting was to be held on January 16 at 2:30 p.m. Dulles’ appointment book verifies that the meeting was held as scheduled and that MacArthur, Robertson, Bowie, Parsons, and several other officials were present. However, no memorandum of the discussion has been found in Department of State files.