Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

286. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, November 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance to Indonesia

In accordance with a suggestion made to you by Mr. Quarles, working level representatives of the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Forces, and the three Services, have discussed the question of military assistance to Indonesia, using Ambassador Allison’s telegram No. 942 of October 11, 1957 (Tab A)² as a basis for the discussions. At a meeting on November 4 this group agreed to recommend:

1) that favorable action be taken on the Embassy’s recommendation that military equipment be made available to Indonesia;

2) that the U.S. be prepared to make token shipments if the necessary arrangements can be worked out with the Indonesian Government;

3) that such token shipments be designed so as not to increase materially the ability of the Central Government either to mount a punitive expedition against the regionalist movements in the outlying islands or attempt to take West New Guinea by force.

In addition, the representatives of Defense recommended that a high ranking officer, of General or Flag rank, be made available to assist Ambassador Allison in the negotiations.

In my opinion the decision we take on the Indonesian request for military assistance will have an important bearing on the future course of that country and may well be the decisive factor in determining whether in the long run Indonesia will align itself with the West or with the Soviet Bloc. It is important, therefore, that we consider all the factors involved and that our decision be based on what is in the best interests of the U.S. The following points should therefore be considered:

A. Reasons for assistance.

1. As pointed out in my memorandum to you of October 22 (Tab B),³ the Indonesian request to purchase arms and equipment from the U.S. represents, in the broader context of our relations with Indonesia, the successful achievement of a fundamental policy objective. We have worked since 1950 to create and maintain in the Indonesian armed forces a pro-U.S. orientation, and to encourage Indonesia to look to the West for its military supplies. The Indonesian Government, on its own initiative, has finally met our terms and approached us with a formal request. To rebuff the Indonesians now will only serve to confirm the fear that many of them now have that we are not prepared to assist them.

2. The Indonesian armed forces are determined to modernize, and they will turn to other suppliers if U.S. sources are denied to them. As the Embassy has reported, Indonesia has received offers of military equipment from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and China, among others, and its military leaders are finding it hard to hold out for U.S. equipment, which they prefer, when less expensive or free military supplies are available from other countries. Should they have to turn to the Soviet Bloc to meet their needs the communists will have won a major victory. It will only be a matter of time then before the Indonesian armed forces become completely oriented to the Bloc.

3. There is general agreement that the Indonesian armed forces, particularly the army, represent the most important single force for providing a stable, non-communist government in Indonesia. The Service Attachés and the Embassy regard the army officer corps as predominantly Western-oriented and anti-communist. Army Chief of Staff Nasution (himself a non-communist) has assured our Army Attaché that there is not a single battalion commander in the Indonesian Army who is a communist or communist sympathizer. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that the armed forces would take over the government before the communists were permitted to gain the upper hand.

4. Since 1950, 395 Indonesian officers have been trained in U.S. Service Schools, and 96 additional slots have been made available to them for this year. These officers are familiar with U.S. military procedures and believe in the superiority of U.S. equipment. As a result of their influence the Indonesian Government has overcome its political objections and established its eligibility to purchase equipment from the U.S. Another indication of their influence is that U.S. Army and West Point text books will be used in the new National Military Academy. The request for arms and equipment provides us with an opportunity to strengthen the position of these pro-U.S. elements, as well as those in the government, by a concrete demonstration of U.S. support.

5. The Embassy reports that in the Indonesian war plans Communist China is considered to be the enemy and the U.S. an ally. Under these circumstances, it would seem clearly desirable to standardize Indonesian equipment as much as possible with that of the U.S.

6. The Naval Attaché in Djakarta recently reported that according to General Nasution the arrival of U.S. equipment would have a favorable political impact, would improve the morale of the Services and of the people, and could favorably influence Sukarno.

B. Risks

1. The sale of military equipment to Indonesia would of course involve certain risks, although these risks can be kept to a minimum by proper timing and selection of equipment to be shipped in the early stages. Despite the risks involved, however, I believe it is in the U.S. interest to respond favorably to the Indonesian request.

2. The Dutch and Australian Governments can be expected to indicate their displeasure should we agree to sell Indonesia military equipment, primarily because of their fear that some of the equipment might be used for an attack against West New Guinea. In my opinion the danger of an attack by Indonesia against West New Guinea is so remote, and the stakes here are so great, that while giving due consideration to the positions of those two countries we should not let their attitude determine our position. We cannot afford to lose Indonesia to the Soviet Bloc because of the fears of those countries over West New Guinea. Also, it should be noted that use of equipment purchased from the U.S. for such purpose would be prohibited under assurances given to us by the Indonesian Government last March⁴ which provide inter alia:

“Any weapons or other military equipment or services purchased by the Government of Indonesia from the Government of the United States of America will be used by the Government of Indonesia solely for legitimate national self-defense and it is self-evident that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization, interprets the term ‘legitimate national self-defense’ within the scope of the U.N. Charter as excluding an act of aggression against any other State”.

It should further be noted that the British Ambassador in Djakarta is reported to have recently recommended to his Government the sale to Indonesia of naval equipment on a long term loan basis. Also, the Australian Government announced only last month that it will train eight Indonesian officers in Australian artillery and armored schools.

3. The risk that some of this equipment might be used against the dissident elements in the outer islands has decreased as a result of the National Conference held in September. The Conference appointed a committee of seven to resolve the Army problem, and all the military leaders have agreed that they will accept and abide by the decisions of that committee.

C. Timing

The best time to approach the Indonesian Government must be determined in the light of events in Indonesia. Ambassador Allison has suggested that if the U.S. is to sell military equipment to Indonesia the best time to approach the Government might be immediately following after the Seven-Man Commission appointed by the National Conference to settle the Army question has submitted its recommendations. The political effect and improvement in the morale of the armed forces and the people following such a decision might, according to the Ambassador, prove decisive in continuing the orientation of the army to the West.

D. Recommendations

1. That a favorable response be made to the Indonesian request to purchase military equipment from the United States.

2. That Ambassador Allison be authorized to inform the Indonesian Government of our preparedness to discuss the sale of equipment for the Indonesian armed forces.

3. That an early token shipment be made if the necessary arrangements can be worked out with the Indonesian Government.

4. That the type and amount of matériel to be supplied be determined in the light of the developing situation in Indonesia.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/11–1257. Secret. Sent through Howard Jones who initialed. Also sent to Under Secretary Herter with a covering memorandum of November 15 from Robertson, suggesting that he arrange a conference with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles and Allen Dulles to make a final decision on Indonesia’s request. Robertson wished to be present and to discuss the subject briefly with Herter before the meeting. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/11–1557)
2. Document 275. The tabs were not attached to the source text.
3. The memorandum under reference recommended that Robertson meet with Quarles and Allen Dulles to determine a State–Defense–CIA position on the subject. Robertson had initialed his approval of this recommendation. Its recommendations for the Department of State position were similar to Mein’s recommendations in this memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/10–2257)
4. Reference is to Subandrio’s note of March 14 to Allison; see footnote 7, Document 218.