Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo, December 19, 1956¹

Tokyo, December 19, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• Tanzan Ishibashi, President of the Liberal-Democratic Party
• Koh Chiba, Director, American-European Affairs Bureau, Foreign Office
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State
• Outerbridge Horsey, Chargé d’Affaires, American Embassy
• Richard H. Lamb, Second Secretary, American Embassy

SUBJECT

• US–Japan Relations

Mr. Robertson called on Mr. Ishibashi at his office in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry on the afternoon of December 19. The conversation, which lasted for an hour and a half, was conducted in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

Mr. Robertson began by congratulating Mr. Ishibashi on his election to the Presidency of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and also extended his congratulations on Japan’s admission to the United Nations, which the United States most heartily welcomed.² Japan had every right to be a member of the UN and would have a most important role to play. He believed that Japan with her experience and knowledge of Far Eastern affairs would be able to make a valuable contribution as a member of the organization.

Mr. Ishibashi said that Japan was fully aware of the assistance given by President Eisenhower and the American people in securing Japan’s admission to the UN, and that America’s assistance was deeply appreciated. Japan was now re-entering the family of nations and must assume new responsibilities. In doing so, Japan urgently needed the cooperation and assistance of the US. He believed that Japan with her intimate knowledge of Asian problems could be most helpful.

Mr. Robertson emphatically agreed with Mr. Ishibashi on the need for close cooperation between the United States and Japan and for diligence by both our countries in settling problems which may arise between them. Mr. Robertson pointed out that this was especially important since the Communist world, including the Chinese Communists as well as the Russians, was constantly seeking to disrupt US-Japan relations. Japan with fifty per cent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was the Communists’ primary goal in Asia, and in their efforts to win over Japan the Communists were constantly seeking to drive a wedge between Japan and the US.

Mr. Ishibashi indicated that he was in general agreement with Mr. Robertson’s estimate of the situation, and that the Japanese people were aware of the Communist danger. Japan was determined to cooperate fully with the United States and recognized that she needed the assistance of the US in combating the Communist threat. It must be remembered however that Japan at present was in an unhealthy condition. One danger lay in the weakness of the Japanese economy, and it was imperative that the economy be strengthened. There were also a number of relatively small practical problems in US–Japan relations which if left unsolved could further weaken the structure of our relationship and give the infection a chance to grow. The great majority of the Japanese people have friendly feelings toward the United States and appreciate the assistance the US has given Japan; anti-American activities are the work of a small minority. However, there is the danger that anti-American elements will seize upon these small problems and build them into large ones. It is therefore essential that both countries exert all their efforts to settle these problems promptly. In doing so, Mr. Ishibashi emphasized that both countries must speak with absolute frankness; patience is also required. Mr. Ishibashi hoped that the US would “bear with” Japan in dealing with these problems. He asked that Mr. Robertson use his influence to obtain US understanding of the Japanese position in this regard.

Mr. Ishibashi went on to say that misunderstandings between our two countries often arise, and that it sometimes is very difficult to make the other side understand what one actually thinks. In his own case Mr. Ishibashi thought that one source of difficulty lay in his inability to speak English, although he reads English well and widely. Mr. Ishibashi thought that his inability to convey his views accurately in English had in large measure been responsible for his difficulties under the Occupation which led to his being purged and removed for several years from political life. He had been accused at the time of not cooperating with SCAP; actually however he had been doing his best to make SCAP’s policies succeed. In the course of the conversation Mr. Ishibashi referred several times to misunderstandings that had arisen concerning him during the Occupation. He also stressed repeatedly his belief that cooperation between Japan and the United States must be based on complete frankness on the part of both countries.

Mr. Robertson agreed on the necessity for complete candor in our dealings and assured Mr. Ishibashi the US would welcome such an attitude on the part of Japan. Japan of course must expect the same degree of frankness regarding our problems on the part of the United States.

As an example of the specific problems potentially capable of causing serious difficulties between Japan and the United States, Mr. Ishibashi referred to US restrictions on the import of Japanese cotton textiles; he called particular attention to the proposed US tariff on velveteens, which he understood that Mr. Robertson had discussed with Acting Foreign Minister Takasaki. Mr. Ishibashi said that Japan was extremely anxious to settle the problem on the basis of voluntary restrictions, and he was confident that a mutually satisfactory agreement would soon be worked out. Meanwhile, he hoped that the US would take no action on the matter which might have a “catastrophic” effect on US-Japan relations and cause lasting harm. In this connection Mr. Ishibashi said that instructions were being sent to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to raise the matter urgently in Washington. (Mr. Chiba displayed some confusion at this point. He indicated that there was some doubt as to whether any such instructions had been sent to Shigemitsu, or in fact whether Shigemitsu definitely was going to Washington—though perhaps there had been new instructions of which he was not aware.) In concluding his discussion of the textile problem Mr. Ishibashi said that the Government had been placed in a very difficult position and found it hard to defend American policy and to answer accusations in the Diet that the US, by restricting trade with China on one hand and limiting Japanese imports to the US on the other, was “placing the squeeze” on Japan.

Mr. Robertson said that with regard to the textile problem the State Department was completely in agreement with Mr. Ishibashi that the matter should be settled on the basis of voluntary restrictions of Japanese exports. Mr. Robertson and his colleagues in the Department would continue to make every effort to achieve a settlement on this basis. He understood that the Presidential decision on velveteen tariffs was scheduled to be announced on December 23, before his return to duty in the Department.³ However, the Embassy would cable the Department reporting the Japanese Government’s views on the matter. Mr. Robertson pointed out however that the cotton textile issue was a very difficult political problem in the US. It was not the total volume of Japanese cotton exports, which took up only a small portion of the American market, but the concentration in individual categories, e.g., velveteen, which constituted the chief difficulty. Mr. Robertson understood that Japanese velveteen exports had taken up as much as eighty-five per cent of the American market and forced the closing of many mills which were unable to meet Japanese competition. In many instances these mills constituted the only major industry of small towns and their closing had had disastrous effects on the local economies, arousing petitions of protest supported by the entire local population.

Mr. Ishibashi indicated that he could well understand the concern over the impact of foreign imports on domestic industry, since Japan had had somewhat similar experiences in the case of the sewing machine industry.

In discussing the impact on the US economy of Japanese textile imports, Mr. Robertson added parenthetically that he hoped arrangements could be worked out sometime in the future for Mr. Ishibashi to visit the United States, and he indicated that a visit by Mr. Ishibashi would be most welcome.

Mr. Robertson then explained fully to Mr. Ishibashi the policy of the United States regarding trade with Communist China and the reasons therefor. He pointed out that international communism is still bent on world domination, as events in Eastern Europe and Asia clearly indicate. Communist China is still branded by the UN as an aggressor, is still in a state of war with the UN in Korea, has refused to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits, and is building up its forces in North Vietnam; there is no indication that the Communists are prepared to “peacefully co-exist” with the West. In building up her vast war machine Communist China urgently needs imports from the West. It is the policy of the United States to make the build-up of this war potential as difficult as possible. This policy is in the interest not only of the US but of other nations of the Free World, including Japan, and, carrying as it does the main burden of military security, the US believes that it can without apology ask the cooperation of other nations in restricting trade. Mr. Robertson warned that there was a danger that the long term security of all Asia might be jeopardized in return for small and short term trade benefits.

Mr. Ishibashi referred to the difference between the levels of CHINCOM and COCOM restrictions. As a result of these differences, though direct trade between Japan and Communist China in strategic items was blocked, Western European countries were shipping substantial quantities of the restricted items to China through the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. Mr. Ishibashi thought there were certain “inconsistencies” in the situation.

In reply Mr. Robertson carefully explained the reasons for the difference between CHINCOM and COCOM levels. He admitted that under this system some strategic goods did slip through to Communist China. However, the amounts were limited in quantity, and the delays and increased costs involved in obtaining materials through this indirect route severely handicapped the Chinese Communists in building up their war machine.

Mr. Ishibashi said that the Japanese Government does not disagree with the general policy of the United States and the Free World regarding trade with Communist China. However, the US must recognize that the Japanese economic position is a precarious one, and that Japan’s life depends upon foreign trade. He again referred to the widespread feeling among the Japanese people that Japan’s trade in both directions—with the United States and Communist China—was being restricted unreasonably and stressed the difficulties which this raised for the Government.

Mr. Robertson said it was important not only that our two Governments understand the problem but that the people be made to understand it as well and to realize that their very freedom is at stake. He said we too had domestic political problems in this field, and that American businessmen would also like to trade with Communist China.

Mr. Ishibashi agreed on the need to enlighten the public concerning these matters. He believed, for example, that it was most important for the Japanese people to understand that Japan’s defense efforts were not for the benefit of the US but were necessary for the defense of Japan itself. Japan would welcome any suggestions from the United States which might help to improve public understanding of our mutual problems. In this connection he pointed out that Japan was actively seeking to develop markets and expand investments in Latin America and in Southeast Asia. US assistance in developing these markets would be greatly appreciated by both the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. Among other things Mr. Ishibashi thought that positive US assistance in this regard would greatly improve Japanese popular attitudes toward the US and would help turn attention away from the problem of trade with Communist China.

Mr. Robertson said that the US was acutely aware of Japan’s need to develop markets for her exports and would continue as she had in the past to assist Japan in every way in developing these markets.

As the meeting ended Mr. Robertson said he was looking forward to working closely with Mr. Ishibashi and the Japanese Government, and was confident that we would be able to work out our problems together. Mr. Ishibashi expressed similar sentiments.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/12–1956. Confidential. Drafted by Lamb. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.
2. Approved by the Security Council on December 12.
3. The President announced his decision on January 22; see Document 109.