Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

98. Letter From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)¹

Djakarta, May 20, 1955.

Dear Ken: Your letter of April 1² enclosing copy No. 20 of a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Prime Minister Menzies on March 14 [15], 1955 (dated March 22)³ arrived during the Bandung Conference. The pressure of work at that time and in the ensuing weeks has delayed the preparation of a reply.

The difficulty of the present situation is of reconciling the anti-colonialistic posture of the United States with practical necessities, of carefully balancing the views of our close allies, Australia and the Netherlands, with the ground swell of Asia opinion, which, unless it changes, will continue to press for the removal of the last vestiges of Western colonialism. The Bandung Conference represents only another confirmation of the unanimity of Asian nations regarding anti-colonialism which we should recognize as the end product of modern Asian history.

There is no doubt that the Australians are disturbed as evidenced by any number of statements and facts at the prospect of any Indonesian Government obtaining control of Western New Guinea. In Australian thinking, Indonesia is inherently unstable and Indonesian control of West New Guinea would always be a weakness in Australia outer defenses. It might better be said that Australia’s fear of Indonesia, perhaps arrived at almost subconsciously, is based on the demographic pressures which will result from a continuing growth in the Indonesian population, a trend on which I see no limiting factor visible at the present time. If Indonesia obtains control over West New Guinea and if the current population trend in Indonesia continues, it seems almost inevitable that within several generations there will develop in Indonesia great population pressure which will probably be expressed politically by demands for East New Guinea. This would appear the more likely if the increase in Australia’s population does not maintain the present ratio of strength between the two countries, particularly if Indonesia becomes a viable, more closely integrated state.

At the same time that Australian views on the disposition of West New Guinea continue to harden, Indonesian official eagerness to obtain the territory is becoming more intense. For all parties, the problem has ceased to be a legalistic one but has become charged with emotional content, stemming on the Indonesian side from the mystical ideology of the national revolution, of which the principal proponent is President Sukarno. His view, which he constantly expounds and which will undoubtedly be given an extensive airing at the All Indonesian Congress now scheduled for mid-August, is that the Indonesian revolution will be incomplete until Indonesian sovereignty is extended over Dutch New Guinea. The President believes, together with many other Indonesians, that this country was under such heavy pressure at the Round Table Conference in 1949 that it had no choice but to allow the Dutch to remain in control of New Guinea. They regard as a betrayal of faith the Dutch failure to agree to a determination of the status of New Guinea within one year from the time of the transfer of sovereignty and the current refusal of the Dutch even to talk about, much less transfer, sovereignty, over West New Guinea.

In other words, the so-called “liberation of West Irian” has now become a national objective, which a change of government in Indonesia, such as the coming to power of the opposition parties after the elections would not basically affect. I do not anticipate, however, that the opposition parties, once in power, would press for action on New Guinea as relentlessly as the Sukarno–PNI combine. But sooner or later such a government would feel constrained to make further attempts of some kind to acquire “West Irian.” Although I think we can appreciate Australian fears about the persistence and emotionalism of Indonesia’s campaign to get “Irian”, the acquisition of a voice in the administration of West New Guinea would not necessarily lead to a campaign to create a still greater Indonesia. With one or two exceptions, such as Mohammed Yamin’s statement shortly after the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands, the Indonesians do not attack the presence of the British in Borneo and the Portuguese in Timor.

Indonesian tenaciousness in pursuing its primary goal of acquiring sovereignty over West New Guinea has become increasingly dogged over the past year. In Indonesian eyes, their country secured a moral victory in the UN last fall, only to have the fruits of that victory snatched away by Dutch lobbying in the corridors, at which the Indonesians believe the Dutch are more adept than they. This result may have had some bearing on the leftward drift of the foreign policy of the Indonesian Government since that time. You will remember that President Sukarno alluded to such a possibility, (as reported in mytel 1496 of June 15, 1954⁴) which has materialized in the joint Ali–Chou statement of April 28. The Indonesians were so desirous of obtaining Chinese support for their position on New Guinea, which was already pledged by the final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, that they agreed to wording which could be interpreted as meaning they would support an armed Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan. Even though, as I have reported, they backed away from this interpretation, the incident illustrates how blind they can become when New Guinea is involved. The fact that some 28 nations at Bandung, including many of our close allies, agreed that Dutch Indonesian negotiations should take place is going to encourage the present government to continue its agitation on this subject. Foreign Minister Sunario was quite emotional when he thanked the Conference for its resolution on New Guinea and I fear his attitude is probably representative of most of the articulate elements in the national sentiment.

It is simply because we shall be plagued by the New Guinea question until it is satisfactorily settled that I see some reason to consider at this time alternatives to our present policy of neutrality. I think that as time goes by, the prestige element for both Indonesia and the Netherlands will not necessarily decrease and in fact will continue to hinder a settlement not only of New Guinea but also of the economic issues between the two countries which are actually of greater importance to Indonesia at present. As for the Australians, the terms of the settlement might be such as to convince them that their security would not be seriously menaced by Indonesian sovereignty over the western half of the island. I do not see how Australia can have cordial relations with Indonesia or that Australia can influence in a favorable sense developments in Indonesia (a wish expressed by Ambassador Peaslee,⁵ Assistant Secretary Robertson, General Collins⁶ and others at Baguio)⁷ so long as their support of the Dutch position on “Irian” raises Indonesia’s suspicions of Australia’s intentions. This, of course, applies in even greater measure to the Dutch.

On the other hand, if the Indonesians are at some time in the future to obtain a satisfactory solution of the New Guinea problem, they will have to think in terms of satisfying Australian fears as well as making some accommodation to the Dutch. I am of the opinion that neither of these hurdles is insuperable provided a reasonably stable Indonesian Government emerges as a reflection of an increasingly more satisfactory internal economic and political situation. The Australian view, for example, would undoubtedly become much less extreme if Indonesia were to become a member of SEATO, a possibility which I am sure is remote. But Australia might be satisfied, in the proper circumstances, with something less, such as a bilateral non-aggression treaty. And it seems to me not beyond the realm of possibility that adequate guarantees from a respectable Indonesian Government regarding the Dutch minority and Dutch economic interests here might hold out some hope of bringing about a modification of Dutch views.

It seems to me that we should follow closely the evolution of Indonesian and Dutch thinking in order to identify as quickly as possible any weakening in either party’s position. While I believe it unlikely the position of either party will weaken in the near future, it behooves us to reinforce such a tendency if it appeared to the best of our ability. In the much more probable event that neither side will weaken, I think we must sooner or later move toward a careful exploration of those elements on both sides which might be susceptible to a compromise solution. Such exploration would have to be done in the utmost secrecy through diplomatic channels. At a certain stage, it might even be well to consider the technique used so successfully in the Trieste negotiations⁸ of conducting the exchanges in a capital not directly concerned. The Indonesian elements which might be favorable to a compromise solution might well be found among moderates should the opposition parties come to power. On the Dutch side, there are undoubtedly elements which would favor a compromise solution if such a solution would guarantee greater stability to their investments in Indonesia and better protection of Dutch nationals in this country.

I fear that the time is past when the idea of a UN trusteeship would be acceptable to either party. Likewise, as the problem is now essentially political, efforts to solve it on a legalistic basis by reference to the Hague Court will prove barren. I am inclined, if the above conditions begin to prevail, to seek a solution in terms of a condominium to be terminated by mutual agreement and with provision for the ultimate expression of the desire of the inhabitants. The condominium plan should envisage the Indonesian right to participation in the economic development of New Guinea even though this development might have to be in the form of companies, a major portion of whose capital would be supplied from Western sources. The condominium would have to give Indonesia the right to real participation in the government although in practice I doubt that the Indonesians could find many surplus administrators to divert to New Guinea. Each member of the condominium would have a right to name administrators to serve in the area. Provision finally would have to be made for reference of disputes to an impartial agency as otherwise I fear a stalemate might develop. It might be possible to construct such an impartial agency to settle disputes between the condominium partners by inducing several nations such as India, Thailand and the Philippines, with the possible addition of the United States, to form a commission to assume this responsibility. It should be possible to devise such a mechanism within the framework of the UN. While the size of the commission is not important it should be, it seems to me, composed of at least three or four member nations as the pressures on a single country acting as the impartial tribunal might be almost unbearable.

What I have in mind essentially is the establishment of a buffer area to prevent the Indonesian demographic pressures, which I noted above, from bringing Indonesia into conflict with Australia, which in the long run would mean conflict with the United States as Australia undoubtedly will remain a bulwark of United States strength in the Pacific Ocean area.

In line with our overall policy towards the present Indonesian Government, however, I see the need for not discussing a possible change in United States policy towards West New Guinea outside American Government circles until an Indonesian Government more agreeable to us comes into power. However, it may be useful to have some plan ready before the next UN General Assembly session which we could use ourselves depending upon the outcome of the Parliamentary elections now scheduled to be held September 29. The full election results may not be known, however, until a month or six weeks after the elections take place.

While the foregoing is couched in general terms, I believe it may be useful for you to have the full trend of our views on this problem. A continuation of this exchange should I think be helpful in fulfilling the policy laid down by the NSC paper which you mentioned.⁹

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Hugh

1. Source: Department of State, 123–Cumming, Hugh S., Jr. Top Secret; Official-Informal.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. See Document 90.
4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 432.
5. Amos J. Peaslee, Ambassador to Australia.
6. General J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative of President Eisenhower in Vietnam.
7. At the conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in East Asia; see footnote 6, Document 86.
8. For documentation, see Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 365 ff.
9. Presumably NSC 5518, in preparation at the time of Young’s letter.