407. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1
534. For Hoover and Robertson from Nufer. While the following already has been reported in substance by Milba communications, in view request contained Deptel 630,2 I am submitting my own appraisal on local scene. This may help explain current negotiating difficulties.
As indicated in previous messages, negotiations have not turned out to be a simple land settlement problem. On the contrary, the thorniest problems encountered are on such intangibles as jurisdiction, enforcement applicable Phil laws on bases, terms of agreement, two flags, etc., which unrelated to land settlement but which loom largest in Phil’s eyes. Settlement of title question by Magsaysay Nixon statement did not solve the problem but in Phil’s eyes was [Page 680] merely sine qua non for initiation current Milba talks. It must be realized that Phils consider above-mentioned problems not only as irritants but directly affecting their national sovereignty, and believe MBA was forced on them by Roxas without real negotiations. They are so emotionally convinced of this that any attempt to prove the contrary would be of no avail and moreover they are keenly aware and deeply resent what they believe to be inequality of treatment as compared on bases agreements in other countries including former enemy countries.
I sincerely believe it is essential we conclude negotiations as rapidly as possible. The longer the delay the more difficult satisfactory conclusion becomes. Our inability so far to respond effectively on the many points Phils have raised strengthens their position in their own eyes.
The MBA discussions have naturally stimulated such groups as the Tolentino Committee to intensify their efforts to bring about a wholesale review of the entire complex U.S.-Phil relations and these activities are inevitably having their impact on Milba negotiations.
I fully appreciate that regardless of the sincerity of others the fundamental purpose of some Phil politicians, such as Speaker Laurel, who support the Tolentino Committee, is to exploit for demagogic reasons issues which could embarrass Magsaysay and generally weaken his position in the next year’s election. Obviously, we cannot afford to let this happen. Developments here are being closely followed by Indonesian and Thai missions and I cannot help but feel that our failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with our best friends in this area would in the eyes of their governments cast grave doubts on sincerity our publicly announced policies Southeast Asia especially regarding our meaning of partnership.
To follow a constructive path here we must adjust our relationships to meet changing conditions. The Phils are a proud, emotional and sensitive people; especially sensitive to any conditions which they feel impair their independence or sovereignty. At the same time they are generally sincere in their friendship for the United States and do not seek to dissolve or weaken the ties between our two countries but to strengthen them by bringing about those adjustments which, in their eyes, are essential to their national integrity.
We must, therefore, be willing to consult with them; giving greater cognizance and weight to their legitimate aspirations and giving them greater evidence of trust and respect for them as a sovereign nation. Above all, we must show a more sympathetic understanding of the difficult period through which they are passing largely as a result of their rapidly growing nationalism.
We must recognize these developments and seek to channel them into a constructive and democratic pattern. As the Department [Page 681] knows there are two types of nationalism here. Positive nationalism, as advocated by Magsaysay, which is based upon close cooperation with us. The other, supported by Cuenco and others, favors neutralism. If we fail satisfactorily to resolve those issues which Phils consider essential and which we believe we can do without impairing our ability effectively to use and operate our bases and without prejudicing United States objectives here or in other areas of the world, we inevitably weaken Magsaysay’s policy and strengthen the hand of the Cuenco-type nationalists. I therefore consider it essential that all our decisions affecting U.S.-Phil relations take these considerations into account.
In summary, I am optimistic about our long term objectives in the Phils and about the possibility of attaining a satisfactory Milba settlement provided we recognize the realities of the situation as it now exists. If we cannot do so, then I would be pessimistic about the future and these negotiations.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2756. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.↩
- Telegram 630, August 25, expressed concern at Bendetsen’s pessimism and requested Nufer’s “candid assessment” of the chances for success in the negotiations and comments on Bendetsen’s appraisal. (Ibid., 711.56396/8–2256)↩