97. Memorandum of Discussion at the 248th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 12, 19551
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.]
2. U.S. Policy on Indonesia (NSC 171/1; NSC 5417/3; NSC 5518;2NIE 65–55;3 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Rubber Policy”, dated May 5, 1944;4 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 9, 19555)
[Page 160]Mr. Anderson began his briefing of the most important features of the proposed new statement of policy. The President interrupted him to inquire why it was that when the Indonesian Republic had been set up, Western New Guinea had been excluded. [Acting]Secretary Hoover and other members of the Council explained why Netherlands New Guinea was still the subject of negotiation between Indonesia and the Dutch.
Mr. Anderson continued his briefing by reading the pertinent paragraphs describing the U.S. program for assisting the small holders to improve the raising and marketing of rubber in Indonesia.
Mr. Rockefeller broke in to inquire whether the proposed new policy on Indonesia called for the utilization of UN or regional instrumentalities to assist Indonesia to develop more effective means of meeting its rubber problem. If it was true, as the policy statement seemed to suggest, that it was often difficult for the United States to provide assistance to Indonesia unilaterally, it might be possible to assist Indonesia by the use of UN or other regional instrumentalities.
Governor Stassen replied that if it proved to be in the interest of the United States to make use of UN agencies or other regional instrumentalities, such as the Colombo Plan, in assisting Indonesia, the policy statement certainly permitted it. The President asked Governor Stassen whether, if we had recourse to such mechanisms, they would be susceptible to being steered in the direction of U.S. aims and objectives. Governor Stassen answered that as a rule, of course, it was more difficult for the U.S. to control the direction that such agencies proposed to take.
Secretary Hoover then stated his view that for several good reasons the State Department opposed implementing the rubber program for Indonesia at the present time. In the first place, there were the forthcoming national elections, which might quite notably change the picture. Moreover, if we were to implement the program for planting new and better trees, it would be necessary to take out of production a great many areas where inferior rubber trees were now being tapped. For this reason many Indonesians themselves opposed this program.
Secretary Humphrey expressed warm approval of Secretary Hoover’s statement, and said he hoped that the Secretary of State would give this problem a lot of thought before making any decision to go forward with it. The President said that he judged that Secretary Humphrey did not approve of this program, and Secretary Humphrey replied that he certainly did not. He did not object to the creation of schools to train Indonesians in better productive processes, but he opposed the program for planting new rubber trees.
Governor Stassen explained that of course the basic objective of the rubber program was to prevent Indonesia from falling prey to [Page 161] Communism. The Communists were obviously making use of the Chinese middlemen to advance their cause. Accordingly, it seemed to Governor Stassen very desirable to institute a program which would assist and improve the lot of the Indonesian smallholders. The President said that we could safely leave the decision on the implementation of the rubber program to the Secretary of State, as indicated in the present report. After all, Secretary Dulles was not to be classified as “a great radical”.
Mr. Anderson then pointed out that the Acting Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Walter Williams, had been invited to attend this Council meeting to represent the interests of the Department of Commerce in the Indonesian rubber program. Secretary Williams said that his people in the Commerce Department felt that the imminence of new elections in Indonesia argued strongly against implementation of the Indonesian rubber program at the present time. The experts in the Commerce Department also believed that there was quite a high degree of non-receptivity to this program in Indonesia. Secretary Williams went on to request that if the Secretary of State at some future time decides to bring up this matter again, the Commerce Department and other interested Government agencies be given an opportunity to present their views.
Governor Stassen said that he wholeheartedly agreed with the recommendation of the present policy that the timing of the implementation of the rubber program be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State. While there was obviously no sense in trying to ram such a program down the throats of the Indonesians, he could not refrain from pointing out that where we have been successful in rolling back Communism in various backward countries, we had usually seen to it that there was some considerable improvement in the lot and the lives of the ordinary run of people.
Secretary Hoover said he had two additional comments to make apropos of the policy on Indonesia. In the first place, he wished to point out the high quality of Hugh Cumming, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia….
Mr. Anderson then said that he judged that the Council was prepared to approve the draft policy submitted by the Planning Board. This was the consensus of the Council.
. . . . . . .
[Page 162]The National Security Council:6
- a.
- Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5518) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 9, and of the recommendations of the Operations Coordinating Board concerning NSC 5417/3, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 5.
- b.
- Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5518.
Note:NSC 5518 subsequently approved by the President and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.
[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 13.↩
- NSC 5518 is printed as Document 95. Regarding NSC 5417/3, see footnote 2, ibid. Regarding NSC 171/1 and NSC 5429/5, see Document 81.↩
- Document 88.↩
- This memorandum enclosed a memorandum of May 4 from Staats to Lay, which reported that the OCB that day reconsidered the implementation of NSC 5417/3 and recommended that, since the Indonesian Government had shown no interest in such a program and the Embassy in Djakarta had not recommended any action, NSC 5417/3 should not be implemented at that time, but should be considered by the NSC Planning Board as a part of its review of overall policy toward Indonesia. Lay’s memorandum noted that the Planning Board had included a paragraph on the subject in NSC 5518. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5518 Series)↩
- This memorandum enclosed a May 6 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense stating that they considered NSC 5518 acceptable from the military point of view and recommended that he concur in its adoption. (Ibid.)↩
- Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1396. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1955)↩