Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, September 7, 1956—10 a.m.

575. Eyes only Secretary.

Dear Foster: Thank you for your 509.² I entirely agree with your concept that success of Japanese-Soviet negotiations depends on reaction of Japanese people to Soviet toughness. There has been an encouraging trend in this direction during recent developments on these negotiations. I believe our proposed action can help carry this trend along.

I also agree that in any normal situation it is not advisable to carry on relations “out of channels”. However, in Tokyo we have, I am afraid, a special and most unfortunate situation. The Foreign Office is almost powerless to affect policy and the influence of the Foreign Minister with his Cabinet colleagues is minimal. Moreover he is engaged to considerable extent in trying to salvage his own personal political position. In spite of this, I have endeavored at all times in presenting official United States positions to do it through the Foreign Minister. At same time I have felt it necessary informally to carry on discussions with such people as Kishi, Kono, and Nemoto, who, in fact, have much more say in making foreign policy than does the Foreign Minister. In absence of the Foreign Minister it would have been useless to conduct type of discussions reported in my 530³ and 531⁴ with Foreign Office. You will see from my 564⁵ that I understand necessity of your dealing with Japanese Ambassador in Washington but as you will also see, I pointed out certain problems which unfortunately need to be kept in mind.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.9431/9–756. Secret; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 3, Document 95.
4. Dated August 31, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.941/8–3156)
5. In telegram 564, September 6, Allison reiterated his view that the timing of a possible public release of the aide-mémoire had to be coordinated with factional leaders of the LDP. For this reason, it was “imperative” that the Japanese Embassy in Washington take “rigorous steps” to ensure the paper’s secrecy in the interim. (Ibid., 661.941/9–656)