Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

519. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 62–57

Washington, June 18, 1957.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THAILAND²

The Problem

To estimate the probable political developments in Thailand over the next year or two, with particular reference to its international orientation.³

Conclusions

1. We believe that Thailand has entered a period of increased political restlessness and uncertainty. During the next year or two the chances are about even that the leaders of the ruling 1947 coup group will maintain a working relationship. Although there is a good chance that any change in government leadership would be accomplished by negotiation, the possibility of violence cannot be excluded. The most likely outcome of a major change in leadership would be Sarit’s ascendancy to dominant leadership. We do not believe that the nature of Thai Government or its domestic and foreign policies would change radically, at least in the short run, in the event of a shift in the top leadership. (Paras. 10, 12, 14–16)

2. Assuming continued high levels of US aid and firm indications of US intentions to defend Southeast Asia, during the period of this estimate Thailand will probably continue a generally anti-Communist foreign policy, including association with the US in collective defense measures. However, we believe Thailand’s leaders will continue to modify their past policy of unequivocal alignment with the US and will probably seek to develop a more flexible foreign policy, particularly in respect to relations with Communist China. The Thai leaders will probably continue to tolerate unofficial contacts with Communist China and will probably enter into some official commercial and cultural contacts as well. However, we believe Thailand will not recognize the Peiping regime during the next year or so unless Communist China is admitted to the UN. (Paras. 23–24, 31–32)

3. In the event of a Communist attack on Laos, Cambodia, or South Vietnam, we believe the Thai government would participate in military countermeasures only if assured of prompt commitment of US forces to the defense of the area. If such Communist military aggression were not opposed by SEATO forces, in particular by US forces, the Thai government would almost certainly seek an accommodation with the Communist Bloc. If Communist control of one or more of these countries came about through subversion, Thailand would probably move toward a neutralist position and seek to balance its relations with the Communist Bloc and the West. (Para. 33)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of NIE 62–57.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.” All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on June 18, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.
3. The internal political situation is discussed in Appendix A, the economic situation in Appendix B, and the military situation in Appendix C. [Footnote in the source text. The Appendixes are not printed.]