Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

405. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, August 27, 1956—1 p.m.

525. Dept pass SecDef priority for action; passed CINCPAC for info as ALUSNA Manila’s 270700Z. For Hoover and Robertson at State and Robertson, Gray and Radford at Defense, and for info to Stump at CINCPAC. From Bendetsen. Reference: Phil Milba. In anticipation of our forthcoming telecon, it may be of assistance to amplify upon the views expressed in 477 and in 517.²

The pessimism I have expressed to you is based upon my conviction that we cannot accomplish anything of value in these negotiations if the U.S. considers that our problems respecting bases are superficial, are concerned with check-points, Santamaria type incidents, and that they can be solved by a land settlement and the release of title and title claims. However, as I said in my 517, the opportunity for a constructive result without real prejudice to any legitimate U.S. interest has not yet passed. If we revise our approach to the problem and to what we might be willing to do in these negotiations, essentially with respect to such matters as jurisdiction, cooperation in the legitimate application and enforcement of Phil laws on U.S. bases, and duration (again, as amplified in my 517) then, in my opinion, we have a good chance to obtain a satisfactory result and to make a start on rebuilding our relationships.

Since my arrival here, assisted by a competent staff and with all the energy I could bring to bear, I believe I have developed and reported to you the issues deterrent to these negotiations, which, unless favorably resolved would prejudice U.S. interests. In the absence of a soundly concluded negotiation here and now I understand from good authority that the U.S. can expect a concerted political attack upon Magsaysay, his supporters, and the U.S. the opposition politicos are said to be awaiting only the conclusion of these negotiations to take the political offensive. It is my view, and this view is shared by those whom I believe to be competent observers, that if the issues I have identified to you and on which I have made recommendations are favorably resolved along the lines proposed, Magsaysay and his supporters will be able effectively to deal with this campaign and to emerge stronger than ever.

Further to amplify on previous msgs, as I have indicated, the negotiations have not turned out to be the simple land settlement problem which I allowed my Wash briefings to lead me to believe. This was doubtless my own fault, but at least it is only fair to say that I left there with an impression which I have found to be unrealistic. I should add that while I was competently briefed on Olongapo, check-points, the Santamaria incident, and other irritants, and on many other aspects collateral to our U.S. base requirements, I developed the impression that by taking a few steps to avoid such incidents in the future and by releasing title and title claims, this would do the trick.

Instead of encountering a relatively simple land settlement problem, I have found myself caught in the midst of a profound and sincere national reexamination by the Phils of the entire fabric of the U.S.-Phil partnership. This reappraisal in my opinion is not simply a Recto-inspired anti-U.S. attack. Neither does it stem alone from other dissident Phil factions. It would be a mistake to construe it necessarily as anti-American, rather it is basically pro-Phil.

While I have done my best to prevent these Milba discussions from being broadened to embrace these complex and interrelated issues, it is clear that many responsible Filipinos here do not regard the Milba negotiations as a question that can be considered in isolation or merely as a long deferred land settlement under the MBA. Rather, they have taken the position that despite U.S. protestations about the “mutuality” and the “special relationship” of the U.S.-Phil partnership, the record when viewed in comparison with what the U.S. has done with respect to other Far Eastern and European nations, including some declared neutrals, does not bear us out. I realize I am not reporting any facts which have not already been brought to your attention. I am animated by the thought that in this and previous msgs it might be of value to send [illegible] as an outsider and reasonably unprejudiced observer in an attempt to describe the mental uncertainty and turmoil which besets some of the most intelligent and conscientious pro-U.S. Phil leaders at this particularly difficult phase of Phil history.

The Phils are fiercely proud of their independence, and while nationalist sentiments have never been stronger, responsible Phil leaders when they analyze their situation realistically, as they do, cannot help but conclude that their country’s choice is for all-out U.S. collaboration. For practical purposes these leaders consider that there are but three courses of action which the Phils could take, namely: first, to continue to align themselves squarely with the U.S. and to follow our lead in all important matters; second, to turn to neutralism; or, third to succumb to Communism. Fortunately, there is no serious thought that I can discover on the part of such responsible leaders to follow any course other than firm partnership with the U.S. They are not seeking to weaken the ties between our two countries; they are honestly trying to strengthen them. In these negotiations at least, they are not seeking to strengthen them through increased material U.S. aid (although this is a naturally hopeful aspiration) but rather by bringing into the “unique relationship” with the U.S. those elements of respect, dignity, and mutual trust which are the true ingredients of human partnership.

I have been seriously concerned about the undeniable validity of some of the arguments of these responsible leaders. They have the feeling that the U.S. has interpreted Phil-U.S. agreements in what appears to them to be a thoughtless, arbitrary and paternalistic manner. They also feel that we have not given them the means of defending themselves against Phil opposition leaders who maintain that this country is merely a U.S. protectorate or puppet. As a minimum, we must at least give the appearance of taking the Phils more fully into our confidence and explaining to them the wider considerations which prompt some of the actions the U.S. is required to take in as the acknowledged leader of the Free World. If we do not do this, we will raise doubts concerning our true intentions.

In summary, what I am trying to get across is:

(a) If we forge an agreement in these negotiations without raising our sights and yielding on the issues I have raised, it would be my opinion that our bases here would have but short term value as a defense asset;

(b) If we do raise our sights and yield to the extent I have recommended, then our base system here can constitute a long term defense asset.

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2756. Secret.
2. Document 403 and supra, respectively.