531. Letter From the Ambassador in Thailand (Bishop) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am transmitting herewith a coordinated evaluation by appropriate members of the Country Team of progress under the Overseas Internal Security Program (1290–d) during the period 1 December 1956 to the present.2 … Appropriate members of the Country Team also concur in this letter.
You will note that in IID 5, we have given especial attention to the capacity of the Thai Armed Forces to meet a possible threat posed by Communist-sponsored paramilitary activity supported from abroad. In view of technological advances which must inevitably give rise to revisions to military strategy, I have some question whether the Thai Armed Forces could make a sufficient contribution to the Free World military effort in time of war to justify on a military basis our expenditures in this field. I realize, of course, that for prestige and political reasons we must expect the Thai Armed Forces to [Page 945] demand and probably to be given the trappings of modern war. However, it appears to me now more likely that any military operations in Thailand would be of a guerrilla-type rather than of mass armed invasion. This is based on an assumption that if the treaty provisions of SEATO were called into effect a United States and major allied military effort would be directed towards the sources of invasion of the treaty area rather than toward meeting that invasion solely inside the treaty area. At the same time, it is recognized that, again for prestige and political purposes, we will probably be required to give the Thai Armed Forces sufficient arms and training to enable them to make a contribution to collective security operations outside of Thailand.
At the same time, however, it appears probable that if the Thai Armed Forces are called upon to protect their country it will be in connection with a revived effort by the Communists to employ guerrilla-type insurrectionary movements against the governments of Southeast Asia which have withstood the “soft”-line tactics of the Communists. In this connection, I fear that we may be overestimating the ability of the Thai Army to deal with military actions of the type which the Communists successfully launched in northern Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Malaya. In addition to the fact that the marksmanship of the majority of men in the Royal Thai Army is dubious, the Royal Thai Army receives at most a month per year of some type of jungle training, has only one battalion of airborne troops, and has little mobility, especially in the rainy season. It is, therefore, unequipped for the type of highly mobile tactics which have been shown to be essential by experience with Communist irregulars elsewhere. More important still, JUSMAG has pointed out (in its Country Statement as of 30 June 1957) that, “The greatest weakness in the Thai Armed Forces is the lack of effective leadership … .3 Many of the officers holding key command and staff positions have been selected on the basis of personal loyalty and political reliability rather than by professional competence.” It might also be mentioned that most of the high-ranking Thai Army officers are deeply involved in business, in some cases in association with persons of very doubtful loyalty, and that they seldom leave Bangkok because of their preoccupation with business and politics. It is hard for me to see how, with such leadership, the Thai Army is to be forged into an instrument capable of dealing effectively with a Chinese Communist-supported insurrectionary or guerrilla movement.
With the above thoughts in mind, I am asking General Partridge, the Chief of JUSMAG, to inaugurate a study of the best way preparation can be made through the JUSMAG program to meet this [Page 946] threat. In due course we shall, if found desirable, submit recommendations to Washington. It is obvious that there is some justification for the Military Aid Program on its present scale for some time, because of existing commitments, because the prestige of both the United States and Thailand is involved, and because this program is important in maintaining strong ties with the present predominantly military leadership of this country. However, these are not strictly military justifications and it would be my hope that, in line with the concept of the NSC 1290–d Program we might be able to save some heavy expenditures and also, if found desirable, to reorient the Thai Armed Forces in the direction of fitting them primarily to meet a threat from guerrilla action rather than that posed by a war involving regular military in large numbers.
Sincerely yours,