Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

95. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, August 30, 1956—11 a.m.

513. Deptel 442.² We share Secretary’s concern over consequences of international conference. See no grounds for thinking USSR would attend such conference confined to status Kuriles and Sakhalin, and obviously we would not want to agree to any conference not precisely so limited.

There has been some press discussion of possibility of such a conference and idea has been mentioned to us in past in informal conversations. From point of view of Japanese supporters of idea, conference is not only legally correct method (since San Francisco Treaty powers must share in final disposition disputed territories), but would serve shift onus of non-settlement. Apart from attempts Soviets would presumably make to broaden it to include Taiwan and Ryukyus, and bring in Communist China, there would be pressure from within Japan, especially from Socialists, to include discussion of full return of Ryukyus. Since no practical results could be expected, only purpose would be for propaganda and, on balance, we would almost certainly lose.

Last evening’s papers cited Shigemitsu saying in London that U.S. is considering international parley to decide title to Southern Kuriles, and prominent LDP party official Suma is also quoted as believing conference should be held for that purpose. However, I have no grounds for believing that GOJ has taken formal position on matter and agree that Shigemitsu’s suggestion to Secretary was perhaps made on his own responsibility.

Our previous line of non-involvement in Soviet-Japanese negotiations, sound though it was, can perhaps no longer be maintained in view of furor here over reports from London. FonOff working level gossip yesterday was that Shigemitsu has so thoroughly lost face by the succession of denials and confirmations that Kono faction intends use episode to push through Cabinet reshuffle, including ouster of Shigemitsu. I think we can probably best serve our interests in Japan and at the same time give Shigemitsu some support, not by favoring international conference, but along following lines.

Suggest urgent consideration be given public statement by U.S., and by as many other San Francisco Treaty powers as we can round up in brief time, to effect we support Japan’s interpretation of “Kurile Islands” in Article 2 of Peace Treaty as excluding Etoforu and Kunashiri, that on moral, historical and legal grounds, we believe they should be returned promptly to Japan and that any question of doubt on this point could be referred to ICJ. Association of other San Francisco powers with us would prevent our being isolated in responsibility for final breakdown of negotiations if (as we would expect) Adenauer formula unacceptable to either or both.

Domestic political situation in relation to Moscow negotiations is so confused that such action might have disadvantages as well as advantages. I am seeing Kishi this evening and other key leaders in next day or two, as appointments can be arranged, and suggest that no final decisions on this be made until I can report results of such conferences.³

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.941/8–3056. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. In telegram 442, August 30, the Secretary asked the Embassy’s opinion of the worth of holding an international conference to determine the status of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. “See many drawbacks and little possibility [conference] could yield desired result for Japan but call might be worth considering from standpoint US-Japanese relations. Appreciate your estimate this factor with particular attention to probable views government as whole, since Shigemitsu may speak only for self.” (Ibid., 661.941/8–2756)

3. In telegram 530 from Tokyo, August 31, Allison reported meeting on both August 30 and 31 with Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party, Ryutaro Nemoto, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Nemoto’s Deputy, Takizo Matsumoto. Allison reported in part:

   “I suggested, as my own idea and after making clear I was not acting under instructions, possibility of US, either alone or with other San Francisco Treaty Powers, issuing statement supporting Japanese contention on status Etorofu and Kunashiri and requested their opinion as to whether or not they believed such statement would be helpful. Both Kishi and Nemoto said it would be most helpful but it was stressed that content and timing were matters of great importance. On these two points Kishi expressed strong hope that, if it were decided to make a statement, Japanese leaders would be consulted in advance. I believe such consultation essential and I informed Kishi that I would so recommend.” (Ibid., 661.941/8–3156)