Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, September 6, 1956—4:19 p.m.

509. Eyes only Ambassador.

Dear John: Here is my personal thinking about the Russian Treaty situation:

A solution is not to be found in ingenuity of formula, negotiating skill or persuasive oratory. It is to be found in the nature of the Japanese nation’s reaction to Soviet toughness. If the result of that toughness is to bring about increasing Japanese hostility toward Communism, both as regards the Soviet Union and mainland China, then I believe there is a fair chance that the Russians will take a compromise territorial formula the Japanese could live with. If, however, the result is to strengthen the hand of those within Japan who believe that they should be more conciliatory toward the Communists, then of course the Russians will persist in their tough policies. The answer is thus to be found not in any territorial conference or in any special form of negotiation, but within the hearts and minds of the Japanese people themselves. They and they alone can provide the answer.

With respect to our own talks with the Japanese, I cannot indefinitely accept a situation which puts our relations on an “out of channels” basis. In the long run this will involve serious risks. I believe that you must deal primarily with the Foreign Office and that I cannot exclude dealing with the Japanese Ambassador.² Best regards, Foster.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.9431/9–656. Secret. The source text indicates Dulles was the drafting and approving officer, but it does not bear his initials.
2. A number of documents in Department of State files indicate that Dulles had planned to see Ambassador Tani on September 5 to hand him the aide-mémoire and read the oral statement, but that this appointment was cancelled at the request of Allison, who believed that because the factional situation in Japan’s governing party exacerbated the dangers of premature disclosure of the contents of the two documents, no approach should be made through the Japanese Embassy in Washington. However, in view of the Secretary’s conversations with Shigemitsu, the Department still wished that the U.S. views be communicated by the Secretary personally, and therefore suggested that Dulles see Tani, and Allison visit the Foreign Office, as nearly simultaneously as possible. By the time telegram 509 was sent, telegram 564 from Tokyo, September 6, in which Allison expressed his agreement to to this procedure, had been received in the Department. (Ibid., 661.941/9–656)