107. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: In the light of recent developments, I am concerned that the present United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands may in the near future present us with serious problems in the conduct of our foreign affairs which may in turn jeopardize the retention of United States military bases in the islands. As you know, during the past summer there was general, organized opposition in the Ryukyus to the recommendations of the Price Committee Report of such serious nature that the implementation of these recommendations was postponed for further consideration. Although they were directly precipitated by dissatisfaction with the planned land acquisition program, the disturbances were symptomatic of more general discontent with conditions of administration amounting to continued military occupation. The discontent led to increased local pressures favoring reversion to Japan and these pressures in turn stimulated [Page 245] Japanese irredentist sentiment. A revival of this interplay between the Ryukyus and Japan in the future could present us with diplomatic problems of major importance.
Moreover, through accession to the United Nations, close working relations with the Afro-Asian bloc and resumption of formal relations with the USSR, Japan will be in a position to attempt to internationalize the dispute and appeal to the United Nations. Groups of Okinawans in Japan have already petitioned the Soviet Union and other UN member nations to support the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. The spectacle of Communist or Asian agitation and support for an international inquiry into the “colonial” administration of the islands must be viewed as a definite likelihood.
It is evident, of course, that a favorable local climate is essential to achieve United States objectives in the Ryukyus since hostility of the local population would largely negate the utility of military bases. Opposition in the area would inevitably affect Japanese attitudes toward the United States, particularly with regard to United States bases in Japan. I do not believe that we are immediately confronted with any situation of critical proportions, but am convinced that we have entered a new stage in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands where it is necessary to make modifications or else incur a growing hostility that may endanger our diplomatic and military position in the Far East. An informal but public resolution by Democratic members of the Ryukyuan Legislature on December 19 calling for reversion points up the urgency of the problem.
In view of these factors, I suggest that we establish a joint working group composed of representatives of our Departments to review the present administration of the Ryukyu Islands and make such recommendations for change or modification as may be indicated. The present change-over in area command responsibilities from CINCFE to CINCPAC makes this a particularly propitious moment to consider this question. I do not mean to imply in any sense that the past administration of the Ryukyus has been mismanaged, for I believe under the circumstances it has been well handled, but rather that it appears necessary at this time to take some judicious and timely steps in the direction of local government lest we jeopardize our long-term essential requirements in the islands. I believe the promulgation of the proposed Executive Order on the Civil Administration of the Ryukyus should be delayed pending the formulation, submission, and consideration of the recommendations of this working group.2
[Page 246]Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/1–857. Secret. Drafted in NA on January 2. Forwarded to Dulles as an attachment to a memorandum from Robertson, in which Robertson pointed out that a study conducted in the Department, whose recommendations had been concurred in by Consul General John M. Steeves in Naha, had concluded that “political and economic reforms in the Ryukyus may best be accomplished under a civilian administration not responsible to the military command. This civilian administration, conducted with due regard for the interests of Japan, would provide a maximum of political protection for United States security and other interests in the Ryukyus and Japan.” The memorandum concluded that “continued military administration cannot, by its very nature, resolve the problems which now confront us.” Steeves’ views are in despatch 18 from Naha, October 23, 1956. (Ibid., 794C.02/10–2356) No copy of the study referred to by Robertson has been found in Department of State files.↩
- In a January 23 reply to
Dulles, Gordon
Gray wrote: “The Department of Defense does not at
this time agree that any change or modification in present
arrangements is necessary or indicated. We would, of course, be glad
to consider any aspects of the matter that the Department of State
wishes to offer.” Gray
designated B. A. Robbins, Director, Far East Region, ISA, to meet with any Department
official for this purpose. (Ibid.,
794C.0221/1–2357)
In a January 28 letter to Horsey, Parsons indicated that the January 8 letter had gone forward “although Mr. Murphy was not convinced that a civilian administration is the answer. Since then we have learned from our contacts across the Potomac that the idea of a civilian administration has gained a certain amount of support, particularly in OSD/ISA.” (Ibid., 794C.0221/12–2756)
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩