Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

403. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, August 22, 1956—3 p.m.

477. SecState for Dulles, Hoover and Robertson. Request immediate transmission to Defense for Wilson, Robertson, Gray and Radford; will be sent other means CINCPAC as ALUSNA 221155Z. For Stump. From Bendetsen and Nufer. Reference Phil Milba. Message is in three parts.

Part I. This part summarizes situation:

A. Bendetsen not optimistic about situation. He considers that there has been a basic misappraisal of seriousness of situation here. Regrettably the unfortunate Brownell opinion maneuver did much damage to U.S.-Phil relations. He feels that this led to the erroneous conclusion that by conceding on the title issue as we did on July 4 that the U.S. thereby virtually cured the disease, and undid the basic damage. He believes that while it was essential to yield on title issue as a gesture of friendship and that such action did clear the air somewhat, it by no means remedied the situation. He feels that beneath the surface, U.S. relations have in fact deteriorated to a serious degree and that the foundations are dangerously weak and that the U.S. faces a series of basic and hard decisions. It is also Bendetsen’s conviction that if the U.S. were to press Magsaysay into accepting an executive agreement regarding bases of the specific nature the U.S. now has in mind, even if by minutes of understanding we were to suspend our jurisdiction over Phil nationals on U.S. bases, it would not last because it would rest on what has become a set of poor foundations. He also feels that such a step on Magsaysay’s part would weaken him. He might still get adequate votes from the people next time, but he would simply have no effective political organization. Bendetsen believes Magsaysay would not have the members Congress with him. Magsaysay has precious little organization now.

B. Bendetsen believes this negotiation is regarded by Phils as a necessary means of reviewing the entire relationship between two countries and that there is no practical way of changing their view. On other hand from U.S. point of view negotiation began in spring of 1949 as a land settlement pursuant to MBA. Actual negotiations then lasted one day. Title question arose. Brownell opinion later sought and delivered to Phils with explosive results. Negotiations no longer matter of land settlement as we have tended to regard them.

C. Situation largely stems from three sources.

1. First is economic. This is the major cause of disease.

2. Second is that Phils consider MBA to have been forced on them by Roxas despite high sounding phrases in Roxas speech to Phil Senate when ratified there. Present member of Phil Senate who was then Phil Sec Def and member of Phil base negotiating team² expresses this view with eloquence and conviction. Proof to contrary next to impossible as U.S. records are poor with no transcript and nearly everyone else directly concerned on both sides now dead. Phils also point out that nearly all base agreements by U.S. with other nations since 1947 are different and more favorable to host nation particularly as to jurisdiction, etc., even with former enemy Japan.³ On the published record of such agreements Phils are substantially correct. This lends weight to attack on MBA. To say MBA has the support of Phil voters because they voted Magsaysay into office with large majority is a myth. Most little Filipinos are too worried about tuberculosis, high prices, a job and a living to have foggiest idea on subject. But the articulate politicos believe they know all about MBA and other U.S. base agreements and do not like it. Neither U.S. nor Magsaysay can win here in long pull if politicos are against U.S. Some influential politicos are beginning to turn now and will do so unless we repair the foundations before it is too late.

3. Third cause in Bendetsen opinion is that U.S. has veered U.S. base problem out of perspective for several years. This has reflected itself in Embassy here. Often this subject has pre-empted major time and concern of top officials. Too often stress has been laid on idea that poor and thoughtless actions by U.S. military in base administration, such as in case of check points and Santamaria,⁴ virtually sole cause of our problem. These incidents are not the cause of basic problem. They merely pour salt on wound, but wound was already there.

D. Highlights Phil impressions contributing to basic deterioration in the Phil-U.S. relations are:

1. Published provisions of base agreements between U.S. and Spain, NATO⁵ and Japan are much more considerate and favorable regarding jurisdiction, law enforcement, term and joint consultation than Phil MBA. U.S. proclaims friendship, mutual confidence and trust and Phils have form of government like U.S. but U.S. does not actually trust them. We have not closely consulted; we do not tell them what is going on at bases or even generally how we plan to use them. We say they are sovereign but their laws do not de facto apply at bases and we do not adequately cooperate with them on endorsement even as to violations by Phil nationals because we won’t allow any Phil official to have office on base or access to Phil nationals on bases in most cases.

2. This adds up in their minds the idea that we treat them as fourth rate nation.

3. Phils convinced we give more aid to former enemies, Germany and Japan, than we give Phils.

4. Phils consider they afford U.S. greatest opportunity to prove to Asia that our way of life is best, but Phil economy dismal, large part in hands of Chinese with Japanese about to come in and exploit Phil resources. U.S. seems to them to be too little concerned with their economic plight.

5. Phils believe military aid program inadequate and unrealistic in face of their economic condition.

E.

1. If U.S. considers good relations with Phils to be important for long term we must recapture lost initiative. This cannot be done unless we are willing to change our sights and convince them that we do trust them as partners. To convince them that we do trust them and that we do not regard them as fourth rate power we would need to revise somewhat base agreement to make it look as good to them as do the published agreements with Japan and NATO. The basic question is whether U.S. is willing to take such a step as this during these negotiations. If we are not then any resulting settlement which Magsaysay might be persuaded to impose would in Bendetsen’s opinion be short term and of doubtful value, and should not be attempted.

2. Bendetsen feels it possible to make a start on repairing foundations, recapturing initiative and improving relations which would be reasonable, on balance and with which U.S. could live. But he also feels that separately from these negotiations the U.S. should urgently consider how more effective steps could be taken under appropriate U.S. leadership to bring about conditions whereby Phil economic level will be raised.

3. When Bendetsen has further pursued his talks with Pelaez and others during the next few days he may propose that he return to Washington for consultation.

[Here follows the second part of this telegram, which concerns practical negotiating problems and recent decisions made by Bendetsen to deal with them. Bendetsen reported that he had decided against negotiating with either the entire Philippine panel or any of its several subcommittees since such a procedure would be very time-consuming and the “U.S. position would be inevitably disclosed point by point in least favorable and most prejudicial manner.” Instead, he had chosen to negotiate with Senator Pelaez alone. This, he believed, would be a more effective tactic since Pelaez appeared to be an extremely able negotiator who was honest, sincere, and “pro-American in the sense that he considers good relations with U.S. are vital to both countries but must rest on firm foundations.”]

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8—2256. Secret; Priority.
2. Ruperto Kangleon.
3. Apparently a reference to the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty, signed in Tokyo on February 28, 1952, and entered into force on April 28, 1952 (TIAS 2783); and to the Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, and Agreed Official Minutes, signed at Tokyo September 29, 1953, and entered into force October 29, 1953 (TIAS 2848).
4. See footnote 2, Document 390.
5. Apparently a reference to the Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed in London on June 19, 1951 and entered into force for the United States on August 23, 1953. (TIAS 5351)