Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 5, 1957—1 p.m.

1145. During an extended discussion this morning Djuanda said Subandrio had told him of our talk yesterday (Embtel 1141²) and he expressed his personal regret at excesses during present West Irian campaign. He said that he had experienced similar and even worse excesses on part of Dutch during the pre-independence period but that this was no excuse for Indonesians acting same way. As Defense Minister he has given instructions to Army to take steps to prevent demonstrations getting out of hand but he admitted this was most difficult to assure.

According to Djuanda, question of how far Indo Government will go on West Irian matter depends to large extent on over-all problem of restoring political stability and in particular on degree of cooperation it is possible to bring about between Sukarno and Hatta. If Sukarno and Hatta can get together in an effective manner it will make for moderation, if, on other hand, no satisfactory agreement can be reached Sukarno will probably take bit in his teeth and Djuanda fears extreme action such as breaking off diplomatic relations with Dutch and nationalization their economic interests. Djuanda apparently expects nothing to come of U.N. debate and says government will then be in most serious situation.

Djuanda said that if his resignation in favor of Hatta could bring about Sukarno–Hatta cooperation he would offer it at once. However, Sukarno has made clear that at present he will not accept Hatta as Premier although he will agree to his return to the Vice Presidency. This Hatta has in the past refused to do. Djuanda believes that if he should resign now it would only mean that Sukarno would be left with no one but extreme left wingers to advise him which would be disastrous. The Prime Minister has had one long talk with Hatta since latter’s return from China and is having another tomorrow. (I am seeing Hatta morning November 7.³) He says Hatta has agreed to assume chairmanship of forthcoming reconstruction conference but that he has not yet put to him directly the question of returning to the Vice Presidency. A complication has arisen regarding the reconstruction conference, Djuanda told me most confidentially, for he has received from the National Council “advice” to effect that Sukarno and Hatta should be joint chairmen of the conference. Djuanda says he has not yet presented this “advice” to the Cabinet and is still considering just what to do about it. He expressed belief that Sukarno had personally nothing to do with this action on part of National Council as he had previously agreed to Hatta being sole chairman of the conference.

Djuanda claimed, with what I consider be great understatement, that his position “is not at all easy”. He said: “Both Sukarno and Hatta are stubborn men and both have taken extreme positions, but, of the two, I believe Sukarno is less stubborn.” Djuanda is working for a compromise which he believes is essential if Indo is not to break up and Java fall into Commie hands. He says Sukarno will not agree to abolishing the National Council, which Hatta has demanded, but he will agree to modification of its make-up to assure greater and more effective regional representation with a consequent lessening of extreme left-wing influence. Other compromises would also be necessary but Djuanda believes Sukarno would agree if he had reason to believe the more conservative elements in the country could and would bring about some of the things he is most interested in such as a favorable settlement of the West Irian problem.

While Djuanda was not pessimistic this morning he was more frank than ever before about the great difficulties still to be overcome before Indo is past the danger point. In my opinion Djuanda is a serious, dedicated man who firmly believes that the only hope of avoiding bloodshed and a break up of the country is the bringing about of a compromise which will make possible the restoration of the Sukarno–Hatta leadership. He is working for this in a patient, Indo manner with no thought of self, and if there is any way we can help him I think we should. I have suggested in my 1142⁴ one way. I am sure there are others.

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–557. Secret.
2. Document 279.
3. Telegram 1174 from Djakarta, November 7, reported that Allison’s conversation with Hatta that morning had been devoted largely to the latter’s impressions of China but had touched briefly on the subject of West Irian. It concluded: “In essence Hatta’s position is same as Subandrio’s, as reported in my telegram 1141. He made it abundantly clear that this is a national aim and not one solely sponsored by Sukarno.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–757)
4. Supra.