501. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1
4038. Your 3557, 3558, 3559, 3562, 3577, and 3615.2 In order re-emphasize consistency US policy toward ChiCom, discourage further relaxation Thai position on embargo and inspire constructive Thai action bolster confidence Lao leaders, request you deliver following personal confidential message from Secretary to PriMin.
“The last time I had the pleasure of writing to you I outlined the general attitude and position of the US toward the policies and actions of the Communist countries including Communist China. As SEATO allies, we discussed this matter further during our conversations at Bangkok after the recent SEATO meetings.
Since that time there has continued to be much speculation and many false rumors regarding a change in the attitude of the US. I can assure you that our policy in Asia continues to be one of firm opposition to the growth of Chinese Communist aggressive capabilities and of resistance to the enhancement of Chinese Communist international prestige and influence. We shall continue to join our efforts with those of other free countries determined to resist Communist aggression and enslavement.
In this connection I would like to advert to the subject of the US conversations with the Chinese Communists at Geneva which I mentioned in my message to you last November.3 The US is continuing these talks in the hope that it will be able to obtain the release of the 11 Americans still imprisoned in Commie China, and to get from the Communists a meaningful renunciation of force. A prime objective of the talks is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait and we believe that if the Communists can be pressed to declare that they will renounce the use of force, the pressure of world opinion will make it more difficult for them to engage in the military action which they have so often threatened. At Geneva we have discussed solely: 1) the return of nationals; 2) the renunciation of force; and 3) an accounting for American military personnel missing in the Korean war. We are not in any sense considering an accommodation with the Communists and have not discussed any matter involving the rights and the interests of the Government of the Republic of China. The talks do not imply any form or intention of recognition or international acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime.
In the context of this policy I would like to bring up two subjects: namely, the need for measures to strengthen Laos against the Communist threat and the need to avoid steps which might suggest [Page 894] that the position of the free world vis-à-vis Communist aggression is weakening.
As you already know from our Ambassador, the US attaches great importance to the need for measures to strengthen Laos against the Communist pressures, which continue undiminished. As Thailand and the US recognized at the time of the Vietminh invasion of Laos three years ago, the latter’s security is essential to Thailand. One measure which would contribute to the most effective possible defense of Thailand and Lao interests is joint Thai-Lao military planning, in which we understand Lao Govt prepared to press ahead. The US stands ready to help in this activity but must await the development of an effective working relationship between Lao and Thai military authorities. I hope your Govt will give new emphasis to this and other measures which may strengthen Laos, and assist its leaders to resist Chinese Communist pressures such as the recent invitation to the Lao Prime Minister to visit Peiping.
Secondly the US is convinced that steps such as a relaxation of the embargo against trade with Communist China, which might appear to constitute a weakening in free world opposition to Communist aggression must be carefully avoided, particularly at this time when the Communists would like the world to forget their aggressive, expansionist designs. The recent announcement by the United Kingdom regarding its own trade controls was in the context of ‘exceptions’ for ‘reasonable quantities’of a limited number of items and the UK has indicated that it will carefully screen such shipments. I want you to know that the US Govt had no part in this decision by the UK and will endeavor to encourage the UK to exert such controls as to give the least possible benefit to Communist China. The US has not seen any evidence in terms of Communist China’s international behavior which would alter the validity of the reasons for the original imposition of the embargo of trade with that country. Communist China has done nothing to cleanse itself of the stigma of being a blatant open aggressor and a threat to the free nations. The US will therefore continue its absolute embargo on shipments to Communist China.
The US is deeply appreciative of the fact that Thailand is one of the few nations in the world that has stood staunchly with the US in maintaining a complete embargo against Communist China. This has been a source of strength and moral support to the US in the successful maintenance of this important policy of denying to Communist China material for its economic and military build-up. I was therefore disappointed when I received reports that the Thai Govt has decided to permit trade in non-strategic items with Communist China. I now understand that you have no intention of permitting barter trade, and therefore no rice may be shipped to Red China. I sincerely hope so. My Government feels that relaxation of controls on trade with Communist China will unfavorably affect the whole structure of collective defense.
I understand full well decision on questions such as I have discussed above are exclusively matters for the Thai Govt to make on its own. But our friendship is such that I feel confident that we can without misunderstanding exchange views on these matters in the spirit of our collective defense association.
[Page 895]With all personal good wishes.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.929/6–2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bushner, Tyson, and Corcoran of SEA, and Forman of CA. Initialed for Dulles by Robertson.↩
- Telegram 3557 is printed as Document 499. The remaining telegrams all deal with the Thai decision to relax the embargo on trade with the People’s Republic of China. All these telegrams are in Department of State, Central File 493.929.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩