Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

275. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 11, 1957—3 p.m.

942. Deptel 681.² While as I have previously indicated I recognize reasons for reluctance in Washington to accede to Indonesian request for military equipment, I believe time has come for urgent and thorough reassessment of question. Since drafting of NIE 65–57³ last August (Deptel 530⁴) situation here has continued changes in process at that time and has developed along lines not then possible to foresee in Washington to point where I believe we are justified in considering whether we are not now offered new opportunity to take positive action toward achieving some of our objectives if we move in time. Indonesian officials have been discussing this problem with us for over a year and in spite of what must appear to them indifference on our part they still hope for action.

Following message has been discussed thoroughly with and approved by all service attachés at this post and they have participated in its drafting.

Strength of Indonesian desires obtain military supplies from U.S. evidenced by tenacity during long period of over one year as well as approaches we continue receive from responsible leaders, including President Sukarno himself last week (Embtel 877⁵). For reasons given below I strongly recommend early carrying out third step of procedure as recommended in Deptel 585 October 12 a year ago⁶—government to government discussion on availability, payment, credit terms and other matters relating to supplies and services. I think our immediate goal should be token shipment of military equipment to Indonesia this calendar year.

1. Basic fact of importance to Indonesians and one we should keep in mind is that Indonesian Government has established eligibility to purchase military equipment from U.S. in spite of possible political opposition. Lists of equipment desired have been submitted and senior officers, most recently Army Chief of Staff Nasution on October 9, continue to tell us they prefer U.S. material. This preference based on several factors including military training in U.S. of number of officers, familiarity with U.S. military procedures, standardization of supplies, belief in superiority of U.S. equipment and political judgment that U.S. motives not inimical to Indonesia. Of importance in considering future alignment Indonesian Army officers is plan to use U.S. Army and West Point text books in new national military academy; this week 920 U.S. Army field manuals presented to academy who requested them for use as basic texts in 6 different subjects. Orientation toward U.S. by new classes Indonesian Army officers would obviously have greater depth if U.S. military equipment available for future practical application of classroom training.

2. Second basic fact is Indonesian armed services are determined to obtain modern equipment. There is no question of their preference for American supplies. They have been waiting for a long time, however, and are becoming understandably impatient. As senior Naval officer commented recently, Indonesians are finding it hard to hold out for U.S. equipment when less expensive or free military supplies are available from other countries. We have begun hear of disillusionment over possibility receiving U.S. aid and reluctant decisions to start negotiations with other countries for certain types of equipment. Navy, for instance, reportedly prepared to sign contract with Yugoslavia for purchase 6 sub chasers and 1 LCM. During past year Indonesia has received offers of military aid from various sources and has actually received jeeps from USSR. Most recent official reports mention offers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, France and West Germany. Offers of arms, including jet fighter aircraft, rumored to have come also from Communist China, and we have just learned ChiCom military mission now scheduled visit Indonesia November and December.

(In this connection even if U.S. supplies Indonesia with major portion of her requirements, we should anticipate and be prepared for Indonesian acceptance of some military aid from other countries including bloc countries.)

3. General Nasution assured Army Attaché October 9 there was not one battalion commander in Indonesian Army who was Communist or Communist sympathizer; Lt. Colonel Macmour, recently relieved of duty North Sumatra (Embtel 833⁷), was last top troop commander with PKI sympathies. Nasution also claimed military-youth cooperation groups will be used by Army to counter PKI inroads amongst Army and young people throughout country, particularly Java. He said he also had other plans for removing opportunities for Communist infiltration and control in veterans, labor and farmer circles. While Nasution’s own position continues to be subject of speculation and some possibility exists he may be removed before long, though Djuanda stated in late September there was no present intention make change (Embtel 806⁸), our assessment is that as long as he is Chief of Staff he will try carry out above program and even if he is replaced all conceivable candidates for next Chief of Staff would continue in some degree Army’s anti-Communist campaign. Stability and cohesion of Army appears to have improved recently. Also possibility of central government’s using force to attempt eliminate regional disaffection appears to have diminished as result outcome of national conference and agreement of military leaders to abide by decision of seven-man commission set up to solve Army problems. In our opinion following assessment in paragraph 38 of NIE 65–67 has more validity now than at time of publication in August: “The army, despite its factionalism and internal conflicts, will probably continue to be a better potential force for providing national unification and a stable non-Communist government (than non-Communist political parties).” If U.S. approval of sale of military equipment followed on heels of seven-man commission recommendations for solving Army problems (which may come any time after Hatta’s return end of October) political effect and improvement in armed forces and civilian morale might prove decisive in continuing Army orientation toward West and particularly U.S. Psychological impact of arrival of U.S. equipment or even announcement of planned delivery during ChiCom military mission visit here would also be important.

4. Senior officers have told Naval Attaché there are no Communist officers in Indo Navy. They also say Navy would approve signing of necessary agreement with U.S. to obtain grant U.S. military aid but must abide by government decision against this. Despite pro-U.S. bias, however, Navy looking elsewhere for equipment in view desperate needs and conclusion by some Naval officers that nothing will come of requests for U.S. help. Navy now in process completing 5-year modernization plan for presentation to Parliament near future with request for funds. Items listed with price and proposed country of purchase. At present time draft plan provides no procurement from U.S. Responsible officer has told us, however, he was prepared hold up presentation of plan if we could give him even slight indication Naval material would become available from U.S. He also said short term loan of 2 or 3 years would be impossible, but loan or credit terms of 7 or 8 years would be realistic. Air Force chief has also indicated need for deferred long term loan.

5. Ministry of Defense officials, including Secretary General, recently confirmed to Naval Attaché top command’s determination prevent further Communist encroachments in armed services and suggested new military equipment from U.S. would be major factor in supporting nationalist and anti-Communist policies of present military leaders.

6. All Indo officials with whom military equipment program has been discussed have urged early delivery of at least token equipment. Secretary General of Defense Ministry said, “If you cannot give us 4,000 trucks, see that we get 50. If not 3,000 rifles, let us have 60. If you are afraid to provide a lot, let us have a little and see how it goes.” In this connection service attachés concur in recommendation we undertake as soon as possible modest shipment of equipment to each of 3 services (Embtel 792⁹). For example:

• Army: transport;
• Navy: destroyer escort and/or LST and landing craft, complete weapons TBA for one marine battalion;
• Air Force: amphibian rescue aircraft, helicopters, trainers, transports, and air navigation and communications equipment (see AIRA IR–176/191/211/216–57¹⁰).

Longer range program would depend on developments in Indo and possibly further negotiations.

7. In discussing terms of purchase of military equipment Defense Ministry officials have told us France and West Germany have offered following terms of credit for purchase of naval vessels: 10 percent when contract is signed, additional 15 percent when keel is laid, additional 30 percent on delivery and remaining 45 percent over 3 to 5-year period. We have also been told that British Ambassador here, in connection possible sale of planes for Navy from commercial firms in U.K., informed London last week he believed long-term credits for military equipment would be “safe” and extension such credit to Indo would be in best interests of U.K. (I have not discussed this matter with him since I think it best to keep our own counsel for time being. Indo military officers, of course, may have informed others of their discussion with us.)

8. In connection our own credit arrangements I urge careful study be given to possibility extension of credit up to 10 years and sale for local currency under Section 103–c of Mutual Security Act. In present financial circumstances, Indo could hardly make commitment for repayment in 3 years, but importance of solidifying U.S.-Indo association through military aid is justification for using latitude provided in MSA legislation. For instance, would Section 144 be applicable; if payment made in local currency, could rupiah be made available under Section 505 for construction barracks, mess halls, military roads, etc.? If long term credit cannot be otherwise arranged, I am now prepared to recommend consideration of use of provisions of Section 401.

9. Effects of national conference which closed September 14 cannot yet be fully assessed (Embtels 749¹¹ and 793¹²). No question, however, that conference halted, at least temporarily, process of disintegration and provided framework for improvement in administration, economic and military fields. General political solutions await action by President Sukarno and working out of relationship between him, Hatta and military leaders. Although there is no certainty, chances appear better now than 6 months ago that non-Communist political parties will join forces, initially on local level, to thwart Communist program. Djuanda told Stewart of Asia Foundation yesterday that he thought increasing cooperation among Masjumi, NU and PNI would make possible formation strong party cabinet within 3 or 4 months. National conference also served to retard Communist advance for time being. Another new development has been unprecedented request from Secretary General Ministry Information for 15,000 anti-Communist books from USIS for distribution by Ministry in Communist stronghold of Central Java. In this situation new U.S. policy of positive assistance coming at time when all elements Indo society are searching for best road ahead could provide rallying point for important non-Communist elements and thus be significant influence itself in guiding political developments in direction we wish.

10. Supplying military equipment to Indo even on modest initial basis would involve taking risks which I recognize and which are obviously under consideration in Washington. Regional disaffection, strength of Communist Party and Communist sympathizers in Java, Communist infiltration in lower ranks of Army, Sukarno’s instability, threats concerning take-over of West Irian, and economic deterioration are elements which cannot be ignored. On balance, however, I think risks of inaction are even greater. To sit back and allow recognized dangerous possibilities to prevent our accepting Indo’s invitation to work closely with them in military matters would seem to me unduly cautious and practically certain to force Indo to seek accommodation elsewhere. On other hand practical indication of our interest in helping Indo provide its own defense with modern equipment could provide stimulus leading to more important associations with us in other fields as well.¹³

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/10–1157. Secret.
2. Telegram 681 to Djakarta, September 25, instructed the Embassy not to make a commitment to Nasution when he inquired regarding the status of the Indonesian request for military aid. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/9–2557)
3. Document 257.
4. Telegram 530 summarized the conclusion of NIE 65–57, ibid. (Department of State, Central Files, 101.21–NIS/9–757)
5. Telegram 877 from Djakarta, October 4, reported that in a brief conversation with Allison the previous day, Sukarno had “expressed his deep personal interest” in obtaining U.S. military equipment. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/10–457)
6. Document 182.
7. Dated September 30, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 756F.00/9–3057)
8. Dated September 26, not printed. (Ibid., 756D.00/9–2657)
9. Telegram 792 from Djakarta, September 24, recommended a “modest beginning of a small amount of materials and service as soon as possible.” (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/9–2457)
10. Not further identified.
11. Telegram 749 from Djakarta, September 17, commented that analyses of the results of the National Conference indicated that its primary effect had been psychological. The conference had “temporarily checked deterioration of relationship between regions and Djakarta,” but the regional leaders now had “more detailed approach to reshaping of country and their own demands. This in turn could lead regional leaders to greater lengths defiance if central government is not eventually willing compromise on various questions.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/9–1757)
12. Telegram 793 from Djakarta, September 24, reported a brief conversation with Djuanda, in which he had expressed optimism concerning the results of the National Conference. (Ibid., 756D.00/9–2457)

13. Robertson raised the subject of Allison’s recommendations at the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on October 18, noting reports that an Indonesian military mission might be going to Yugoslavia and Moscow and that a Chinese mission might be going to Djakarta. Notes of the meeting record the Secretary’s response as follows:

    “The Secretary said he was fearful that the central government would use our arms to destroy the only element in the country in which we can put any hope. He had doubts that we should give them aid for this reason and also as a competitive matter with the Commies.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)