449. Circular Instruction From the Department of
State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and
Consular Offices1
CA–5294
Washington, January 14,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Detailed Suggestions of Possible British Action to Counter
Subversion in Malaya
As the action posts are aware, the problem of communist subversion in
Singapore and Malaya may be raised during the bilateral discussions with
the British on the occasion of Prime Minister Eden’s
[Page 755]
visit
to Washington at the end of January.2 If so, it is
anticipated our approach will follow the lines set forth in the annex to
the December 5 draft OCB paper on
possible courses of action to counter communist subversion in
Malaya,3 copies of which were
pouched to the action posts at the time.
It will be recalled, however, that the OCB paper also recommended that we present to the
appropriate U.K. authorities on the
operating level detailed suggestions as to possible additional courses
of action which we think they might well undertake. An interagency
working group has now completed a detailed list of suggestions, and a
copy is transmitted herewith.
For the time being, the enclosed paper is for your own information only.
Since the Department cannot anticipate with certainty what the British
reaction will be to our initial approach during the Eden talks, instructions as to how you
should use the enclosed document will probably not reach you until after
the talks have taken place.
It is the Department’s hope, however, that instructions can then be
issued to you to use the enclosed list as a basis for discussion with
those British officials with whom you have close and cordial contact and
in whom in your judgment we would be most likely to produce a favorable
response. A simultaneous approach would in all probability be made to
the British Embassy here.
The Department is fully aware that we run the risks of appearing merely
to intrude into matters which are of deep concern to the British, of
appearing to presume to tell them how to run their own affairs, and
thereby of generating an attitude hostile to our suggestions. The
Department will therefore rely upon your careful tact and judgment, once
you have received authorization to approach your British colleagues, to
the end that we can in fact stimulate the British to take ameliorative
action in this situation, which we regard as both grave and urgent. You
should bear in mind that we are more interested in stimulating the
British to develop and undertake a comprehensive and positive program
than we are in seeing these particular suggestions followed.
We envisage that you will receive instructions to approach the British
informally, making clear, however, that you are acting on instruction.
You will probably be authorized to leave with your contact a copy of the
enclosed paper if you should believe it would serve a useful purpose to
do so. The Department will plan to leave to your sound discretion the
degree of informality of your approach, the decision
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as to which official or officials you
approach, and the extent of whatever remarks you deem advisable in order
to make clear that our interest stems from concern over the threat to
our common interests in Southeast Asia, from an appreciation of the
British contribution to the interests of the Free World in that area,
and from a genuine desire to offer constructive suggestions.
[Enclosure]
LIST OF SUGGESTIONS
In reviewing the information available to the United States
Government with regard to the threat of communist subversion in
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, a U.S. inter-agency working
group has set forth a number of possible courses of action which the
group thinks might well be considered by the appropriate authorities
as suggested means of countering the advance of subversion.
The United States does not, of course, have detailed knowledge of
such anti-subversion programs as may have already been undertaken by
the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Malayan authorities. Undoubtedly,
therefore, a number of the courses suggested below have already been
undertaken in one form or another by those authorities while others
may well have been considered and found impracticable. They are
nevertheless set forth here in the hope that they may be of some
assistance in suggesting possible additional lines of action.
A. Labor
- I.
- Immediate
- a.
- Require a more careful investigation of the bona fides
of new unions before granting registration. Registration
regulations should be tightened to prevent
unrepresentative minority elements from seizing control
of existing free unions.
- b.
- Require all unions to re-register annually.
- c.
- Persuade the British TUC to urge ICFTU support of the Singapore Trade Union
Congress and other free unions.
- d.
- Urge expansion of the ICFTU office in Singapore.
- e.
- Encourage employers to grant concessions to
non-communist unions and to resist recognizing
communist-line unions.
- f.
- Explore the possibilities of creating anti-communist
strength by channeling private business and government
procurement contracts to companies favoring and
cooperating with anti-communist labor unions.
- II.
- Long-range
- a.
- Enact basic labor legislation, to include a minimum
wage law and protection for workers engaged in
legitimate organizing activities.
- b.
- Urge employers voluntarily to improve working
conditions.
- c.
- Persuade non-communist Asian labor leaders elsewhere
(for example, ICFTU
Calcutta) to condemn communist exploitation of the
Singapore labor movement.
- d.
- Encourage visits to Singapore and the Federation by
confirmed anti-communist labor leaders from other
countries, particularly Asian.
B. Educational
Institutions
- I.
- Immediate
- a.
- Substantially increase facilities for higher education
for the Chinese, with major emphasis on the technical
fields and with adequate provision for the study of
Chinese culture.
- 1.
- Develop a comprehensive plan for expansion of
the University of Malaya and the Singapore
Polytechnic. (Extend University facilities and
plant to the Federation; add an engineering
school, a language institute, a school of Chinese
studies, and courses in political science and
labor relations.)
- 2.
- Develop plans for the Singapore Polytechnic in
order to convert the institution into one having
appeal to Chinese who seek advanced training. Make
special provision for supplementary English
language training, explaining it as being made
available only to provide the tool needed for the
acquisition of technical knowledge.
- b.
- Bring experienced anti-communist Chinese teachers and
materials from Hong Kong or elsewhere.
- c.
- Endeavor as a matter of high priority to obtain
Commonwealth joint financial support for a sizeable
grant to the Kuala Lumpur Technical Training Institute,
raising it to college level.
- d.
- Arrest and detain known communist student leaders even
though such action involves risks—risks which, however,
increase rather than decrease as time passes.
- e.
- Pass local legislation establishing non-substantive
regulations applicable to the entire school system with
regard to the maximum number of students in schools,
classes, etc. (Use selectively to break up the large
communist-infested schools.)
- f.
- Seek means to control the curricula, the content and
selection of text books, and the selection of teachers
throughout the entire school system.
- g.
- In addition to those from British universities,
recognize degrees from reputable institutions of higher
learning in other countries.
- h.
- Encourage visits by athletic teams and coaches from
other Free World countries.
- II.
- Long-range
- a.
- Encourage an exchange-of-persons program with other
non-communist Asian countries.
- b.
- Urge and assist the Singapore and Federation
Governments to devote a maximum of their resources to
the expansion of free public primary and secondary
schools, stressing the Malayanization theme but making
provision for the study of Chinese language and
culture.
- c.
- Expand and improve the teacher-training
program.
- d.
- With a view to furthering the program of
Malayanization, establish official standards, as nearly
uniform as possible, for all teachers and for all
schools from the primary through the university
level.
- e.
- Expand the vocational training facilities.
C. Press
- I.
- Immediate
- a.
-
Seek means of bringing into being pro-Free World
vernacular newspapers.
. . . . . . .
- c.
- Encourage the circulation of non-communist Chinese
literature.
- d.
- Publicize Diem4
and other successful anti-communist Asian
leaders.
- e.
- Through government administrative controls cut off
supplies of newsprint to anti-Free World
newspapers.
- f.
- Through existing Singapore and Federation Government
agencies institute legal proceedings against
communist-oriented Chinese papers on whatever grounds
may be available: e.g., building safety
regulations.
- g.
- Create special administrative procedures applicable to
the publication of any newspaper or periodical. Possible
examples are special requirements for registration,
bonding, health regulations, etc., the object being to
create opportunities for taking non-political action
having political objectives.
- II.
- Long-range. Bring pressure to bear on
the more important advertisers to favor anti-communist
periodicals.
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D. Propaganda
It is believed that an effective anti-communist effort in Singapore
and the Federation should provide for a program of propaganda in
addition to, and paralleling, the various types of activity
enumerated above. This program should be directed primarily toward
youth, teachers and labor leaders and be carried on by Malayan and
visiting Asian leaders. It should utilize publications, radio and
films to reach the target groups and its content should be two-fold:
- I.
- Negative propaganda, stressing the
evils of communism and ways in which it would adversely
affect established creeds, customs, traditions and ways of
life.
- II.
- Positive propaganda, to strengthen
loyalty to the existing governments, to increase
appreciation of the rights, freedoms and cultures the people
now enjoy, and to develop confidence in the physical and
spiritual strength of the Free World.
E. General
- I.
- Immediate
- a.
- Use the present legal security powers as firmly as
possible in detaining, imprisoning, and deporting
communists and suspected communists.
- b.
- Afford complete police protection to
anti-communists.
- c.
- Acquaint other Asian governments, particularly
Commonwealth members, with the gravity of the
situation.
- d.
- Seek means to enlist the aid of Commonwealth political
party organizers who are experts on communist tactics to
work with anti-communist political parties in Singapore
and the Federation.
- e.
- Establish a copyright law under which publications
from all countries outside Malaya would require approval
or registration before being admitted in internal
circulation. (To be used selectively to exclude the
principal mainland Chinese publications and other
pro-communist material.)
- II.
- Long-range
- a.
- Give as much behind-the-scenes support as possible to
the Marshall and
Rahman
governments.
- b.
- Increase the proportion of civil service jobs open to
Chinese.
- c.
- Bring pressure to bear on wealthy Chinese business
interests which are supporting the
pro-communists.
- d.
- Include Malayans on British delegations to
international conferences which affect Malaya.
- e.
- Provide guarantees which will attract more foreign
private capital.
- f.
- In consultation with the elected Malayan officials,
seek to accelerate the economic development of Singapore
and the Federation.
