273. United States Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, Washington, October 4, 1957, 10:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m. and 2:15–4:15 p.m.1
[Here follow a list of participants, minutes of the Secretary’s opening remarks, and discussion concerning the Middle East, Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. The list of participants included 26 persons. The three delegations were led by Australian Foreign Minister Casey, New Zealand Foreign Minister T.L. Macdonald, and Secretary Dulles.]
Indonesia. (Top Secret)—The Secretary stated that he would like to discuss Indonesia while Mr. Allen Dulles was present, and with the concurrence of the others, asked that he comment on conditions there.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that we felt that since Sukarno’s visit to Peking and Moscow he was coming increasingly under Soviet influence. It is not that he is a communist but that he apparently believes that he can use the communists. Since the elections in 1955 Indonesians have had a troubled political life primarily because no single party has a majority in parliament. That has created difficult governmental situations. Sukarno has felt that he could not make the system work and has devised what he terms “guided democracy”, which has played into the hands of the communists. He has established a National Council which has taken some of the powers of the cabinet and of parliament. As a result some Moslem elements, especially in the outer islands, have been dissatisfied. The situation has also developed to a point where some military leaders in Sumatra are not following the direction of the central government. They do come to Djakarta from time to time for discussions, as they recently did to attend the national conference. The national conference in Djakarta had no real results. We were afraid Sukarno might pull a trick and arrest the dissident leaders while they were in Djakarta but he did not. In the meantime the situation has somewhat worsened. The position [Page 467] of Hatta also has been weakened by his signing a declaration with Sukarno. … Simbolon, Sumual and Hussein cannot tolerate a communist regime and are still in revolt. Sukarno evidently feels that he can let these revolting elements die on the vine. That is the situation as it stands today. The thinking here is that the break-up of Indonesia is not something to be sought but only to be accepted if part of Indonesia goes communist.
In reply to a question by Minister Casey as to whether decentralization should be encouraged, Mr. Allen Dulles said he thought not, but that the dissident leaders should be encouraged to maintain their position. There are still some strong points outside Java, such as Medan, under control of the central government. Also Simbolon and Hussein are finding it difficult to get arms for their forces. In the recent elections on Java, in which Sukarno abandoned the PNI, the strength of the PKI increased substantially. The communists are working closely with Sukarno.
Minister Casey asked whether the overall increase of communists in Java would not indicate that similar increases are possible in the elections in 1959, adding that the figures tend to upset the Australians.
Minister Macdonald asked whether it would be correct to say that the present situation in the outer islands has developed to some extent because of the smuggling undertaken in many cases by some of the army people, and whether Indonesia would not eventually have to come to some form of federation.
Mr. Allen Dulles replied in the affirmative, pointing out that it should be kept in mind, however, that Java is not economically viable.
Ambassador Spender asked whether Sukarno is still a key figure with the masses, and Mr. Allen Dulles replied that he has the greatest appeal to the population as a whole, although there are some indications that he is losing some of that appeal, especially among the Moslem elements. Ambassador Spender commented that the election figures suggest increasing political efficiency in the communist organization, with the chance that they will increase their position on Java. He asked if there were any internal forces which might tend to arrest this trend, and if so a) is there anything that the western world, especially the United States can do to help arrest it, and b) if not, had any thought been given to any action which might be taken, such as assisting the political organizations of the other parties. The greatest danger, he thought, was the weakness of the other parties.
Mr. Allen Dulles commented that if we consider Indonesia as a whole there is a chance to arrest the situation. If Java is considered [Page 468] alone, however, there seems to be nothing to stop Sukarno and the PKI from taking over.
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Minister Casey asked whether there is any fear that Indonesia will go communist by constitutional means. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that such is not the situation today. He said that some consideration has been given to extending some support to the outer island elements and unless something can be done for these elements they might wither on the vine as Sukarno wants them to.
Minister Casey stated that Subandrio had told an Australian officer at Kuala Lumpur that Indonesians don’t fear communism as we do and that they regard the continued existence of the Communist Party as a safeguard against Indonesia becoming smothered like Thailand. The Minister said his Government is very much disturbed as to what can be done about the situation in Indonesia apart from what can be done by the United States.
Mr. Robertson said that one factor not to be overlooked is that the animosity of the army officers toward Sukarno is not personal but political, it is in opposition to his taking communists into the government. The national conference attended by some of the dissident elements was in itself indicative that these elements want to keep the country together. Mr. Allen Dulles added that the overall army picture is not encouraging. Nasution has been playing along with Sukarno, and there is a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of the elements in the outer islands over his performance, so that his removal might come about if there is enough pressure brought to bear. The army, especially on Java, has been infiltrated by communists, a situation which might also be changed if Nasution is removed.
Ambassador Spender asked if there is any machinery presently in existence, or which might be set up, to consider what can be done to arrest this situation. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the matter has been under recent consideration by the highest levels of the United States Government.
Minister Macdonald asked the bearing on the situation of the technical assistance programs being extended bilaterally or under the Colombo Plan. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that these programs are very helpful, but their influence is very slow in being felt.
Minister Casey stated that the net effect of all this is very disturbing. The Australian Ambassador in Djakarta recently told him that if Sukarno would come out against communism it would wither away. He asked if there is any direction in which Australia can work to improve the situation.
[Page 469]The Secretary said that no conclusion had as yet been reached on whether the growth of communist influence on Java is so great that hope should be banked on the revolutionary elements. The time is fast approaching, however, when this decision will have to be made. The people in the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta feel that the situation has not reached the point where Sukarno would be unable to reverse his position. They are reluctant to see the U.S. take any step which might tend to force Sukarno over. …
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Minister Casey asked if Australia should concentrate its aid to Indonesia in the outer islands. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the U.S. is considering such a course of action since while using the assistance on Java in an effort to turn Sukarno it is also important to keep the dissident elements alive and operating.
Mr. Robertson stated that Indonesians had often expressed to him their high appreciation for all the efforts of the Australian Government in Indonesia, which in many ways they appreciate more than the efforts of the United States. Minister Macdonald suggested that a word be added concerning the work being done in Indonesia by the Australian Christian Student Movement, in which New Zealand was planning to join. Minister Casey said that this is a small movement in which the students volunteer to go to Indonesia and live under Indonesian conditions, in Indonesian homes, and receive Indonesian salaries while teaching English and doing other work. All the Australian Government gives them is the fare and a bicycle. There are not many students but they have been well received.
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[Here follows discussion concerning Malaya.]
West New Guinea. (Secret)—Minister Casey stated that this is the fourth time this subject has come before the United Nations and each time there is an increase in the membership of the Afro-Asian group. There is some talk in New York of Indonesia trying to get this subject considered as a matter of “no great importance” thereby requiring only a majority vote to pass a resolution. He did not know what type of resolution Indonesia will introduce but thought it would probably be one requesting the good offices of the United Nations. The Dutch and Australian Governments are trying to get everybody lined up but are not sure they can prevent a two-thirds vote, but they have hopes. Minister Casey was of the opinion that the Dutch are not bluffing and that if the UN adopts a resolution they will defy it, perhaps along the line the South Africans have followed. [Page 470] It should be taken into account that if Indonesia wins and a resolution is adopted there will be consequences. He fears this might consolidate Sukarno’s position. He said he understood the reasons motivating the United States position but wondered whether the U.S. might not be willing to take the risk involved in using its influence behind the scenes to influence the vote of some countries. He said that if anything is done it must be done within the next three weeks since most countries will probably be consolidating their position within that period.
Ambassador Spender said that some of the Asians who still support the Indonesian position have told him personally that they are sick of the Indonesians themselves, but that in view of the Bandung resolution they must vote with them. If a resolution is passed, he said, 1) the Dutch will refuse to accept any resolution which creates an international issue of greater significance and 2) by attrition the area will eventually be turned over by the Dutch to the Indonesians. He thought that if the Indonesians gain a vote in this session they will keep it up until as a result of attrition the area falls into their hands. Ambassador Spender felt very definitely the United States did not want New Guinea to go to the Indonesians for both legal and security reasons. He hoped there were ways by which the United States could make known that, although abstaining, it would not be unhappy to see others oppose any resolution. He asked if it might not be possible to point out to selected countries the gravity of the Indonesian situation and by inference let it be known that an increase in the area of Indonesia might be more grievous. Minister Casey reiterated the foregoing points.
Minister Macdonald said he had learned from some Indonesian cabinet ministers when he was in Indonesia some time ago that Sukarno uses the subject to stir up popular opinion.
The Secretary said that the United States feels very definitely that for the present and as far as we can see in the future it would be contrary to the security interests of the United States for West New Guinea to come under Indonesian rule, especially if the threat of communist Indonesian control was present. It would bring Indonesia closer to Australia and be a breach in the offshore island chain. Also there could be some advantage if it were realized in some quarters in Indonesia that as they move to the left any gain in support from the United States would be in doubt. The matter has been studied again very carefully this year, including the fact that if they gain a two-thirds vote it will make the problem more difficult. The Secretary said that it was not felt so far that it would be advisable to change our position. Those who are trying to keep Indonesia from going communist or to present some alternatives would lose such alternatives if we were to change our position. If it were only a matter [Page 471] of the Sukarno government it might be salutary to show them that flirting with communists involves paying a price. Our people are concerned with the reaction in the outer islands, upon which we might wish to fall back in case of communist take-over in Java. They feel if we change our position it might militate against our ability to work with those elements in the outer islands. The Secretary asked Mr. Allen Dulles to comment on this.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that although the decision is a political decision, he agrees that a change in our position would weaken our chances of working with the anti-communist elements. The elements in the outer islands feel as strongly about the matter as Sukarno and any change would impair our chances of working with the anti-communist elements on those islands.
The Secretary commented that the form of the resolution was not known. Ambassador Spender said he thought it would be very much as that presented last year. Minister Casey said it might be easier to beat a strong resolution than a mild one.
The Secretary said there was probably nothing else which we could usefully say about this at this time.
[Here follow discussion of military planning, remarks by Foreign Minister Casey, and discussion concerning Antarctica.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 920. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mein and distributed with a covering memorandum of October 18 by Robert K. German of the Executive Secretariat.↩