Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

266. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 19, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Consideration by NSC of Special Report on Indonesia²

The attached “Special Report on Indonesia” (Tab A)³ prepared by the Committee appointed in accordance with the NSC decision on August 1 will be submitted to the Council at its meeting on Monday, September 23.

Committee Report

The Committee finds that the most promising approach for the United States at this stage of developments in Indonesia lies in exploiting the political resources and economic leverage available in the outer islands and recommends that we utilize and develop these assets. Specifically the Committee’s main recommendations are:

1. In the outer islands. The U.S. should … to strengthen the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands in order through their strength to affect favorably the situation in Java and to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java; and that more forthright means be undertaken if the situation in Java continues to deteriorate.

2. Java. The United States should a) seek to promote effective action among the non-Communist elements against the Communists, b) seek to prevent the growth of the military potential of the government forces on Java while at the same time utilizing and supporting the non and anti-Communist forces in the military and paramilitary forces on Java and in the Central Government, c) induce a psychological awareness of the menace of communism on Java, d) seek to focus world opinion on the Communist menace on Java.

3. U.S. Aid Programs. The abrupt termination of economic aid and information programs in Indonesia is not desirable but they should be handled so as to give no indication that we are reconsidering our policies, and our Technical Assistance Program and our Economic Development Program should be oriented toward the outer islands.

. . . . . . .

5. Diplomatic Relations. For the time being our official diplomatic relations with Indonesia should be maintained as near as possible to what they have been in the recent past.

The Committee’s recommendations are based on the following premises: 1) That the Communists on Java have not only a relative but also an absolute majority and that the trend cannot be reversed by any action we might take; 2) that we wish to strengthen the dissident regional elements so that in their negotiations with the Central Government they will be negotiating from a position of strength and the government from one of weakness; 3) that failing successful negotiations, and should the regional elements break away, we will have laid the groundwork for strengthening the outer islands; 4) that in the event of a civil war the anti-Communist forces will have greater strength; 5) that time is running in favor of the Communists and against us.

. . . . . . .

Planning Board Recommendations

The Planning Board has considered the report, and its comments and recommendations are attached as Tab B.⁴ The Planning Board concurs in the recommendations submitted in the report and recommends their adoption by NSC, subject to a change in the wording of Par. 9. …

The Planning Board also refers to the possible consideration by the UN of the West Irian issue and comments that the ad hoc Interdepartmental Committee had concluded that the public position of the United States on this question should not be changed. The Committee’s report is silent on this point. At your request we are reviewing our policy on West Irian and will shortly place some recommendations before you for your consideration. Although the position reported to have been taken by the Interdepartmental Committee is that favored by FE, it would seem preferable to postpone any consideration of this subject by the NSC until such time as the Department’s review has been concluded.

Recent Developments in Indonesia

A national conference attended by representatives of the Central Government and of the regions, including some of the dissident leaders, and with President Sukarno and former Vice President Hatta as advisers, was held in Djakarta September 10–14. The complete results of the conference are not yet known. From reports we have received it appears that the conference had a certain measure of success and may have served to bring the dissident elements and the Central Government into closer relationship. Sukarno and Hatta signed a statement in which they undertook to cooperate in settling the problems of Indonesia, but as yet we do not know what position Hatta will occupy although he is expected to be given some responsibility in the government in the near future. The conference also agreed unanimously on the recommendations submitted to it by its subcommittees, except the military which had not concluded its work, and on a resolution which stated inter alia that with the conclusion of the conference normal relations between the Central Government and the provinces had been reestablished on the basis of the constitution and the existing law. The military committee has now agreed to leave the solution of the question of Army disunity to the Government and a special committee of seven members, and to abide by its decision. It is still too early to appraise fully the results of the conference but it is not altogether unlikely that following this meeting the Central Government and the dissident elements may be able to work out some of their differences.

In view of these recent developments in Indonesia and the inconclusive information available at this time, it would seem preferable to not reach any final decision on a course of action such as suggested in the Committee’s report until we are more definite about the decisions of the conference and on the actions which the Central Government plans to undertake to implement them. Also, in view of the statement in the resolution approved by the dissident elements present at the conference that normal relations had again been established with the Central Government, we may in fact wish to consider at a later date an entirely different course of action than that recommended. It would seem advisable, therefore, that the Council merely take note of the Committee’s report and postpone any final decision until the post-conference situation in Indonesia can be more fully appraised.

Ambassador Allison’s Comments

The Ambassador’s comments are attached at Tab C.⁵ The Ambassador questions some of the assumptions of the Committee and is of the opinion that certain possible courses of action which might be helpful have not been considered. The Ambassador is of the opinion that Sukarno is not “beyond redemption” and that it is still possible to reduce his reliance on the Communists. He also feels that we should support the Indonesian position on West Irian, as a means of winning Sukarno over, at the same time weakening the Communist position in Indonesia. The Ambassador also makes specific comments on the points made in the paper and on the various recommendations of the Committee.

Recommendation

That at the Council meeting you recommend that the Committee’s report be received but that no action be taken on it at this time.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5518 Series. Top Secret. Sent to Secretary Dulles with the memorandum Infra, copies of NSC Action No. 1758 (see footnote 3, Document 240), and NSC 5518 (Document 95) on September 23 as part of his briefing material for the NSC meeting that day.
2. Document 262.
3. The tabs are not attached to the source text.
4. The report was circulated to NSC members with a covering memorandum of September 13 from Lay. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5518 Series)
5. Presumably telegram 697, Supra.