Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

432. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 66/1–57

Washington, September 3, 1957.

POLITICAL OUTLOOK FOR THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS²

The Problem

To estimate political developments in the Philippines and trends in US-Philippine relations over the next few months.

Conclusions

1. At this stage in the election campaign the Nacionalista party appears to have a clear edge. We believe that the Liberal party candidates, Yulo and Macapagal, rate considerably higher as individuals than the Nacionalista candidates, Garcia and Laurel, Jr., in terms of ability, adherence to principle, and concern with improving conditions in the Philippines and with good US-Philippine relations. However, in these same terms there is little to choose between the two parties, and both major candidates are beholden to special interest groups. (Paras. 15, 17–18)

2. The Progressive party and its presidential candidate, Manahan, have a legitimate claim to the mantle of Magsaysay and would probably push reform measures, honest government, and good US-Philippine relations. However, the party lacks organizational strength and financial backing, and Manahan’s chances of victory are slight. (Paras. 12–13)

3. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, the Philippine government will probably lack the degree of stability, sense of direction, and public confidence it had under Magsaysay. Under either the Nacionalista or Liberal party, corruption will probably increase, privileged groups will probably exercise increased influence on the government, and there will be a halt to effective economic development and social reform. Thus, a trend will be initiated toward the venal and expedient administration of public affairs that characterized the pre-Magsaysay era. As such a trend progressed, public reaction would take the form of widespread unrest which might, in time, either build up to a serious economic and social upheaval or degenerate into general political apathy. In either event a climate favorable for Communist subversion would be created. (Paras. 21–23)

4. The base issue, particularly the problems of criminal jurisdiction and of demarcation of base areas, will continue to cause friction and irritation in US-Philippine relations. For the short term however, we do not believe that the Philippines will take any action which would seriously jeopardize US military base rights. The bulk of the Philippine population and most of the leaders will probably continue to recognize the necessity of reliance on the US for security and to favor continued cooperation with the general line of US policy in the Far East. The long term outlook is for the growth of nationalism, increased pressures for a more independent foreign policy, and a general loosening of ties with the US. (Paras. 25–27)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of NIE 66/1–57.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates were high-level interdepartmental reports appraising foreign policy problems.NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the members of the NSC. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the following intelligence organizations participated in preparation of this estimate:CIA, and intelligence organizations of Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with this estimate on September 3 with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

2. This estimate supplements NIE 66–57, “Political Outlook for the Philippine Republic During 1957,” 12 February 1957, superseding the political section of that estimate in the light of Magsaysay’s death. We believe the sections of that estimate regarding the Communist threat, economic prospects and US-Philippine relations, excepting those references to Magsaysay, remain valid. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 66–57 is not printed.]