Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

518. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, June 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Proposed US Action to Inhibit Alteration in Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Position

During the past year and a half Thai leaders have permitted a number of events to take place which amount to marginal accommodation by Thailand to Communist China. However, barring unforeseen developments we do not anticipate that Thailand will basically change its foreign policy of membership in SEATO and association with the US. We are nevertheless concerned that the events which have been permitted tend to further Communist propaganda aims and promote Communist penetration and subversion, particularly among the large Chinese minority in Thailand. Furthermore, such events are likely eventually to affect public opinion and may lead Thailand’s neighbors to believe that Thai support for SEATO is weakening. Such a belief, even though erroneous, would reduce SEATO’s stabilizing effect in Southeast Asia, and militate against the accession of new members.

There are a number of possible reasons why Thai leaders have permitted such events to take place. The most important, in our opinion, is Thailand’s desire to have an “anchor to windward” in case Communist China should achieve greater influence in Asia and the world. The firmness of the US stand regarding Communist China is an important factor in Thailand’s judgment regarding Communist China’s prospects. The Embassy has stated that “it is axiomatic that Thailand must attempt to be ahead of and not behind the US in any accommodation to Communist China.” The Embassy has also stated that, “Although Thai apprehensions regarding Communist China continue to be the governing consideration in Thai foreign policy, Thailand was bound to make some adjustment to major international developments, particularly when these developments have included action by the US which could be interpreted, despite our protestations to the contrary, as forecasting a modification of US policy towards Communist China.” The Embassy believes and SEA concurs, that one such US action is continued participation in the Geneva talks (Embassy despatch 290, November 25, 1955; Embassy despatch 81, August 4, 1956; and Embassy despatch 407, December 7, 1956²).

Our approaches to the Thai regarding their contacts with the Chinese Communists have elicited statements of firm support for the free world, but little else. A complete cessation of these contacts indeed may or may not be possible, but we feel that the downhill drift can be slowed. We believe that in order to counter this trend new pronouncements, demarches, threats or verbal assurances would have only limited effect. More important are actions which would illustrate concretely and definitely to the Thai the firmness of our China policy. As indicated below, we believe there are several measures the US could and should take to reassure the Thai and other nations whose policy may depend to a considerable extent upon their estimate of the firmness of the US position vis-à-vis Communist China.

I therefore recommend that we:

1. End the Geneva talks which the Thai have regarded as an indication of softening US policy toward Communist China (in order to minimize Communist charges that the US is “causing increasing tension” it would, of course, be necessary to issue a carefully worded statement explaining that continued absence of progress renders further talks useless).

2. Avoid relaxation in the US policy of restricting the entry of Americans into Communist China.

3. If possible arrange a meeting between the Secretary and Prince Wan during a two week visit the latter is making to the US this month at which time the Secretary could elicit Prince Wan’s views on Thai policy toward Communist China and re-emphasize the firmness of US policy toward the Chinese Communists.

4. Suggest to one or two Senators or Congressmen (such as Zablocki and Judd) that they visit Southeast Asia following adjournment of Congress, spending at least a week in Thailand, during which time they might convey to the Prime Minister and other Thai leaders the depth of US feeling regarding the Chinese Communists.

I realize that the Geneva talks and the policy restricting the entry of Americans into Communist China have regional, perhaps global, implications for the US which may necessitate our current actions in these fields. At the same time, we feel that their harmful effect on Thailand might advantageously be pointed out to the Secretary. If you approve these suggestions, SEA will coordinate With CA and FE/P in preparing a memorandum from you to the Secretary after suitable consultation with our Embassy in Bangkok.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/6–657. Secret. Drafted by Bushner and sent to Robertson through Jones.
2. Despatches 290 and 81 transmitted Embassy comments on indications that Thailand was weakening its anti-Communist stance. Despatch 407 reported on the prospects for Pridi Phanomyong’s return to Thailand. These despatches are ibid., 792.00.
3. At the end of the text, Robertson disapproved recommendation 1 and wrote in the margin: “Secy thinks talks should continue.” He approved recommendations 2, 3, and 4.