Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, September 13, 1957—3 p.m.

697. No distribution outside Department. Department telegram 553.² I have studied carefully Department’s 553 and 530³. …

While there is much in analysis and recommendations of Ad Hoc Committee with which I agree, there is also much with which I disagree or about which I should desire more detail before making final comment. It also seems to me that Ad Hoc Committee has proceeded on certain assumptions which I believe are questionable and has failed to consider certain possibilities of action which in my opinion would be most helpful.

I find little or no evidence in either Committee report or NIE 65–57 of any real consideration of the reasons for the great Communist gains or for Sukarno’s increasing reliance on Communist support. I do not believe valid recommendations can be made for a cure without considering the causes of the disease. Apparently Washington has not considered what the effect of United States policies present and past may have had on recent Indonesian developments. While certainly much of the responsibility must be taken by the Indonesians themselves, I believe it would be helpful to consider also the mote in our eye.

While both Committee report and NIE 65–57 recognize the key position occupied by Sukarno, no attempt is apparently to be made to influence him to change his ways. He is presumably beyond redemption. I just don’t believe this is so. It will be difficult to influence him and certainly if the report of the Ad Hoc Committee is adopted in full it will probably be impossible, but given patience, imagination and a willingness at least to consider significant changes in our over-all policy toward Indonesia and toward Sukarno personally, I believe there is a chance that progress can be made toward reducing Sukarno’s reliance on the Communists and toward reducing Communist influence in the country at large.

As I read Department telegram 553 the Committee in essence recommends that we keep to our present policy ….This seems to me too negative an approach and one fraught with considerable danger.

With respect to specifics of Department telegram 553, I agree with statement that if Communist gains on Java continue unchecked it will seriously affect United States security interests. While I agree that approach (c) has the greatest promise of the three put forward, I believe there is a further and to my mind better approach which could be made. This would add to approach (c) the factor of a sufficient change in United States policy toward West Irian issue and other Indonesian desiderata to give the non-Communist forces some material to work with and some hope of being able to convince Indonesian people that they have as much to gain from friendship with United States as with USSR. These are a naive, emotional, vain people and simple logic and bare facts do not appeal. Sukarno still sways them and unless we can find some way of swaying Sukarno I fear we will have but little success. This swaying can be done I believe by a combination of exploiting, as Committee recommends, the political and economic leverage of outer islands and non-Commie forces in Java with an over-all United States policy which will make it possible for Sukarno to believe his long-range interests lie with United States rather than elsewhere. If we only follow approach (c) as outlined in Committee report, we may gain short-range success but we will sooner or later be faced with necessity of facing up to Indonesian emotions and prejudices, which are not exclusive property of Sukarno, but without Sukarno to act as the dynamic leader and unifying force recognized in para 35 NIE 65–57.

Regarding basic factors for United States planning, I agree with (a) and (b) but again point out there is no study made of causes for this situation. Agree with (c). With respect to (d) my Army Attaché’s office completely disagrees and has pointed to exactly an opposite trend. From personal knowledge I would hesitate to judge but I am convinced that my Army Attaché’s office has … good sources within Army…and has a much closer relationship of give and take with influential officers. While it certainly is not decisive I find it of some significance that war plan of Indonesian Army assumes Commie China as potential enemy and the United States as Indonesia’s ally under certain circumstances. With respect to (e) I have same comments as with regard to approach (c) above.

Concerning Committee’s recommendations I would agree with general approach plus additional factors mentioned above. I do not understand full implications recommendation (a) and should like have clarification as to just what it means. Same applies to (b). I would agree with (c) but be somewhat skeptical of results.

I agree with recommendation (a) on courses of action on Java with caveat that the establishment of a government able and willing to pursue a vigorous anti-Communist policy is most unlikely in the near term future. I remain of opinion that most we can reasonably expect is a truly independent non-Communist government. The other may come eventually and we should not stop working for it but should recognize that premature or too vigorous insistence on an anti-Communist government may prevent the establishment of a non-Communist government. We should remember that there as in other cases the perfect is often the enemy of the good. While I have some sympathy with first sentence of recommendation (b) it seems contradictory to second sentence and I should like clarification. Has consideration been given to fact that if we refuse central government’s requests for arms it may well turn elsewhere but that if we meet at least some of their requests we will be in a position through supply of spare parts and replacements to exercise some degree of influence and control? Refusal to meet any of requests may well alienate many of our good friends in Army hierarchy who devoutly hope and work for closer relations with United States and who, having been trained in America, do no want their military machine to be dependent upon non-American sources. Recommendation (c) seems both unrealistic and unwise to me. Constant stressing of dangers of Commie China or USSR soon becomes counter-productive here. Non-Commie Indonesian leaders already understand extent of Commie [influence?] on Sukarno and his share in creating tensions between central government and regions. Masses are not interested and probably would not believe anyway. Focusing of world opinion on Communist menace in Indonesia could well have opposite result from what we desire. I am most skeptical of its usefulness.

I fully agree with statement that abrupt termination of economic and information programs would do more harm than good and concur in recommendations (a) and (b). I interpret (b) to mean that while not terminating programs on Java greater emphasis in planning future programs will be on outer islands as is done by recent $15 million loan.

. . . . . . .

Allison

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/9–1357. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 553 to Djakarta, September 10, summarized the Special Report on Indonesia, Document 262, and requested Allison’s views on its analysis of the situation and recommendations. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/9–1057)
3. Telegram 530 to Djakarta, September 7, summarized the conclusions of NIE 65–57, Document 257. (Department of State, Central Files, 101.21–NIS/9–757)