Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

408. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, August 30, 1956—9 p.m.

579. State for Hoover, Robertson; Def for Robertson, Gray, Radford;CINCPAC for Stump Priority by ALUSNA 301430Z. Also pass Niact Defense. Phil Milbamsg. From Bendetsen: Reference your 666.² Your statements in Deptel 666:

a. “While fully appreciating your observations regarding depth of Philippine feeling on subject of US bases continue believe any past and present difficulties stem not from agreement itself but from certain unfortunate circumstances its implementation” and

b. “We thus far however unconvinced any basic reason for Phil desire for changes other than those motivated by particular political ambitions opposition members”

convince me that I have failed to make problem clear to you. If issues stem in substantial degree from unfortunate past circumstances in implementation of MBA, rather than from fundamental causes I have endeavored to describe in previous messages, my negotiations here could have been favorably terminated sometime ago. In same message you request:

“If there are other considerations present of which we unaware would appreciate your further advice and specific recommendations.”

There certainly are and my further advice and specific recommendations follow:

1. I agree we could not live with an agreement which incorporated the recommendations of the Tolentino Committee. Am virtually certain it would not be necessary to go that far in order to obtain an agreement which the Phil Government could be expected fully to support. Have encountered no serious effort by Phil panel to force recommendations of Tolentino Committee in toto. If I had, I would have long since proposed to recess negotiations and return.

2. In the fourth paragraph of your message you state: “We continue to believe, however, that if Philippine interests adequately and visually protected, agreement will be an asset to Magsaysay in this fight.” This is exactly what needs to be done, viz., “adequately and visually protect” Phil interests. In order to do this, it is essential as a minimum (a) that as to criminal jurisdiction over US persons subject to military law, we use the same language as we have used in places like NATO and Japan. I believe I can successfully obtain substantial support for an agreement if we do this. I am also satisfied that it is essential that we be willing, as we have been willing in other places, to hand over any of our people who commit a crime which is of grave and special concern to the national government, and also those persons whose offenses are against Phil law only. That as to jurisdiction over offenses committed on US bases by Phil nationals, we fully relinquish, because, so far as I am aware, we have no such jurisdiction over the nationals of any other host country with which US has mutual defense arrangements. In this connection, I am now convinced after thorough probing that if I were to propose to Phils that the US suspend its jurisdiction over Phil nationals for offenses committed by them on US bases for a trial period of, say, two years, I would gravely insult their national sensibilities. This would be the same as saying openly to them that we do not trust them but that we do trust the Japs, for example.

3. The clearest way that I can express the reason why these jurisdictional changes are essential is because we have like arrangements in NATO and in case of former enemy, Japan. Even though, as you say, these changes would make little substantial difference in the jurisdiction which Phils can now exercise over US persons subject to US military law, it is still necessary that we make the change in wording because what the Phils want is the same words and music as the record plays in NATO and Japan. Stating it another way and using universal language, a little semantic love play can get us what we need and, at the same time, make the Phils happy and self-dignified for the years ahead. We are now somewhat in the same position as the well-intentioned husband who loves his wife but does not tell her so. If you feel that we cannot go along with this minimum concession, it is my belief that we cannot reach agreement of lasting value and we should lay plans accordingly. For what it is worth, I believe it would be contrary to the interests of the United States in this important area, which is perhaps the keystone of US prestige in the Southeast Asia region, to decline to go as far with the Phils as we have gone in NATO and Japan as to SOFA aspects.

4. I am in the course of determining, without committing the United States in any way, the Phil rock bottom position on a package deal. I anticipate no insurmountable difficulties regarding base needs and delimitation of existing bases if we move fast enough. If we don’t I am frankly unable to predict what will happen.

5. Upon reaching a determination of the Phil rock bottom position, a process I hope to complete not later than Monday, September 3, Manila time, I will cable you soonest the text of an agreement which I believe the Phils will accept and which I also believe the US could accept without bereavement to any essential security, operational control or basic military requirements.

6. Subject to your reaction to such cabled text, which I would need soonest, I believe it would be possible to reach agreement satisfactory to both governments and which the Phils could be expected to support and stand behind, by the end of the forthcoming week.

7. If we do not make the grade by that time, then in my opinion it would be essential to recess negotiations and for me to return to Washington for consultation.

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–3056. Secret; Niact.
2. Dated August 29, not printed. (Ibid., 711.56396/8–2956)