288. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1249. During interview with Congressman Saund2 this morning which I attended, President Sukarno talked mostly of the West Irian problem. He pleaded with Congressman to urge American Government to reconsider its position and not “lose to Moscow”. Sukarno claimed that whenever he told Indonesian audiences that America was a true friend of Indonesia he was always met with the question: “Then why doesn’t America support us on West Irian question?” This would be followed by statements that Soviet Union always supported Indonesia. Sukarno went on to say that American Government leaders made a great mistake in thinking that economic and other material aid was the only important thing to give the new nations of Asia. “This is an age of nationalism in Asia,” said the President, “and raising the standard of living of people, while important, is not enough. ‘Man does not live by bread alone’. We must have political as well as economic help”. Sukarno then repeated his oft-stated theme that if America would only come out on Indonesian side in this matter, he could turn the nation overnight into close friend of the United States. He claimed that all Indonesia wanted was public recognition by America that cause of Indonesia was just; the working out of the details of transfer of sovereignty could be discussed at length with the Dutch. Sukarno definitely implied that he did not expect an immediate transfer and was prepared to wait several years for implementation once public recognition had been given to lightness of Indonesian claim.
While both Congressman Saund and I attempted to urge caution and desirability of an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary settlement of this problem, we made no impression on Sukarno. He continues to claim, and there is considerable evidence to back him up, that this is a genuine mass demand, and he cried: “Let me keep the masses in my hands”. In light of his previous statements, it was clear he meant by this that if we supported him on West Irian he could keep the masses under control and on our side.
During later stage in the conversation the Congressman asked Sukarno what had been effect on public opinion of Indonesia of the two Russian “Sputniks”. After instantly replying that they had constituted a “plus” for Russia, Sukarno went on to say, “I do not know in detail what the military significance is, but I am certain that in [Page 502] this modern age, with earth satellites and guided missiles, the security significance of West Irian to Australia has disappeared”.
At beginning of conversation President said to me that his new guesthouse on Bali was practically finished and he asked, “When will President Eisenhower come to visit me there?” I am convinced that this man still would rather be friends with America than any other foreign country, but he is going to take help from any quarter possible to achieve his ends. It is all very well to say, as in last paragraph The Hague’s 810 to Department,3 that Dutch would look askance at substitution of US influence in their former colony in exchange for trading Dutch territory to India [Indonesia]. The Dutch have no influence here. The Australians are fast losing what little they had. If American influence is not maintained in Indonesia, the only other foreign influence will be Soviet Russian or Communist Chinese. Do the Dutch honestly think this would be in their true long term interest? There is one way and one way only of maintaining American influence here. It is along the lines of my 11414 or some similar approach which provides for flexibility and time to work out details of a solution fair to best interests of all. We can perhaps maintain a neutral position for a short time longer but the sands are running out.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/10–3057. Confidential↩
- Representative D.S. Saund of California.↩
- Reference should be to telegram 802, Document 283.↩
- Reference should be to telegram 1142, Document 279.↩