Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

499. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, June 16, 1956—noon.

3557. Reference Embtel 3529.²

1. Thai Cabinet decision to “normalize” trade with all countries including Communist China (except for strategic items) was result following pressures:

a. From opposition political elements castigating government as US puppet, as callous to people’s need for cheap Chinese goods, etc.

b. From merchants and influential elements within government seeking quick profit (undoubtedly some bribed by Communist gold).

c. From foreign elements, particularly Indian and British, who would appease Communism in Asia.

2. These pressures, heavy and constant for many months even before my arrival here, have often been on verge success and³ genuinely desirous winning honest majority fairly, is especially sensitive to political attack and criticism at this time. Furthermore, Prince Wan, seeking world-wide approval his candidacy UN General Assembly and sensitive United Kingdom and Commie blocs pressures, favored action by Cabinet which he felt would incline Commonwealth and Commie blocs accept him next fall. Finally, Phao–Phin group perhaps for profit motives favored relaxation. In view these pressures Prime Minister yielded.

3. While sorely tempted recommend solicitous “bedside” manner in meeting this possible shift in Thai policy, believe it in United States interest to register both in Bangkok and in Washington emphatically and promptly United States disturbance at possible softening Thai attitude towards Communist China. Therefore recommend Secretary or Under-Secretary personally convey to Thai Ambassador for transmission Thai Government message incorporating inter alia following points and that I be instructed convey same personal message from Secretary to Foreign Minister and Prime Minister:

(a) Expression deep regret and concern on part United States for step which Thai Government proposes taking;

(b) Regret because such step would mean withdrawal by Thailand from policy, identical with that of United States, of total embargo against China Communist still branded an aggressor by UN. Such withdrawal would be the more regrettable because would mark an end of pursuit identical policies by Thailand and United States, which policy each chose voluntarily, to oppose Communist aggressors. Once having chosen that policy, failure to hold to it while aggressor still stands stark and brazen before world, can only comfort enemy and strengthen those who would appease him;

(c) On its own part United States intends adhere firmly to existing policy of total embargo;

(d) Because of our partnership and abiding friendship for Thailand feel deep concern that Thailand will not gain from such trade and stands to lose. Trade with Communist is economically unsound (barter) and politically dangerous (subversion);

(e) Emphasis on United States feeling matter solely for decision by Thai Government and United States view put forward only as friend.

4. Have just learned PM stated at press conference because of its importance will again submit matter to Cabinet for further study. Pibul emphasized Thailand not “going neutral”. Added only Thailand and United States embargo all trade. Thailand will continue embargo strategic items. Not clear whether decision relax will be reviewed.

5. Request instructions soonest.⁴ Will continue informal efforts counter pressures for relaxation embargo.

Bishop

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.929/6–1656. Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. Apparent omission in the source text at this point.
4. Document 501.