Office of the Historian

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1

Tokyo, October 23, 1956—4 p.m.

939. US wire service and Japanese correspondents’ assessments of Dept’s reactions, as carried in press over weekend, tend stress dissatisfaction Japan’s performance, apprehension re future.2 Such reports, juxtaposed with Soviet comments, have ring of US diplomatic defeat, especially as reported reactions in other countries (except ROK) generally welcome restoration relations and hold Japan did as well as could be expected. Moreover, reported Departmental reactions may be construed as support for pro-Yoshida group efforts prevent ratification.

If opportunity arises during Secretary’s press conference tomorrow,3 believe useful to counterbalance largely negative tone of “unofficial” Washington comment reported here as well as underscore contrast US and Soviet policies toward Japan. Without endorsing agreement or specific provisions, Secretary might note agreement is step in direction US has long favored (along lines para 2 September 7 aide-mémoire).4 Might observe territorial problem remains and (per [Page 235] last para aide-mémoire) US would regard Soviet recognition Japan’s entry UN [sic], which we and others have so often sought.5

Allison
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/10–2356. Confidential; Priority.↩
  2. On October 19 in Moscow, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Protocol on trade and a Joint Declaration which terminated the state of war between them and restored diplomatic relations. In the Declaration the Soviet Union undertook to support Japan’s admission to the United Nations, to repatriate Japanese “war criminals,” and to restore Habomai and Shikotan when agreement was reached on a peace treaty. Etorofu and Kunashiri were not mentioned. For text of the Declaration, see 263 UNTS 99; the Protocol is ibid., 124. The Japanese-Soviet fishing and sea-rescue agreements, signed in Moscow on May 14, went into effect simultaneously with the Declaration. Ratifications were exchanged December 12.↩
  3. This press conference was not held. In his October 2 press conference, Dulles commented on the negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union as follows: “I would prefer not to comment on the course that is being followed by the Japanese Government at the present time. It’s primarily their problem and, so long as they work it out in ways which do not infringe upon our rights under the Japanese peace treaty, I think we must recognize and do recognize that they have freedom of action, freedom of choice. I don’t know myself just what the solution will be or whether it will work, but I believe that they must be and are the masters of their own destiny in this respect.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1956, p. 578)↩
  4. See Document 101.↩

  5. At his daily briefing, October 24, Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the News Division, made the following statement in response to a question:

    “The United States has for a long time felt that the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union ought to be formally terminated. We have said this on several occasions, most recently on September 7 in an aide-mémoire to Japan. It is fitting that this has at last been accomplished.

    “The United States considers Japan eminently qualified for UN membership and for the past several years has actively supported Japan’s membership application.

    “The terms of settlement were a matter of primary concern to Japan and the Soviet Union. Since they seem to have reached an understanding, we can only assume that the agreement is satisfactory to both governments, although we are sure that Japan regrets that its just claim to sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri (the two southernmost Kurile islands) has not yet been recognized by the Soviet Union.” (USIA Wireless File (Far East); Department of State, Central Files, 661.941/10–2456)

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