Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

463. Operations Coordinating Board Outline Plan¹

Washington, February 27, 1957.

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SINGAPORE AND THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

Wherever appropriate, the courses of action in this paper will be applied to the situation existing in British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, particularly those courses which deal with combating Communist subversion, even though these areas are not covered officially by NSC 5612/1.

I. Introduction

A. References:

(1) U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1), Approved by the President September 5, 1956.²

(2) NIE 64–56, The Political Outlook in Malaya through 1960, dated January 24, 1956.³

(3) NSC 5602/1.⁴

B. Special Operating Guidance:

1. U.S. operations in Singapore/Malaya should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

2. Accepting the present primary role of the British in Singapore/Malaya, the U.S. should proceed along parallel lines insofar as the policies of the two governments coincide. …

3. If the people of Malaya feel strong that the British are obstructing or delaying their nationalist aspirations for self-government, the U.S. should discuss with the British possible lines of action to dissipate any resentment as to British intentions. Care should be taken to avoid becoming identified in the public mind with such alleged British obstructionism.

4. Multi-Racial Nature of the Population. The population of Malaya is heterogeneous. The Malays, who regard themselves as the “true” inhabitants of the peninsula and therefore entitled to special privileges, number in the Federation only a small plurality over the second largest group, the Chinese. (If one combines the populations of Singapore and the Federation, the Chinese are the more numerous.) Other significant groups are the Indians, Eurasians, and Europeans. The problem of building a Malayan nation is vastly complicated by the fact that the separate groups have not inter-married to any great extent and continue to adhere to their separate languages, religions, and customs. The diversity of interests presents more opportunities for Communist exploitation than for free world exploitation.

The rapid movement toward self-government and independence in Singapore/Malaya raises the important problem of preventing the Peiping-oriented Chinese from gaining ascendancy through constitutional or other means. U.S. representatives must be ever-mindful of the rivalries among the racial groups, avoid identification with any particular group, and to the extent possible use their influence with leaders of all groups to promote cooperation among them.

4. Independence for the Federation. It is planned that the Federation, with the blessing of the British, will become a sovereign nation within the Commonwealth by the end of August 1957. The problem will then become the maintenance against Communist subversion of a free, pro-western nation composed roughly of half Malays and half Chinese.

a. Malaya already exhibits many of the symptoms of hyper-sensitivity to western pressures which newly independent Asian nations have so consistently demonstrated. The U.S. should be ever-mindful of this sensitivity.

b. In particular, in determining the size of our official staff in Malaya and the degree of our direct involvement in Malayan affairs, we must take into account the danger of appearing to Asian eyes as intent upon supplanting British influence with our own.

c. Similarly, not only during the period of transition to independence but also afterward, we must avoid unnecessary action which would tend to confirm British suspicions that we are eager to assume their role of Malaya’s protector and “big brother”.

d. The presence of a large Chinese population predisposed to view Communist China with favor, the inroads already made in the Chinese community by Communist elements, and the secondary nature of the U.S. role in Malaya require exercise of the greatest discretion and ingenuity on the part of the American representatives in Malaya in their efforts to obtain information and to exert their influence.

6. Status of Singapore. Singapore is expected to achieve full internal self-government sometime early in 1957, and plans to hold elections for a new legislative assembly in August. Britain is expected to retain military bases in Singapore and to remain responsible for Singapore’s external defense and foreign affairs.

7. Relation of Singapore to the Federation. For a variety of reasons, Singapore and the Federation have moved separately toward full self-government and independence. Some form of merger of the two territories appears logical and desirable, but not certain to take place in the foreseeable future.

C. U.S. Commitments and Understandings:

The provisions of the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, apply to the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore since the U.K., one of the signers of the Treaty, is sovereign over those areas. The early independence of the Federation of Malaya will alter this circumstance. The present Chief Minister⁵ states privately he favors Malaya’s joining SEATO, but internal political factors may preclude this step. However, some form of indirect connection is a possibility, e.g., through the special bilateral defense treaty with the U.K. which is under final negotiation.

II. Actions Agreed Upon

NSC Citations	OCB Courses of Action
Para. 59. “Accept the present primary role of the British in Malaya insofar as they are willing and able to maintain it, and collaborate with the British so far as practicable.”	1. U.S. representatives in Singapore and Malaya should continue tactfully their efforts to convince the British of the wisdom of encouraging local government leaders to take courses of action which appear to the U.S. to be necessary.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	2. If the unexpected should happen and if British and Commonwealth strength and influence should deteriorate in Malaya, the U.S. should consider with the British possible lines of action to halt such deterioration.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: When situation requires
	. . . . . . .
Para. 60. “Encourage the British and local authorities to take vigorous actions to curb Communist subversion, and be prepared to assist in such action as requested by British or local authorities.” 4. The U.S. should continue to impress on the British the general threat which Communist subversion poses to their own and Free World interests in Singapore/Malaya.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	5. U.S. representatives should continue their efforts to persuade the government leaders of Malaya/Singapore that their present control and the future independence of these areas will depend upon mutual and constant vigilance and firm action to break up the well-organized and well-financed international Communist organization in both territories. U.S. representatives should continue their efforts to persuade government leaders that they must take action to protect all citizens from the effective intimidation methods used by the Communists.
	Assigned to: State
	Support: All agencies
	Target Date: Continuing
	6. The U.S. should encourage the two governments to discredit, arrest (possibly through income tax evasion), or deport those rich pro-Peiping Chinese merchants who allow themselves to be useful adjuncts of the Communist organization.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	7. Local government officials should be urged to adopt effective measures to prevent circulation of Communist propaganda through books, films, and newspapers.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	8. Schools, unions, and youth groups should be provided, through indigenous channels so far as possible with books, publications, films, and other similar materials calculated to present the anti-Communist world in a favorable light to offset the effect of Communist propaganda, and should receive the help of visiting U.S. leaders and specialists.
	Assigned to:USIA
	Support: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	9. The U.S. should, when opportunities arise, discourage the training of Malayans, particularly in such fields as diplomacy and defense, in neutralist countries and should encourage their training in the U.S. and other countries firmly committed to anti-Communist foreign policy.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA, Defense
	Target Date: Continuing
	10. U.S. representatives should encourage Singapore Government leaders to use sufficient pressure on the large-circulation Chinese-language newspapers to persuade them not to slant their news favorably with respect to Peiping but to print accounts of the hard facts of life in Communist China. Where possible, U.S. officials should exert direct influence on such editors also.
	Assigned to:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	11. The U.S. should continue the stepped-up publication of “Bebas” (Malay-language publication for Malays) and work out an effective Chinese newsletter publication to reach non-English-speaking Chinese.
	Assigned to:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	12. The U.S. should encourage the local governments to improve their own information services in order to present the truth to the people, counteract Communist distortion, obtain public understanding of government actions and publicize favorable developments in economic, social and political fields. Upon request, and with British clearance and consent where necessary, provide U.S. advice and training in improving local information services, which should be operated by, with and for the local population.
	Assigned to:USIA
	Support: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	13. While recognizing that the problems of elementary and secondary education are the responsibility of the elected governments and of the U.K., the U.S. should cooperatively assist in unattributed and overt measures designed to reduce subversion in the Chinese schools.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	14. The U.S. should encourage and where appropriate help to provide the means whereby indigenous agencies can organize and revitalize youth groups as a counterattraction to the appeal of Communist-oriented activities.
	Assigned to: State Support: USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	. . . . . . .
Para. 61. “Employ all feasible means to prevent Singapore and the Federation of Malaya from falling under Communist control. In the case of armed attack, place initial reliance on Commonwealth, ANZUS, or SEATO resources as appropriate, but be prepared to take such additional U.S. action as may be required.”	16. The U.S. should use every effective method possible to prevent Malayan recognition of Communist China.
	Assigned to: State
	Support: All agencies
	Target Date: Continuing
	17. Efforts should be made to strengthen the diplomatic, political, cultural and economic ties of Malaya and Singapore with the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, the Government of Republic of China, and Pakistan.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	18. U.S. representatives should attempt to convince the local Chinese that help from Communist China would be inviting a fate such as that experienced by Hungary, North Korea and North Vietnam; that Russia and China impose special harsh treatment upon their colonies, and upon home grown Communist leaders after the take-over; and that being drawn into a Communist system will lower present living standards and enslave the people.
	Assigned to:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	19. The U.S should encourage eventual political recognition between Malaya and the Government of Republic of China, but postpone pressing this issue until a more opportune time because now it would cause bitter dissension and weaken the new government. Meanwhile, quietly encourage closer contacts, particularly trade.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	20. The U.S. should encourage the development of effective local police and military establishments adequate for internal security.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	21. Prepare contingency planning studies with other SEATO nations, if feasible, for the defense of Malaya and Singapore against overt Communist aggression.
	Assigned to: Defense, State
	Target Date: July 1957
	22. Prepare unilateral contingency planning studies with respect to countersubversive and military action which might be taken by the U.S. to thwart any Communist attempt to seize control from within.
	Assigned to: Defense, State
	Target Date: July 1957
Para. 62. “Encourage the development of a strong, stable, independent Malayan nation within the Commonwealth.”	23. U.S. representatives should impress upon Singapore/Malayan leaders that independence and political stability depend first upon successful control of Communist subversion; second, upon immediate and sustained efforts further to develop responsible, well-organized political parties; and third upon placing in effect as many social and economic reforms as are practicable to move the standard of living gradually and perceptibly upward.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	24. U.S. representatives should seek to convince the Chinese, Malays and Indians that their present and future prosperity has been and will continue to be heavily dependent upon trade and ties with the free nations; that present and future trade prospects with Communist China are negligible in comparison.
	Assigned to: State, USIA
	Support: All agencies
	Target Date: Continuing
	25. The U.S. should encourage the efforts of the Malayan Governments to foster and to nurture primary loyalty to Malaya. Conversely, actions by the Governments of Singapore and the Federation which increase apprehension of Malayan Chinese as to their stake in the country should be discouraged.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	26. U.S. representatives should encourage government leaders to convince as many Chinese as possible that (a) they have a stake in a non-Communist Malaya, (b) inviting Communist China’s support would endanger their stake, (c) it does not pay to be a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, (d) after independence they would be well-advised to accommodate themselves to conditions by working peacefully to minimize discriminations rather than turning to revolt, (e) they can improve their position through constitutional processes, and (f) the “Chinese Communism is different” line is false.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	27. U.S. representatives should attempt to convince Malay leaders that it is in their own interests to permit the Chinese greater participation in the new Malayan Government, and to allow conditions under which the Chinese can prosper with minimum interference and discrimination.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	28. U.S. representatives should seek opportunities to convince government leaders and business management that it is in their own interest to encourage and develop free trade unions as an important block to Communist objectives of subverting the labor movement.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	29. Working to the extent feasible through American trade unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the U.S. should encourage (and should persuade the British to encourage) the strengthening of non-Communist labor organizations in Singapore and the Federation, and simultaneously encourage employers by all appropriate means to recognize and support non-Communist labor organizations affiliated with the Singapore Trade Union Congress and the Malayan Trade Union Congress.
	Assigned to: State, USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	30. The U.S. should discreetly … encourage the Alliance Government to assist the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress and give them credit for legislation and other official action which tends to encourage all Malayans to regard Malaya as their home.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	31. The U.S. should continue to encourage the political parties within the Alliance to use moderation in their dealings with each other and to impress upon their leaders that the best hope of a favorable future for an independent Malaya lies in maintaining good working relations within the Alliance.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	32. The U.S. should encourage, and if requested, assist in the creation of a School of Public Administration within the University of Malaya.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	33. U.S. representatives should try persistently, but tactfully, to persuade elected Malayan officials that it is in the interest of Malayans to make it possible for those Malayans possessing accredited U.S. professional degrees to be permitted to practice their calling.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	34. The U.S. should continue its present practice of avoiding actions, such as those relating to the U.S. stockpile, which would tend to affect adversely the price and marketing of rubber and tin.
	Assigned to: All agencies
	Target date: Continuing
	35. Within limitations fixed by the necessity to avoid giving the impression the U.S. intends to dominate Malayan commercial markets in the future or is trying to supplant the British, the U.S. should promote trade and investment between the U.S. and Malaya by continuing present activities, by dispatching a trade mission to Malaya and Singapore, and in strengthening the U.S. commercial staff in Singapore/Malaya.
	Assigned to: Commerce
	Support: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	36. The U.S. should plan for the prompt establishment of diplomatic relations with an independent Federation of Malaya.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Immediate
	37. Take steps to make the U.S. known in Singapore/Malaya by increasing the development of education facilities, teacher grants, book programs and an effective positive documentary motion picture program. The exchange of persons program, emphasizing labor, press and education grants, should selectively include American negroes and Asian-Americans.
	Assigned to:USIA, State
	Target Date: Continuing
	38. Seek to moderate excessive nationalism and combat narrow communalism among the Malays by distributing books in translation, circulating more widely news publications in Jawi, sending to the U.S. Malay leaders drawn from the smaller remote as well as the larger populous communities, stimulating inter-communal youth activities, and extending to secondary schools, largely attended by Malays, publications, films and sports programs.
	Assigned toUSIA
	Support: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	. . . . . . .
Para. 63. “Seek to assure free world strategic interests in Singapore, favoring, only if consistent with this end, elective institutions in Singapore and Singapore’s incorporation with an independent Malaya within the Commonwealth.”	40. The U.S. should encourage the British Government to take a sympathetic attitude toward Singapore’s aspirations for internal self-government, so long as such aspirations are pressed by a responsible non-Communist elected government able and willing to control subversion.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	41. The U.S. should continue to impress upon the British at all levels that public declarations containing the implication that Singapore can never be truly independent, militate against a merger of Singapore and the Federation. Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	42. The U.S. should encourage the Alliance Party, which forms the government in the Federation, to build up its strength in Singapore.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	43. U.S. officials in the Federation should continue in the most subtle manner to bring to the attention of the Federation’s leaders the necessity of avoiding statements and actions which appear to dampen hopes for continued cooperation and ultimate merger between Singapore and the Federation. Likewise, the U.S. should try to influence the Singapore Government not to take steps which might further harden the opposition of the Malay leaders even further to such a merger.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	45. The U.S. should not urge an early merger between Singapore and the Federation until it becomes clear that the newly independent Malaya can accommodate the local Chinese and control Communist efforts to destroy the new nation.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Continuing
	46. U.S. representatives should continue to remind the U.K. and the local Asian government leaders that every further step toward accommodation with Communist China involves the risk of adding to the appeal of Communist China to the local Chinese.
	Assigned to: State
	Support:USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
Para. 64. “After Malaya attains full self-government and independence, be prepared, as appropriate and consistent with recognition of Commonwealth responsibility, to assist Malaya to maintain stability and independence, and encourage it to join SEATO.”	47. U.S. representatives should continue to seek opportunities to encourage the Federation of Malaya to apply for admission to SEATO upon the assumption of Malayan independence. Since, however, present Malayan attitudes are such that Western pressure on Malaya in this regard is likely to engender only opposition to SEATO, our efforts at encouragement must be discreet and deft.
	Assigned to: Defense, State
	Target Date: Immediate
	48. After independence, the U.S. should encourage the Federation to apply for UN membership and should actively support its application and encourage immediate participation after independence in other appropriate international organizations.
	Assigned to: State
	Target Date: Immediate
	49. Should the Federation Government approach the U.S. for economic or technical assistance, the U.S. should consider such a request on the basis of circumstances prevailing at that time, taking into account the Federation’s plans for utilizing its own resources, resources available from public lending institutions and private investors, the availability of assistance from the U.K. and other nations, and competing demands for U.S. assistance.
	Assigned to: State, ICA
	Target Date: After assumption of sovereignty by the Federation
	50. The U.S. should consider limited participation in Singapore and Federation trade fairs and exhibitions, particularly taking into account the effectiveness of such measures to counter penetration of these markets by Communist China.
	Assigned to: Commerce, State, USIA
	Target Date: Continuing
	51. The U.S. should undertake to negotiate a modern treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, an investment guarantee agreement, and a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation.
	Assigned to: State, Treasury, Commerce
	Target Date: After assumption of sovereignty by the Federation

III. Actions Not Agreed Upon

None.

IV. Additional Proposals Under Consideration in the Working Group None.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Singapore and Malaya, Documents. Top Secret. On February 20, the Operations Coordinating Board considered and revised a February 12 draft of this paper. The Outline Plan printed here is the revised version adopted at that meeting. The Outline Plan of Operations was an action paper which detailed the implementation of that section of NSC 5612/1 which related to Singapore and Malaya. The agencies involved agreed to implement the plan subject to later review and modification.
2. For text of that section of NSC 5612/1 which related to Singapore and Malaya, see Document 461.
3. For a summary of NIE 64—56, see Document 450.
4. Text of NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy”, March 15, 1956, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
5. Tengku Abdul Rahman